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Abstract
This study connects the topic of natural resource conflicts with political elements, especially 
elections and looks into clashes between a pastoralist  (Orma)  and an agricultural  (Pokomo)  
community in Kenya. It analyses the clashes in the Tana delta which escalated in August 2012 
from a political  angle.  The main  aim of  this  study was to  see  how elections  and conflicts  
influence each other but also which role other (political) aspects played in the case of the Tana  
delta.  The Tana delta  is  a wetland area at  the Kenyan Coast  which is  mainly inhabited by 
pastoralist  Orma  and  agricultural  Pokomo  communities.  Also,  it  is  a  fall  back  area  for  
pastoralists from as far as Ethiopia, who migrate to the delta in times of drought in search for  
water and pasture. The area frequently sees conflicts which occasionally claim lives or even end 
in severe violence. The latter one was the case in 2012-2013 when almost 200 people died in 
ethnic clashes.  On 4th March 2013 Kenya held its first  elections under the new constitution 
which  was  embarked  in  2010  and  foresees  a  new  government  structure  delegating  more 
responsibilities to the regional level, the counties. This study analyses how the clashes in the 
Tana delta were influenced by these transitional elections and how institutional failure and legal 
pluralism contributed. Also, it identifies the root cause of natural resource conflicts in the Tana 
delta. Due to the fact that theories on election violence suggest that politicians instigate violence 
to unite their voters or to reduce the number of their competitors' supporters, this study also 
takes into account how the clashes influenced the elections. In this respect it examines which 
consequences  the  conflict  had  on the electorate,  how it  affected the popularity of  different  
aspirants and what effects it had on the relevance of factors for the voting decision.
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Chapter 1    Introduction
Conflicts exist in every group or society if two or more parties have incompatible or contradicting 
interests. While some conflicts can be solved prior to an escalation, others result in violence. In the 
Tana delta, a wetland area at the Kenyan Coast, different ethnic groups live together. Even if they 
have, in some respects, disparate needs and interests because of different lifestyles and cultures, 
most  of  the  time the  communities  live  together  peacefully.  However,  occasionally the  existing 
conflicts escalate and end in violence. Such an escalation occurred in August 2012. The underlying 
problems of the conflicts in the Tana delta are various, especially due to the fact that the groups 
living in the area are culturally, religiously, economically and politically divided. Conflicts in the 
Tana delta have existed since the 19th century, however, with time the patterns and players of the 
conflicts have changed. Tension usually increases if the number of cattle rises drastically due to the 
influx of foreign pastoralists who are looking for pasture and water in the delta during dry seasons. 
Furthermore, not to neglect are the interests of foreign investors and the government in the area, 
who would like to implement large scale agricultural projects. These can on the one hand offer 
desired employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, but also be a threat to those living in the 
delta  who  sustain  their  livelihoods  on  Public  Land  because  in  case  agricultural  projects  get 
implemented, they might be displaced and the basis of their livelihoods, the fertile area, might be 
alienated. Therefore, especially the pastoralists for whom the wetland is an essential grazing area 
fear  and oppose these  projects.  But  conflicts  and violence  can  also  be  connected  to  either  the 
national policies, political system or the elections. In the 1990s the services of bandits were used by 
various politicians to destroy or steal voter cards in order to minimise the number of supporters of 
their competitors, and in order to win elections, Orma politicians invited foreign pastoralists to the 
area (KHRC 2002), who later did not want to leave anymore and increased the population pressure.  
Furthermore, in 2001 a conflict escalated (in the year before general elections), which was linked to 
a Pokomo long desired land adjudication policy which was opposed by the pastoralists of which the 
majority are the Orma ethic community. Prior to the 2007 general elections, the Wardei and Orma 
pastoralists attacked each other in the northern Bura and Galole constituencies. These attacks were 
said of having been politically motivated (Interviews 2012-2013). Finally, a conflict escalated in 
2012 less  than seven months  before the 4th March elections  2013.  In several  newspapers these 
clashes were assumed to have been politically instigated and different politicians were investigated. 
On 24th September the Daily Nation newspaper for example printed a cartoon which suggested the 
clashes were linked to the general elections (see Figure 1). Whether or not this was really the case 
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and which consequences the violence had on the election outcome is object of this study.
Kenya, including the region along river 
Tana  saw violence  preceding  or  after 
every multi-party election and violence 
was in certain areas used as a political 
instrument  (even  if  it  was  not 
necessarily  triggered  by  or  directly 
connected  to  elections).  This  research 
was  intended  to  find  out,  on  the  one 
hand,  in  how far  the  4th March  2013 
elections  would  intensify  tensions  in 
the Tana delta and on the other hand, 
how the conflicts in the Tana and the 
conflicting interests would influence the elections. Therefore, the initial research question for this 
research was, 'how do the conflicts and the general and presidential elections 2013 in the Tana delta, 
Kenya influence each other?'. During the preparation for the research and the first research phase, 
which started in June 2012 (until August 2012), the clashes in the Tana delta had not yet broken out, 
which is why the research question did not initially refer to the clashes but to conflicts in general. 
However, in August 2012 the situation escalated and as a result 180 people died in attacks and 
counter attacks during a five months period from August 2012 to January 2013 (see section 5.3). 
Therefore,  the research question was later adjusted to the situation and for the second research 
phase from January to March 2013 the study was centred around the specific clashes. The final 
research question which this study is seeking to answer is, 'how did the clashes 2012/2013 in the 
Tana delta, Kenya and the general and presidential elections 2013 influence each other?'.
This research question was supplemented by the following sub-research questions: (1) Why did the 
clashes happen in the way they did? (a) What was the trigger of the conflict? (b) What were the 
reasons for the conflicts? (c) Why did the situation escalate? (d) Why did the conflicts escalate at  
that particular time? (e) What did people fight for? f) Who was in which way involved? (2) How did 
the  attacks  happen?  What  are  possible  solutions  to  the  conflicts?  (a)  Which  solutions  were 
implemented? (b) How helpful were the measures? (3) How were the clashes influenced by the 
political system? (4) What were the consequences of the clashes on the election? (a) How were 
politicians benefiting and or loosing from the conflict? (b) How did politicians use the conflict and 
peace building process for their benefit? (c) How were politicians and their supporters involved in 
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Figure 1: Cartoon (Nation 24/09/2012 p. 12)
the conflict?
Furthermore, the research was guided by objectives, which were (1) to make an attempt to fill the 
gap in the academic literature of politics in the Tana delta, including the political history of the area. 
In the existing academic literature, politics in the Tana delta were mostly neglected and only few 
references were made to the area.  This study seeks to shed more light on this  part  of Kenya’s 
political landscape, to disclose current and past political interests of the residents as well as to give 
an overview of elected politicians and election violence. (2) Furthermore, the research aimed to 
better understand the way the nature of the political system influenced the conflict. Hereby not only 
the election system, political culture and the adoption of the new constitution and devolved system 
were of interest, but also the role of the administration, institutions and governance. (3) According 
to the literature, pre-election violence can be used by aspirants to unite their electorate or to reduce 
the  number  of  opponents  (see  below).  Also,  politicians  can  take  an  advantage  of  conflicts  by 
distinguishing themselves  from others  in  engaging significantly in  the  reconciliation and peace 
making process. Therefore, the third objective was to find out, whether or not and how politicians 
were involved in the clashes and the peace building and peace making process. (4) Additionally, the 
research aimed to establish how the conflict influenced the elections and voting behaviour in the 
Tana delta. Over the years several attempts have been made to explain voting behaviour and effects 
of conflicts on voting patterns (see Adejumobi 2000; Laakso 2007; Bratton 2008). This research 
provides a case study of changing voter preferences as a result of clashes in the Tana delta. (5) In 
order to better understand the conflict and underlying problems in detail, as well as to grasp the 
political situation in the Tana area, it  is crucial to analyse the interests, and perspectives of the 
residents. Also, details which might not be reported in the media or by organisations which were 
present in the area (like Kenya Red Cross and KNCHR) can be helpful for a better understanding 
and give a more comprehensive picture. Therefore, this research was aiming to provide a better 
understanding of the rationales and perspectives of the different groups as well as details on the 
conflict. (6) Last but not least, with the help of this information the study was meant to identify 
causes, triggers and influences as well as possible solutions to the conflict. 
In chapter 2 background information on Kenya in general with a focus on the Coast, and the Tana 
delta and its people will be provided. First the political marginalisation and the emergence of the 
secessionist group the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) will be summarised. This is important 
to understand the general historical and political setting of the region. The MRC will later appear in 
the research findings due to the fact that this rebel group was accused of having been involved in 
the clashes.  Next,  the election history and political  violence in Kenya will  be discussed with a 
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special focus on presidential elections. In a third section the new constitution which was embarked 
upon  in  2010  will  be  looked  into.  Here,  the  main  interest  is  to  picture  the  key  changes  the 
constitution will bring for the governmental structure and the land question. Finally this chapter 
ends with a literature review of the Tana delta, whereby three topics will be given attention. First, 
climate and geography, followed by a summary of the marginalisation and development efforts and 
finally the three main groups (Pokomo, Orma and Wardei) living in the area will be introduced.
In chapter 3 the theoretical framework will be discussed. The theoretical framework has three main 
sections:  (1)  conflicts,  (2)  voting  and elections,  (3)  institutional  challenges.  In  the first  section 
conflicts  and clashes  are  defined and different  types  of conflicts  are  discussed;  especially with 
regard to conflicts on the African continent in the post-Cold War era. Allen calls these conflicts 
'New Wars'.  Subsequently a  set  of  different  theories  concerning elections  and ethnicity will  be 
discussed. In this part a brief look will be given at theories about political power and the interests of 
politicians in elections with theoretical insights from Luhmann and Machiavelli. The next section 
will  be  centred  on  voter  theories.  First  Down's  rational  voter  theory  will  be  summarised  and 
afterwards voting and identity will be given attention, especially voting and ethnicity including the 
neo-patrimonial theory, which is one of the most popular approaches to explain voting in Africa. 
For a better understanding of this approach theories on ethnicity will also be summarised, including 
Barth's “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries” as one of the central texts. Following that, a section on 
ethnic election violence will connect the previous sections. In a last part legal pluralism and hybrid 
political orders will be presented as a challenge for many African states due to the fact that they 
often weaken institutions. The responsibility of the state in providing security will be explained 
with the help of Hobbes' contract theory of the Leviathan. Institutional failure as well as the lack of 
political trust will be discussed as reasons for conflict escalation.
Following this theoretical journey we will turn towards the empirical findings this thesis is based on 
in  Chapter  4.  This  will  follow  a  presentation  of  the  research  design,  research  process  and 
methodology. Also, weaknesses and strengths of this research will be pointed out.
Chapter  5  deals  with  conflicts  in  the  Tana  delta.  First  a  brief  history  of  clashes  and  conflict 
mitigation will be given by summarising the literature. This will be followed by my own findings 
with regard to the conflict in 2012-2013. After presenting data on initial tensions in 2012, a timeline 
will  present  core  information  on  the  attacks.  In  the  following  sections  these  facts  will  be 
supplemented with context information which will help to get a more comprehensive picture. The 
information  provided  shows  that  the  two  warring  groups  have  different  perspectives  towards 
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interpreting the conflicts. In order to better understand the clashes and its causes it these differing 
rationales of the two communities will be dealt with. These specific group views do not necessarily 
reflect facts only, but foremost describe the perspectives of the two groups and why they believe to 
fight.  Each of  these  rationales  is  divided in  three  sections:  natural  resources  and history,  poor 
governance and institutional failure, and lastly the involvement of politicians and the relevance of 
the elections. In a final section of chapter 5 suggestions for possible solutions as provided by the 
respondents will be presented. 
Following the analysis of the clashes in 2012-2013 we will turn towards the elections which were 
held on 4th March 2013 and we will analyse how the clashes influenced the elections. First we will, 
look at  the political  and election history of,  and the relevance of conflicts  for the county.  The 
borders of constituencies in Tana River were changed several times, therefore, as well as due to the 
fact that the elections in 2013 included the election of county positions, we will look at the election 
history in  what  is  now Tana River  County.  The actual  area under  study was,  however,  Garsen 
constituency only, which will be focused on in the rest of the chapter. A part of Garsen constituency 
is  the Tana delta1,  which was the most affected area by the clashes.  After  having regarded the 
history, we will look at the nomination process, the mock elections and the election day. Following 
this, different campaign topics will be discussed. These were partly connected to solving the root 
causes of the conflict. In the following section the election results will be presented analysed and 
explained. Besides different voting patterns the consequences of the conflict on the elections will be 
a central topic.
In chapter 7 the data analysed in the previous two chapters will be discussed in the light of the 
theories presented in the theoretical framework. On the one hand it will be shown how the data on 
the clashes and the elections confirm the theories, but on the other hand we will also see what the  
case of the Tana delta can add to the existing literature.
In the final chapter,  the thesis  will  be summarised,  recommendations will  be given and further 
research perspectives will be pointed out.
1 A smaller part of the delta is, however, located in Lamu West.
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Chapter 2    Literature Review
This chapter will give a summary of the existing literature on some aspects of the political situation 
in Kenya, and the Tana delta, which are relevant to this research. In the first part some historical  
injustices  which  the  Coastal  region  has  experienced  will  be  presented  and  the  MRC  will  be 
introduced. Then, an overview of multiparty elections and violence in Kenya will be discussed, and 
finally key topics of the new Kenyan constitution and how the political system has changed will be 
highlighted. In the second part a summary of the existing literature on the Tana delta with respect to 
geographical issues and climate, historical injustices and a struggle for development, the people in 
the Tana delta as well as their culture, and lastly past conflicts and conflict mitigation in the area 
will be given.
2.1 The Historical and Political Situation in Kenya
Kenya experienced a  history of colonization partly by the Portuguese,  Germans and Arabs but 
finally, in the late 19th century, the British took control of this part of Eastern Africa. In 1884/85, at 
the Berlin Conference, the territory of today's Kenya was announced to be British protectorate and 
until  1920, when it  became the Kenya colony,  it  was called Protectorate of British East Africa 
(Willis & Gona 2012: 50). Since its political independence in 1963, three Presidents have ruled 
Kenya in a quite a powerful position and influenced the developments in the country significantly. 
From colonization until the post-independence regimes, land was an important political topic and 
instrument. The land question, which Kanyinga defines as “access to and struggles around land 
ownership”, not only connected to agricultural production and development, but also as “the centre 
of  the  social  and political  organisation  of  agrarian  social  formation”,  is  not  solved until  today 
(Kanyinga  1998:  50).  Due  to  historical  circumstances,  namely  its  different  status  during 
colonialism, the land question at the Coast is even a bit more complicated than in the rest of the 
country. As a result of coastal marginalisation, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) emerged, 
which presents the independence of the Coast as their main agenda. But not only coastal people 
experienced injustices. After the country had already experienced election violence in the 1960s, the 
resentment in combination with power struggles as well as different interests resulted, since the 
reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1992, again regularly in election-violence (Klopp 2010). In 
order to solve some of the injustices which arose over the years, the new Kenyan constitution was 
born and enacted in 2010.
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In the following sections we will have a closer look at these topics, namely (1) the marginalisation 
of the coast and the emergence of the MRC, (2) the political history of the country and (3) the 
country's new constitution.
2.1.1 The Neglect of the Coast – Historical Injustices and the Emergence of the MRC
During the 1820s the Kenyan Coast became part of the territory of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Witu2 
in the Tana delta, however, was an independent Sultanate. When the British occupied the area in the 
late 19th century, the population of the Witu Sultanate did not accept their hegemony and after a 
military  intervention  (Goldsmith  2011:  8),  the  British  East  African  Company first  became  the 
administrative authority in 1888, and in 1895, the British Foreign Office took over. The latter was 
authorized by a treaty between the Sultan and Britain (Cooper 2000: 115; Brennan 2008: 832). In 
this treaty, the two parties agreed, that a 10 mile coastline, in Swahili  mwambao, should legally 
remain part of the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the Islamic culture had to be preserved, however, the 
British colonial government would take care of the administration in exchange for a rent (Brennan 
2008: 838). As a result of the different ownership status, the coastline remained British Protectorate, 
while the rest of the country became Kenya colony in 1920. Due to this agreement, the Sultan's 
subjects were allowed to have Private Land in the 10 mile strip. The African people originally living 
in the land, were, however, denied this privilege (Kanyinga 1998: 55).
During  the  colonial  era,  in  the  early  20th century,  the  British  were  interested  in  increasing 
agricultural production in the country to get the costs of the railway construction paid back and to 
benefit from a flourishing economy  (Mnjama 1993: 3). Therefore, the large areas of fertile land 
were given as leasehold or freeholds to the so called White Settlers. The African population in 
contrast was restricted to Native Trust Land Areas, also referred to as ethnic reserves, with limited  
inter-district movement (Rutten & Owuor 2009: 308). Furthermore, at the Coast, land was allocated 
to Arabs and Swahili while the Africans, mainly the Mijikenda population, became squatters in their 
own traditional land (Kanyinga 1998: 56). Due to the fact that the White Settlers' farms were mainly 
located upcountry, in the so-called White Highlands, most investments in infrastructure were made 
in that area. The increased presence of the British administrators and White Settlers upcountry did 
not  only  improve  the  infrastructure  but,  compared  to  the  Coast,  the  communities  were  also 
advantaged  in  regard  to  land development,  communications  as  well  as  social  welfare  and had 
“embraced the Anglo-centric forces of education and agrarian commercialization” (Goldsmith 2011: 
10). Therefore, the people from the Coast had the strong feeling of having been neglected by the 
2 Witu town is located approximately 10 miles from the coast.
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Nairobi government.3 In preparation to the independence, the British colonial government, the new 
Kenyan administration of the to be first President, Jomo Kenyatta, and the Sultan entered into an 
agreement, that the coastal strip should be integrated in the new Kenya. However, Private Land 
ownership  or  freehold  titles  to  land  had  to  be  recognised  and  the  Islamic  culture  respected 
(Kanyinga 1998: 56). From the 1950s onwards, several groups had emerged which demanded for 
independence of the Kenyan Coast (called  mwambao) on the legal basis of the 1895 agreement 
(Willis & Gona 2012: 54). The Robertson Commission, which investigated whether or not the Coast 
should  be  integrated  in  the  new Kenyan state,  came to  the  conclusion  that  the  area  could  not 
generate  sufficient  revenues,  and  therefore  was  not  classified  as  a  viable  administrative  unit 
(Goldsmith 2011: 10).4 
At the time of transition to independence, two main parties evolved, the Kenya African National 
Union  (KANU)  and  the  Kenyan  African  Democratic  Union  (KADU).  KANU,  which  was  an 
alliance mainly of the two biggest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo, were in favour of a 
centralised state, a unitary form of government, and stressed the recognition of private property 
rights.  KADU, by contrast,  was  supported by several  smaller  ethnic  groups (Maasai,  Kalenjin, 
Somali,  Samburu,  Turkana,  Mijikenda  etc.)  who  feared  domination  by  the  Kikuyu  and  Luo 
communities  and  therefore  fought  for  federalism (Swahili:  majimbo)  with  regional  assemblies 
which should have mainly been responsible for land administration (Brennan 2008: 848; Kanyinga 
1998: 54). At the Coast, KADU and its majimboism was much more supported, however, in the end, 
KANU won the national elections with Jomo Kenyatta as President. The victory of KANU resulted 
in a further marginalisation of the Coast and changed the land question from an ethnic to a class  
based issue (Kanyinga 1998: 55) because Kenyatta himself and other politicians started taking large 
areas of land (Mghanga 2010: 21ff). Furthermore, to reduce population pressure in some areas and 
to  boost  development,  settlement schemes were initiated in  the 1960s and 1970s.  According to 
Goldsmith (2011: 13) yeoman farmers could acquire larger plots “of the best land” (12-20 acre), 
while peasant farmers only received eight acre plots in less fertile zones. 
According to Schade (2012: 30) the policy, however, strongly favoured “mid-size farmers among 
the  Kikuyu  elite”.  For  the  allocation  of  beach  plots  presidential  assent  was  even  necessary 
(Goldsmith 2011: 13). In the end, the coastal settlement schemes were mostly allocated to people 
from upcountry. While the local population was further displaced and the number of squatters in the 
3 The presence of the British was surely not only positive, however, in this chapter the focus is on the marginalisation  
of the Coast. 
4 According to Willis & Gona (2012: 56) the commission was, however, never open to the idea of an independent 
Coast. Instead, the commission was from the beginning determined to come to the conclusion the Coast should be 
part of an independent Kenya. This fact was, however, not publicly known.
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Coast rose, the newcomers received title deeds. According to Goldsmith (2012: 14) 38% of the 
indigenous Coast population possess title deeds, while the percentage for people who originally did 
not live in the area is, with 82%, significantly higher. Let alone the disparities in land ownership 
within the Coast Province itself, the area is also relatively disadvantaged compared to other regions 
in  Kenya.  According  to  Goldsmith  (211:  13)  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  post-independence 
governments favoured the “highland communities”. 
Besides injustices concerning the land question, the Coast has also been disadvantaged in other 
respects: Cooper (2000:11) comes to this conclusion after reviewing different household welfare 
indicators like “child nutrition, child mortality, educational participation, health facilities and access 
to safe water”. These facts make the coastal population widely feel marginalised and some of them 
have the impression, all coastal revenues generated by tourism would end up elsewhere, instead of 
benefiting the coastal population itself (Willis & Gona 2012: 49).
Out of this dissatisfaction and feeling of marginalisation, a new secessionist movement arose in 
recent years. As mentioned earlier, this call for independence of the Coast is nothing new, and the so 
called Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) is based on the same foundations and assumptions like 
the  mwambao movements  prior  to  the  Kenyan  independence.  Besides  the  stress  on  a  distinct 
colonial history and marginalisation of the area by the central government, the MRC especially 
refers to the 1963 agreement between the British Queen and the Sultan of Zanzibar (as well as the 
1985  agreement).  The  MRC  claims  the  document  from  1963  was  not  valid  because  coastal 
stakeholders had not been included in the process and since independence the Kenyan government 
did not provide development in the area like it had promised to (Goldsmith 2011: 12). Furthermore, 
the MRC interprets the document as a 50 year lease which should expire in the course of the year 
2013,  instead of  a  permanent  inclusion of the Coast  in Kenya (Willis  & Gona 2012:  66).  The 
recommendation by the Robertson Commission, on which basis the Coast was integrated in Kenya, 
is  also  newly  interpreted.  The  Commission  stated  “The  coastal  strip  should  be  integrated 
administratively with Kenya before self-government and independence takes place” (cited in Willis 
& Gona 2012: 66). According to Willis and Gona (2012: 66), Robertson referred to the Kenyan 
independence and self-government, not like interpreted by the MRC, as a temporal solution until the 
Coast is ready to be self-governed. In its manifesto, the MRC demands for independence for the 
“country Mombasa”, which is located between Lungalunga and Kismayu and it calls the “natives, 
namely; the Mijikendas, Taitas, Pokomos, Bajunis, Arabs, Hindus and other Coastal tribes” to be the 
rightful owners to whom the land should be returned (MRC 2011). In contrast to the  mwambao 
movements, the MRC is not only claiming the independence of the 10 miles strip, but of the whole 
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Coast Province. In order to show their resistance and to force the Kenyan government to withdraw 
its administration from the Coast, the MRC wanted to boycott the general and presidential elections 
2013.  Despite  the  reference  to  Mombasa  in  its  name,  the  movement  has  its  roots  in  Kwale. 
According to  Goldsmith (2012:  5) the MRC, or its  intentions is  supported by a wide range of 
supporters  in  the  whole  province,  however,  in  more  remote  areas  and the  older  section  of  the 
population, the movement is less known. Even though there was no evidence for involvement in 
violence and the MRC always ensured to be a peaceful movement, it was accused of having trained 
warriors, carried out attacks and having been involved in conflicts (Goldsmith 2012).
2.1.2 Kenyan Multiparty Elections: A History of Violence
In preparation for the Kenyan independence, two state forms were considered: a centralised system 
favoured  by the  bigger  ethnic  groups,  and  majimboism, a  federal  system which  the  minorities 
preferred; however, KADU, which was fighting for majimboism was likely to lose the independence 
elections. Therefore, William Murgor, a politician in the transitional government and supporter of 
majimboism, asked his Kalenjin tribesmen to “sharpen their spears  and wait for the sound of his 
whistle for the beginning for the war to drive non-Kalenjins out of the Rift Valley” (Ajulu 2002: 
258). This call in 1961 triggered a series of clashes in the Rift Valley to displace ethnic groups 
which were seen as foreigners but had lived in the area for years. With these clashes, a series of  
election violence started and some years later the same strategy was not only used in the Rift Valley 
but also at the Coast. 
However, KANU won the elections in 1963 and as a result Jomo Kenyatta became the first Prime 
Minister  of  Kenya.  In  December of  the  same year  an independent  Kenya was born with a,  in 
negotiation with the British developed, constitution. This constitution was, however, amended soon: 
After Kenyatta had changed the multiparty system to a  de facto one party state, by attracting his 
opponents  in  KADU to  join  KANU  for  a  power  sharing  and  making  life  for  new opponents 
difficult, the first constitutional change declared the country as a republic and centred the power of 
head of state, head of government and the first military commandant on a newly introduced position 
which substituted the Prime Minister - the President (Mutua 2008: 61). In the following years, the 
Kenyatta  government  further  alienated  the  constitution  until  the  British  influence  could  not  be 
recognised anymore:
Even though the constitution still permitted multipartyism, political elites preferred to 
take their chances under the populist Kenyatta-led KANU as the trouble-free option 
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for sharing out the spoils of independence. From 1964 to 1969, a period during which 
Kenyatta  consolidated  his  personal  power,  KANU  quickly  passed  a  raft  of 
amendments to make it easier to amend the constitution; declare a state of emergency; 
abolish the right of appeal to Privy Council, the last court of appeal for extant and 
former  British  colonies;  require  members  of  Parliament  to  seek  reelection  if  they 
defected  from the  party on which they were elected;  grant  the president  power to 
detain  individuals  without  judicial  review;  abolish  the  bicameral  Parliament; 
completely  abolish  regionalism;  and  provide  that  presidential  elections  would  be 
direct, but that the candidate had to be nominated by a political party (Mutua 2008: 
62).
Until Kenyatta's death in 1978, the country got more and more repressive and had developed into a 
police state. 
His successor, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin who had originally been one of Kenyatta's opponents but 
later  became  Vice  President,  continued  Kenyatta’s  style  and  was  even  more  radical  and 
authoritarian.  He  first  silenced  his  biggest  competitors  with  key  positions  and  exchanged  the 
Ministers, which under Kenyatta had predominantly been Kikuyu, with members of the Kalenjin 
elite (Barkan 1993: 88); his first Vice President, Mwai Kibaki, however, was a Kikuyu. With the 
introduction of the so called “Section 2(a)” any opposition to the KANU government became illegal 
and Kenya finally also turned de jure into a one-party state. Between 1982 and 1990 Human Rights 
offences, waves of arrests, torture and execution were not uncommon to deal with opponents. The 
ordinary people saw the secrecy of the ballot disappear when queue voting was introduced in the 
later 1980s (Mutua 2008: 66ff). This was another step to stay in political control. 
After the fight of civil society, the church and the media, as well as international pressure, Moi 
finally started to loosen the regime by withdrawing “Section 2(a)” and re-introducing multiparty 
elections  in  1991 (Throup 1993:  386).  Hereafter,  the Forum for  the Restoration of  Democracy 
(FORD) was founded and in the next elections in 1992 KANU was challenged by FORD-Kenya 
(led by Oginga Odinga and Paul Muite), FORD-Asili (led by Kenneth Matiba and Martin Shikuku) 
and the Democratic Party (led by Mwai Kibaki) among other parties (Barkan 1993; Mutua 2008: 
68f). However, the KANU-state controlled and manipulated elections, and a divided opposition kept 
KANU and Moi in  power.  Moi remained President:  “KANU employed its  control  of  the  state 
machinery to disorganize, persecute and manipulate elections” (Mutua 2008: 69). In the Rift Valley, 
for example, Maasai and Kalenjin were again incited to displace Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya, with the 
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argument,  according to customary law the area would belong to the former ones.  According to 
Wanyande (2006: 71), at least 300,000 people who opposed KANU could not cast their ballot as a 
result of the displacement. 
In 1997 Moi won the elections again,  and went into a post-election coalition with the National 
Democratic  Party,  led  by  Raila  Odinga,  Oginga  Odinga's  son.  The  1997  election  was  again 
accompanied by pre-election violence in the Rift Valley and this time also at the Coast (Orvis 2001: 
10). Only in 2002 when Moi decided not to contest again, a regime change was possible. Instead of 
vying himself, he nominated Uhuru Kenyatta (the son of the first President) as candidate for KANU 
(Kanyinga  2009:  336).  Raila  Odinga,  who was  also  eyeing  the  seat  contested  with  the  newly 
founded Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The DP, FORD-Kenya and several smaller parties formed 
the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) for this election. Due to the fact, that both, the LDP and the 
NAK, expected not to succeed to form the government independently,  they decided to create a 
coalition government in case their united votes would be sufficient (Ndegwa 2003: 153). This pact 
was sealed by the Memorandum of Unity and the so-called National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
finally received 62%. Henceforth, Mwai Kibaki was sworn in as the third President. However, after 
being the incumbent, Kibaki did not keep his promise to announce Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, 
and  to  give  50% of  the  Ministries  to  members  of  the  LDP,  but  betrayed  his  ally  and  instead 
appointed members of the opposition (KANU and FORD-Asili) to the cabinet (Steeves 2006: 226). 
Despite this disappointment for Odinga and his followers, in 2002 the situation remained relatively 
calm.
Within the following years a new constitution was drafted, however, the government was not united 
on the topic: Kibaki tried to mobilise support for the draft, while Odinga led the opposition and 
finally the first so called “wako draft” was rejected in a peaceful referendum in 2005 (Chege 2008: 
132). In the next elections in 2007 Kibaki (with the Party of National Unity – PNU) and Odinga 
(with the Orange Democratic Movement - ODM) contested as competitors5. This time a close two-
horse race was expected and both parties tried to manipulate the outcome. Even though, the results 
were still  controversial,  Kibaki was declared President (Branch & Cheeseman 2008: 2; Harneit-
Sievers & Peters 2008: 137; Ndungu 2008: 114f). Thereafter, violence erupted in different parts of 
the country. A hotspot was, like in previous elections, the Rift Valley, however, in big cities, and the 
Coast  violence  emerged as  well  (Kamungi  2009:  346).  The consequences  of  the  conflict  were 
tremendous: about 1,000 people died and 300,000 were displaced (Kiai 2008: 162).
5 Several other candidates were vying for the seat as well; the third popular one was Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, his 
chances were however hopeless (Kimenyi & Romero 2008: 3).
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The conflict after the 2007 elections was multi-layered. On the one hand, conflicts erupted between 
supporters of the two candidates predominantly in the Rift Valley between Kalenjin and Kikuyu, 
who's relationship was already pre-stressed by the issue of land rights (Rutten & Owuor 2009); but 
another major reason for the extend of the violence was the forceful backlashing of protesters by the 
police and rival militias like in Endebess and Kisumu (Rutten & Owuor 2009: 320). Furthermore, 
the weakness of political institutions contributed as well. The election commission which had to 
announce the results was appointed by President Kibaki himself (Whitaker & Giersch 2009: 16) 
which is why its autonomy was disputed. And finally, a general discontentedness about the political 
system and  the  use  of  clientage  relations  in  Kenyan  politics  was  most  certainly  the  basis  for 
violence in 2007/2008 (Lynch 2006: 60f). The conflict was probably fuelled by different people of 
the public including politicians and radio journalists. Due to this, a case against six people was filed 
at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, including Uhuru Kenyatta and William 
Ruto (International  Crisis  Group 2012).  The desire for a  change in  Kenyan politics and a  new 
political system, were expressed in the successful referendum for a new constitution on 4 th August 
2010.
2.1.3 The New Constitution and Political System
Since independence in 1963 the Kenyan constitution had been altered several times and over the 
years, the Kenyan political system got more and more repressive, the power was centralised in the 
President  and  institutions  were  quite  weak.  There  was  no  real  division  of  powers,  instead  the 
President was head of state, head of government, and the first military commandant (Mutua 2008: 
61);  he also had the power to  appoint  the Chief  Justice and therefore control  the judiciary,  he 
appointed the Attorney-General as well as the Head of Police Force (Hansen 2012: 6). Therefore, 
the President was very much in control of the system. In combination with the use of clientage 
relations and politicisation of ethnicity in the neopatrimonial system, certain ethnic groups were 
advantaged over the years, while especially minorities suffered from marginalisation (Ajulu 2002: 
259). With the embarkation of a new constitution in 2010, the basis for the elimination of many of 
these deficits  was laid and a new political  system was introduced.  The centralised system was 
turned  into  a  devolved  one,  decentralising  responsibilities  to  county governments  with  a  more 
secured framework than the  majimbo  constitution in the 1960s (Akech 2010: 23). Through this 
process of devolution, power is supposed to be more balanced and pressure shall be taken from the 
presidential election, which has often turned into ethnic rivalries and been diluted by an all-or-
nothing atmosphere (Kramon & Posner 2011: 98). Besides the vertical devolution, a focus was also 
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laid  on a  horizontal  division  of  powers  and especially an independent  judiciary.  The transition 
process is expected to take several years and to smoothen it, a transition government was installed, 
which is supposed to support the new structures, especially the county governments (Kenya 2012b). 
2.1.3.1 The Devolved System
In the devolved system power, responsibilities and financial means shall be more decentralised. 
Therefore, the process of devolution is meant to empower people to self-governance by managing 
their own affairs to spur development and promote democracy as well as accountability of leaders. 
The constitution further foresees equal sharing of local and national resources,  it  tries to foster 
national  unity  by  recognising  diversity,  and  protects  and  promotes  interests  and  rights  of 
marginalised communities and minorities (Ghai & Ghai 2011:119).6
The responsibilities of  the county governments are  similar  to  those which were carried out  by 
elected  local  authorities.  However,  mainly  two  other  duties  have  been  added,  which  are  the 
provision of primary health care and agricultural policy implementation, agricultural extension and 
livestock services (Boex & Kelly 2011: 2). Another key responsibility is the management of county-
level transportation (Kramon & Posner 2011: 97). Through the allocation of at least 15% of the 
national  budget  to  the  47  counties,  a  financial  foundation  for  the  operations  shall  be  given. 
Furthermore, 0.5% of the annual revenues will be used for compensation in marginalised areas. 
Therefore, underdeveloped areas and those who suffered from injustices will be supported to catch 
up. In order to get additional funds, counties can use local revenues, get loans and donations or 
direct  investments,  Private  Public  Partnerships  or  County Infrastructural  Bonds (Omari  2012 et 
al.:495).
According  to  the  constitution  elections  shall  be  held  every  five  years  (and  if  necessary 
supplemented with by-elections). Besides the President and the National Assembly which consists 
of a representative from every constituency (Member of Parliament – MP), one elected Women 
Representative  from each  county,  an  ex  office speaker  as  well  as  12  minority  representatives 
nominated by parties (Kenya 2010: Article 97), the new constitution foresees a second house of 
parliament, the senate. The senate consists of one representative from every county, the Senators, 
and is respectively the national body dealing with county matters. Senators are directly elected by 
the county population and are supposed to represent and protect county interests in national politics. 
The senate has legislative responsibilities and makes decisions about financial matters concerning 
the counties (Ghai & Ghai 2011: 100). Among the two houses of parliament, the National Assembly 
is the more important one: it is responsible for the national budget, most law-making, controlling 
6 Whether or not this will be achieved is, however, uncertain.
14
the national executive, and has to approve declarations of war, besides other responsibilities (Kenya 
2010: Article 95).
The new county government is also elected. The executive of the county government is headed by 
the Governor and his deputy, who appoints members to the Executive Committee for his support.7 
This  committee  consists  of  a  maximum of  10  members.  The  Executive  Committee  has  to  be 
approved by the  elected  legislative  body on county level:  the  County Assembly.  It  consists  of 
County  Representatives,  one  for  each  ward,  who  are  elected  by  the  population  and  possibly 
additional  appointed members  in order  to  ensure gender  balance8 and representation of youths, 
people with disabilities and in some cases minority groups. The assembly elects a chairperson, the 
speaker, who has to be external. The main responsibilities of the assembly are to approve policies, 
plans and the budget; it oversees the executive county bodies and makes county laws (Ghai & Ghai 
2011: 126ff). In urban areas the county government shall additionally be supported by municipal 
structures (Burugu 2010: 39).
In summary, every five years six positions are directly elected by the population: President, MP, 
Women  Representative,  Senator,  Governor  and  County  Representative.  These  are  further 
complemented by appointed representatives for youths,  the minority gender  group, people with 
disabilities and possibly other marginalised groups.
2.1.3.2 The New Government Structure and the Land Question
Besides the attempt to tackle the historical injustices and empowering minorities by devolution, the 
new constitution  also  addresses  the  sensitive  land question.  Like  shown above,  throughout  the 
years, people have been displaced from their traditional land, large land tracts have been grabbed 
mainly by politicians and foreigners, settlement schemes have been created and the population, who 
lost their traditional land rights got more and more dissatisfied about how land issues were handled. 
The Land Commission in Cooperation with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission are 
the main institutions which are supposed to investigate and solve the land question.
According  to  the  constitution,  land  is  now  classified  in  three  different  types:  Private  Land, 
Community Land and Public Land (Kenya 2010: Article 61(2)). While Private Land is held under 
freehold or leasehold (Kenya 2010: Article 64), Community Land is legally registered, transferred, 
declared, held, managed or used by a community, ancestral lands or land lawfully held as trust land 
7 The following fields should be covered by the Executive Committee: County Strategy, Human Resource and Staff 
Administration; Finance and Economic Planning; Security, Police and Disaster Management; Legal and Legislative 
Affairs; Education and Health; Lands, Agriculture and Livestock; Energy, Water and Environment; Investments,  
Trade and Industry; Roads, Works and Housing; and Labour, Youth and Women Empowerment (Burugu 2010: 37f).
8 The gender relation in the Assembly has to be fairly balanced with a ratio of at least 1/3:2/3.
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by  the  county  governments.  Furthermore,  it  is  stated  in  the  same  article,  that  “unregistered 
community land shall be held in trust by the county government” (Kenya 2010: Article 63). Hence, 
the county government is free to decide what happens with this unregistered Community Land. 
Public Land is land which has formerly been Government Land, land held by the state, all minerals 
and water bodies, as well as roads and other land not classified as Community or Private Land. In 
contrast  to  Community  Land,  Public  Land  is  administered  by  the  National  Land  Commission 
(Kenya 2010: Article 62). According to the Land Act, the County Assembly or National Assembly 
have to give approval if the status of a substantial area shall be converted into a different type 
(Kenya 2012a: Article 9(3)). Furthermore, it  is stated in the Land Act, that Public Land can be 
allocated by the Commission on behalf of the national or county government, however, “public land 
that is along watersheds, river and stream catchments, public water reservoirs, lakes, beaches, fish 
landing areas riparian and the territorial sea as may be prescribed” (Kenya 2012a: Article 12 (2c)) 
cannot be allocated. In case of land allocation of Public Land, the Commission is obliged to make 
sure the investment benefits the local communities. Before land is allocated, the Commission has to 
notify the respective local government bodies, the public, and other interested parties and give them 
the possibilities to comment on the plans (Kenya 2012a: Article 14).
2.2 The Tana Delta
The Tana delta is a very fertile and relatively remote wetland area it the Coast Province, surrounded 
by  its  arid  hinterland.  Nowadays  different  groups  live  in  the  delta  who  mainly  sustain  their 
livelihoods through agriculture or pastoralism. Due to the fact that several various groups have an 
interest  in  the  area  or  even  claim ownership,  and the  different  customary laws  as  well  as  the 
statutory one are conflicting, the situation in the area delta can be tense and from time to time 
conflicts arise or even escalate. 
In the following chapter I will summarise the existing literature on the Tana delta with the focus on 
(1) geographical aspects and climate, as well as the relevance of the river; (2) historical injustices 
and attempts for development; (3) the history of the people in the Tana delta and their culture.
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2.2.1 Geography and Climate – The River Tana and its Relevance
The Tana delta is located at the Kenyan Coast where the river Tana flows into the Indian Ocean. 
The, more than 1,000 km long, river flows from the foothills of Mount Kenya in Central Kenya to 
Kipini at the river mouth. It defines the environment and enormously influences the lives of people 
living along the riverine. The river is one of the most important water and electricity sources in the 
country and the wetlands in the Tana delta, which cover about 1,300 km² are according to Temper 
(2009: 4f) some of the most important ones in Africa. In October 2012 the delta was added to the 
Ramsar List9 as an Important Bird Area and because of its diverse ecosystem including “a variety of 
freshwater, floodplain, estuarine and coastal habitats with extensive and diverse mangrove systems, 
marine brackish and freshwater intertidal areas, pristine beaches and shallow marine areas” (Ramsar 
2012). The Tana delta is situated like an oasis in a semi-arid to arid environment and is used for 
agricultural production, permanent grazing land for the herds of local pastoralists and a dry-spell 
pasture area for the cattle of many so called foreign pastoralists. Furthermore, over the years several 
foreign  investors  have  shown  an  interest  in  this  fertile  area,  for  biofuel  production  or  other 
agricultural large scale projects (Schade 2012: 
48f).  Due  to  the  “low,  bimodal  erratic  and 
unreliable” rainfalls  (mean annual of between 
300mm and 500mm) (Nunow 2011: 5) in the 
district, the river is the most important source 
of  life  for  any of  the  groups  mentioned  and 
indispensable for irrigation and animal watering 
points. 
Furthermore,  the  river  is  the  eponym  of  the 
Tana River County and its three districts: Tana 
North, Tana River and Tana Delta District (see 
Figure  2). The Tana delta is mainly located in 
the latter one but due to historical reasons10 the 
area  around  Witu  belongs  to  Lamu  West. 
Additionally,  the  river  including  its  eastern 
river  bank  is  the  disputed  border  to  the 
9 “The Convention on Wetlands is an intergovernmental treaty that provides the framework for national action and 
international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. It was adopted in the 
Iranian city of Ramsar in 1971 and came into force in 1975, and it is the only global environmental treaty that deals  
with a particular ecosystem.” (Ramsar 2008).
10 Witu was once like Lamu occupied by the Arabs and belonged back then to the same Sultanate. Therefore it is part  
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Figure 2: Location of Tana Delta District (Source: adapted  
from Pickmeier & Rutten 2013, ASC Infosheet 16)
neighbouring  Ijara  District  in  the  north-eastern  Garissa  County.  According  to  the  Standard 
(15/09/2012) a three mile strip to the river bank is the current border between the two counties.
For the people of the Tana delta, the river can be a blessing and source of wealth, due to its constant 
water availability as well as the natural fertility that comes with it; but with its unpredictable and 
sometimes destructive floods and the increasing risk for diseases in the area, the river can also be a 
curse. 
Additionally, one should not forget that the river is an unpredictable fluid water source which does 
not necessarily follow the same course but it might change from time to time due to environmental 
influences or human intervention (Werner 1913). The biggest documented influences on the river 
course were the digging and later widening of the Belasoni Canal in the late 19 th century to connect 
the Tana with the Ozi river for better trade (Miller 1981: 130); the construction of several dams for 
the generation of electricity upstream from the 1960s on (Adams & Hughes 1986: 406); and El 
Niño related rains in 1997 (Hamerlynck et al. 2010). A change in the river flow pattern is potentially 
profound. Sometimes such a change might mean that a village does not have direct access to water 
anymore, and people have to walk long distances to carry water for daily consumption. In the mid 
19th century this led to the resettlement of the whole Ngao village, and in 1961 the people from 
Hewani and Vumbwe had to shift their villages in relation to floods (Lebrun 2009: 5). A new course 
of  the  river  can  also have  consequences  on farming possibilities  and strategies:  after  the  1898 
widening of the Belasoni canal, the river did not reach its old mouth anymore and ended up at the 
river mouth of Ozi river near Kipini. Therefore, villages farming in the earlier flood plains had to 
stop flood irrigation. Moreover, due to the absence of floods, the soil was no longer enriched by 
fertile river silt: farmers living alongside the old river course had to shift from rice farming to maize 
as their major crop (Werner 1913: 360). Furthermore, “due to changes of the river, most oxbow 
lakes downstream have dried up” and fishing is nowadays mainly practised at the Coast, whereas 
fresh water fish is supplied by the process of fish farming (Kenya 2009: 10) in fish ponds.
2.2.2 Historical Injustices and Development
By the late 1800s outsiders visiting the area, already realised the potential of the Tana delta. In fact, 
Miller  states,  the area was seen as  the “Nile  Valley of  East  Africa  [which]  would become the 
highway to development  of the interior” (1981:  2),  however,  after  colonialism,  the area lacked 
behind compared to many other parts of Kenya. Miller reconstructs different changes in the area 
of Lamu County until today.
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and explains how colonial policies rather disrupted the area and led to marginalisation. He argues 
that  the  colonial  administration,  in  particular  the  imperialist  struggle  in  combination  with  the 
colonial rule, destroyed “a working system of social and economic relations” (Miller 1981: 3). The 
British colonial rule dictated different laws, like hunting restrictions, initiated agricultural activities 
for export (rubber and cotton plantations) and demanded taxes from the people, however, instead of 
triggering development, like it was intended, the colonial ideas led to a process of impoverishment. 
The biggest obstacle for the development of the area and its people was, however, the colonial trade 
monopoly because it restricted the locals, especially the Pokomo for whom trade was a key source 
of income (Miller 1981:172ff). Furthermore, the distant administration of the colonial government 
failed to build infrastructure as well as health and education facilities in the area (Miller 1981: 156), 
which was the beginning of a regional marginalisation.
The first plantations in the Tana delta were established in 1904 by a British company called the East 
Africa Cotton Syndicate. The project started on an initially 80 acre area between Kau and Chara and 
was later shifted near Witu. At first the cotton production in the Tana delta was very successful, 
however, due to lack of knowledge of the area, the Syndicate eventually failed. Instead of giving up, 
the company extended their area under cultivation to 350 acres and started a section with rubber 
plantation due to the increased rubber demand on the world market. The Syndicate director in the 
Tana  saw the  need  to  build  roads,  as  well  as  a  drainage  and  irrigation  systems,  however,  his 
counterparts in London rather pushed him to further extension. Finally, the plantation project failed 
due to land speculation under a company called the East African Cotton Company (Miller 1981: 
150ff).
After independence the land tenure status of the area which is today Tana Delta District became 
split between foremost Government Land11 (70%), and the remainder, especially at the riverine, 
Trust/Community Land (20%) or is covered with water (10%). Even though the district is named 
after the river delta, only a small proportion of it is actually fertile: only 9% of the district is suitable 
for agriculture, 67% is range land and part of the district was added to the Tsavo East National Park 
(Kenya 2009: 10). For several reasons, title deeds have seldom been handed out in the Tana Delta 
District. According to Schade (2012: 49) only 4.3% of the farmers had received title deeds in 2012. 
Since  the  1970s,  land  has  been  given  to  groups  of  people  to  promote  pastoral  development,  
however, some groups of farmers also acquired so called ranches for commercial livestock keeping 
(Schade 2012: 31). Six ranches have been established in the area of the Tana Delta District (Kenya 
11 Government Land is, since the new constitution has been embarked in 2010, called Public Land.
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2009: 16).12 Besides the promotion of development for pastoralists, the idea of ranches had also 
been introduced, to solve the problem of overlapping land claims, the necessity to control livestock 
numbers and over-grazing which, according to (international) policy makers following the theory of 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968) was likely to raise to an unsustainable extent if  
responsibility for land was not given to the users. Lastly, the policy was also meant to protect land 
from “land grabbing” (Schade 2012: 31; 49).
According to Smalley (2011: 11) since independence different planners showed interest to bring 
large-scale irrigation projects to the Lower Tana, which resulted in a number of projects that have 
been introduced, mainly under the Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA) and the 
National  Irrigation  Board.  The  Lower  Tana  Village  Irrigation  Programme,  funded  by  the 
Netherlands aimed to implement an irrigation scheme in the 1980s in Oda, Ngao, Hewani, Wema 
and Mnazini (Lebrun, 2009: 9). Furthermore, the Tana Delta Irrigation Project (TDIP) was funded 
by the Japanese government, implemented by TARDA and started in 1988. It is located in Salama 
location and used for rice production. The area given to TARDA for agricultural projects in the Tana 
delta is, however, significantly bigger. Until the Tana Integrated Sugar Project (TISP) collapsed, the 
Authority was growing sugar cane for Mumias Sugar Company in an area of 16,000 ha south of the 
TDIP.  However, the three projects faced serious difficulties due to environmental challenges and 
mismanagement. Especially the El  Niño rains in 1997 were a big obstacle for the success of the 
TARDA projects and the TDIP is the only irrigation scheme, that is currently in use (Lebrun 2009: 
11f; Smalley 2011: 12f).13 Over the last five years, other companies, especially foreign investors as 
well as Qatar showed an interest in the area. Besides the TDIP the only other project, which was 
approved, at least for a test phase, is a jatropha plantation for biofuel production by the Canadian 
Company Bedford Biofuels. In case the project reaches the implementation phase, jatropha plants 
will be grown on an area of 64,000 ha on six ranches mainly in what is now rangeland (Smalley 
2011: 14), however, 160,000 ha on these ranches have been leased to the company (Pickmeier & 
Rutten 2013). Other developments that affected the lower Tana region was the construction of five 
upstream, hydropower dams from the 1960s onwards (Adams & Hughes 1986: 406).  Since the 
Masinga Dam construction in 1981 the natural flooding patterns changed and the water level of the 
river lowered. Due to the disruption of the flood patterns, floods reduced, which is an obstacle to the 
practice of flood irrigation. In case of flooding, these are often more fatal than before (Geider 1990: 
98; Maingi & Marsh 2002: 75).  Due to the fact that “all the main economic activities (recession 
12 Four out of these six are according to the District Development Plan company ranches (Kenya 2009: 16). This  
means, the ranch holders have to pay an annually fee for the usage of the territory. The status of the other two is 
unclear.
13 After the El Niño rains it was, however, due to severe damages, inoperative from late 1997 until 2009.
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agriculture, livestock keeping, fisheries and forestry) [in this delta] are practised in accordance with 
the flooding rhythms of the river, occurring twice a year, once in November and once in May in the 
natural pre-dam system” (Duvail et al. 2012: 323) the consequences of the dams on the lives of 
people living downstream was tremendous. 
Despite the construction of hydropower dams in the river Tana since the 1960s, the Tana delta, 
which is one of the most affected areas, only received power in 2006 (KNBS 2009a: 62) and some 
villages are not provided with electricity until today. This underlines the marginalisation of the area 
as compared to other parts of the country. The neglect of the Tana Delta District is also revealed by 
the insufficient road network of only 451 km, “whereby 58.3% is in bad condition rendering most  
parts of the district impassable during the rainy seasons” (Kenya 2009:11). Another indicator for the 
lacking behind in development is the restricted, weak and fluctuating mobile network coverage14. As 
a result in certain locations people have to walk several km to get mobile reception. Furthermore, 
the area is missing health facilities. The district has only one single hospital which was established 
by German missionaries and many parts of the area do not even have dispensaries15 (Kenya 2009: 
18f). Additionally, the district has a relatively low number of schools, especially beyond primary 
level.  While  there are  55 primary schools for  an estimated number of 23,50016 children in  the 
average  primary  school  age  of  6-13  years  (teacher-pupil  ratio:  1:49),  the  district  only  has  7 
secondary institutions and one Youth Polytechnic (Kenya 2009: 8; 20f).17 Last but not least, the 
security has to be guaranteed by two poorly equipped police stations and five police points, in the 
whole district, which is impossible for the few officers (KNCHR 2012: 47).
The Tana delta and its district bear a great potential for tourism, due to the diverse flora and fauna.  
However,  appropriate  facilities  to  accommodate  visitors  like  resorts  and  hotels  have  not  been 
established. Besides the Tsavo National Park, in the West of the District, which is managed from 
Voi, Tana River Primate Reserve (managed by KWS) and a private wildlife estate,  the Nairobi 
Ranch in Kipini can be future tourist attractions (Kenya 2009: 11). Furthermore, the fact that the 
delta has recently been announced to be a Ramsar Site might attract visitors as well. 
Even though the high potential of the area the underdevelopment of the Tana Delta District is highly 
visible and testifies the marginalisation and neglect of the area and its people. In the Kenya Vision 
2030 the Tana delta is mentioned as one of the areas that shall spur the development of the country 
14 In 2009 a coverage of 40% of the district was recorded (Kenya 2009: 23)
15 In 2009 a total of 2 health centres, 10 dispensaries and 8 private clinics was recorded. However, the whole district  
only had one doctor, two clinical officers and 33 nurses (Kenya 2009: 18f)
16 However, the primary school net enrolment rate is 64%, with a transition rate of 53,7% to secondary school.
17 The updated number of schools was given in an interview with the District Education Officer.
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(Kenya 2007b: 13). This, however, does not necessarily include the population of the Tana, who 
have so far not been sufficiently included in the planning of future projects (Pickmeier 2012: 84).
2.2.3 People and Culture – Current Data and a Historical Overview
About  the  population  in  the  loosely  defined  area  of  the  Tana  delta,  no  figures  or  details  are 
available, however, most of the population in Tana Delta District lives close to the river, which is 
the area of the delta, and therefore, to get an impression of the Tana delta population, the district 
figures can be consulted18. At times of the Kenyan Population and Housing Census 2009 the Tana 
Delta  District  (which  equals  Garsen  constituency)  had  with  96,664  people  a  relatively  low 
population density of 6.19 people per km² (KNBS 2009b).19 According to the same census data, the 
population  of  Tana  River  County  was  about  240,000  in  the  year  2009  (KNBS  2009c).  The 
population  in  the  Tana  delta  is  economically20,  ethnically  and  religiously  heterogeneous:  most 
residents  of  the  Tana  Delta  District  sustain  their  livelihoods  through  agriculture  (60%)  or 
pastoralism  (40%)  and  supplement  it  with  fishery  (Kenya  2009:  10);  in  terms  of  religion  the 
majority are Muslims, however a substantial group of Christians can also be found; and ethnically 
both Cushitic (mainly Orma, Wardei21,  different Somali  clans and the Waata) and Bantu groups 
(including Lower and Upper Pokomo, Munyoyaya, Ilwana also called Malakote, Giriama and other 
Mijikenda groups) are present. Traditionally, these Cushitic groups sustain their livelihoods through 
pastoralism,  except  the  Waata  who traditionally are  a  hunter  gatherer  community22 (Kassam & 
Bashuna  2004:  197),  and  the  here  listed  Bantu  groups  rather  engage  in  agriculture  or  fishing 
(Pickmeier 2012: 55). The two biggest groups in the Tana delta are clearly the Pokomo and Orma 
followed by the Wardei.23
The Tana Delta District has in the past years been one of the weakest districts when it comes to 
school performance. The results of students in the national exams for the Kenyan Certificate for 
18 And, like mentioned above, most of the Tana delta is located in Tana Delta District.
19 Only 43% (41,866) of this population were above 18 (Kenya 2009:15).
20 In pre-colonial times and also later on, the livelihoods of the different groups living in the Tana delta (especially 
Orma  and  Pokomo)  supplemented  each  other  and  besides  farming,  pastoralism  and  hunting  another  income 
generating  activity  (at  least  for  the  Pokomo)  was  trade  on  the  river  Tana  with  Arabs  especially  from  the  
neighbouring  Sultanate  in  Witu  or  the  Swahili  people  from Kau.  According  to  Miller  (1981:  12)  interactions  
between the different groups started to begin in the 1860s. 
21 Also called Wardai, Warra Daayaa, Wardeh, Warday, etc.
22 According to Kassan and Bashuna (2004) the Waata are sometimes also referred to as Dorobo which is applied to all 
hunter gatherers “regardless of their ethnic affiliation” (Kassam & Bashuna 2004: 197) and derives from the Maasai  
Il-Torobo. However, I was told in the Tana delta Waata, Dorobo and a third group called Gunya consider themselves 
as distinct groups.
23 Due to the loose definition of the Tana delta no definite percentages can be given about the proportion of the ethnic 
groups. Though, according to the Kenyan Population and Housing Census 2009 the percentages for the Tana Delta  
District are about 44% Pokomo, 44% Orma and 8% Wardei (KNBS 2009c).
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Primary Education - KCPE in the Tana Delta District have been ranked as the third last country 
wide (Nation 29/01/2013).24 The census data 2009 reveal that about 59% of the county population is 
illiterate, 34% got primary education, only 6% went to secondary school, and less than 1% got the 
possibility for any tertiary education (KNBS 2009c).
2.2.3.1 The Pokomo
For  several  centuries  the  Pokomo who sustained their  livelihoods traditionally by farming and 
fishing as well as occasional hunting of crocodiles and hippopotami (Prins 1952: 14f), were the 
biggest group in the Tana delta. In times of famine the Pokomo complemented their diet with water  
lilies and other fruits and seeds (Werner 1913: 379). 
Linguistically this group is divided in Upper and Lower Pokomo. Culturally they share, however, 
the same roots and many customs. The Lower Pokomo can mainly be found in the Tana delta, while 
most villages of Upper Pokomo are located upstream. However, starting in the 1880s some groups 
of Upper Pokomo resettled in Chara location mainly due to Somali raids, which is why in today's 
Kipini West ward some villages of Upper Pokomo can also be found. Due to different backgrounds, 
values,  experiences  and  influences  by  Islamic  teachers  or  Christian  Missionaries,  most  Upper 
Pokomo converted to Islam between the 1890s and the 1920s, while most Lower Pokomo were 
exposed to Christianity since the arrival of missionaries from Great Britain and Germany in the late  
19th century (Bunger  1973;  Brandl  1998:  22).25 These religious  patterns  were reproduced up to 
today.
For farming activities the Pokomo foremost used flood irrigation which, besides water, provided 
their farms with fertile river silt (Werner 1913: 360). Nowadays, most Pokomo “produce recession 
and tidal rice but, mainly due to the reduced peak flows (Maingi and Marsh, 2002), they have 
diversified into rain-fed maize, mango and banana cultivation, fishing and small livestock-keeping” 
(Duvail et al. 2011: 324) and some farmers make use of irrigation schemes. Pokomo use one-trunk-
canoes, which they carve out of trees from the river woods, to cross the river and for transportation 
and trade on the river (Werner 1913: 361).
According to Prins (1952) the Pokomo farmers and fishermen are said to have migrated to Kenya 
24 On a national scale the county improved from the last position to the No. 44 out of 47. However, the performance in 
the county was even weaker than in 2011.
25 In 1884 the British United Methodist Free Church mission (UMFC) established the first mission in the Tana delta,  
the Golbanti mission. The missionaries were at first interested in the Orma, however, when this group rejected them 
and did not show interest in cooperating with the missionaries, the Golbanti mission turned to the Pokomo. In 1887  
a small mission society who knew about the Witu Protectorate opened the Neukirchen mission in Ngao to “set up a 
ministry to the Pokomo on Tana River” (Miller 1981: 97). The two missions did not only bring Christianity to the  
area, but also introduced formal education and the Neukirchen Mission established the up to today only hospital in 
the area.
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from the proverbial Shungwaya which is believed to be located in the south of today's Somalia.  
According to Martin (2007: 18) the peoples of the Shungwaya started migrating to the southern 
territory of today's Kenya, when they were attacked by Galla (Oromo) groups in the 13 th and 14th 
century, Geider (1990: 86f), however, states the migration might have started in the 1450s. He also 
mentions that the Pokomo were probably not one homogeneous group but a Pokomo ethnic identity 
started to emerge after settling and living together at the river Tana. Before moving to the Tana in 
the mid 17th century, at least some of the Pokomo are said to have lived on the Islands Lamu, Menda 
and Pate (Bunger 1973: 12). Due to a shared history and linguistic similarities it is likely, that the 
Pokomo originated from the same group like the Mijikenda and Swahili (Geider 1990: 87).
At the time the Pokomo settled in the delta, most of them established their villages on the left side 
of the river banks in the fertile wetland area. Due to Somali-Orma attacks in the 19th century, which 
also affected the Pokomo, as well as the seasonal floodings of the river, the Pokomo shifted most 
their villages on advice from the missionaries to the south-west banks of the river (Bunger 1973: 63; 
Townsend 1978: 294; Miller 1981: 84). Still, they continued their farming activities mainly on the 
left river banks where they could make use of flood irrigation. In the 1920s and 1930s the Pokomo 
moved  out  of  their  bigger  villages  to  live  closer  to  their  farms  and  started  spreading  smaller 
settlements all along the river. More than 2/3 of the settlements were established on the west bank 
of the river separated from their farms by the river (Miller 1981: 159f). Until today, most Pokomo 
villages are on the west bank of the Tana river (Townsend 1978: 294).
2.2.3.2 The Orma
The Orma are originally a semi-nomadic pastoralist group, whereby life is centred around their 
cattle. The diet of the Orma is mainly based on milk and meat but supplemented with rice and other 
agricultural products (Irungu 2000: 12) which they used to receive from their Pokomo neighbours 
in exchange for milk and meat. Historically they sometimes engaged in hunting (Miller 1981) and 
nowadays  they  have  also  started  farming  and  practising  small  businesses  to  supplement  their 
livelihoods (Martin 2012: 172). According to Ensminger and Rutten (1991: 697) the Orma can be 
divided in three sub-groups (from north to south):  the Hirman, the Galole, and the Chaffa Orma. 
The Orma permanently staying in the delta are Chaffa Orma.
The Orma originated from the Galla also called Oromo who are mainly found in Ethiopia. The 
original  Oromo group which  later  were  called  Orma descended  from Lake  Abaya  in  southern 
Ethiopia  around  1530  (Lewis  1966:  27;  Martin  2007:  42).  Lewis  states,  “the  Galla  were  an 
expanding  people,  moving  north,  north-east  and  south-east”  (1966:  34)  militarily  conquering 
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territories up to the Tana River area (Ensminger & Rutten 1991: 691; Kelly 1990: 80) in the south 
where they started living in symbiosis with the farming Pokomo (Miller 1981). According to Martin 
(2007:42) the Orma arrived in the Tana area by the end of the 17th century. Back then the Orma 
stayed in the hinterlands of the Tana river were they found pasture for their cattle. Only during the 
dry spell Orma came to the delta and negotiated with Pokomo elders to get access to the river, in 
order to water their animals. Until the 1860s no Orma village was established in the delta (Miller 
1981: 97; Townsend 1978: 290). In the late 19th century the Orma suffered from fights with Somali 
and Maasai livestock keepers who were interested to expand into Orma territory. It took the Orma a  
long time to recover from these attacks because, according to Ensminger and Rutten (1991: 691), 
the  Orma and  their  herds  were  decimated  drastically.  Therefore,  they  did  not  experience  land 
pressure in the area until the 1960s, when they also progressively settled in the delta with permanent 
villages (Duvail et al. 2011: 324). During colonialism the Orma were restricted to the hinterlands 
and only during the dry spell they were permitted to travel to the water points at the river using 
specific migration corridors, so called malkas. These corridors were distinct from corridors used by 
Somali pastoralists in order to prevent conflicts (Martin 2012: 173).
Over the years, the grazing areas of the Orma have been reduced due to colonial or post-colonial 
irrigation projects, the creation of the Tsavo Park and due to the colonial policy of ethnic reserves,  
the Orma had been restricted to a territory in the hinterlands and were denied access to important 
dry season grazing areas like the delta (Kelly 1986: 98). After independence the ethnic reserves 
were dissolved and free movement permitted. Kelly (1986) noted that by the time her article was 
written the Orma and their Somali fellow pastoralists were still staying in the hinterlands, which 
constitute 90% of Tana River County. Especially during the rainy season the animals did not come 
to  the  delta  and  even  during  the  dry  spell,  herders  preferred  to  stay  with  their  cattle  in  the 
hinterlands and to utilize wells dug in the then dried river; because in the delta their animals were 
more prone to diseases. However, with the influx of foreign pastoralists and their herds who used 
the area for dry season grazing, overgrazing became a problem. The author further states that due to 
the  danger  of  overgrazing,  the  Orma used  to  have  a  grazing  cycle  between  the  river  and  the 
hinterlands (Kelly 1986: 88) like it was the case in the 19th century (Miller 1981). Kelly (1990: 89) 
reports that a growing number of Orma started a rather sedentary lifestyle and engaged in farming 
from early 1990s  onwards.  Therefore  they settled  near  the  river,  where  they “encroach on the 
traditional economic and spatial domain of the Pokomo farmers” (Kelly 1990: 89). As a result the 
topic of land ownership became even more sensitive because the Pokomo were not exactly keen on 
sharing their farmland with the Orma.
25
2.2.3.3 The Wardei
Different authors like Kassam and Bashuna (2004), Schlee (1992) and Turton (2009) suggest, that 
the Orma have earlier been called Warra Daya or Wardei. Schlee (1992: 5) further remarks, that the 
name was originally used by the Somali for the Orma and he refers to a personal conversation with 
Hillary  Kelly  in  which  she  stated  that  “among  the  Tana  Orma the  application  of  this  term is 
restricted  to  back-migrants  who  had  lived  in  a  dependent  status  among  the  Somali,  being 
descendants of captives” (Schlee 1992: 5). Therefore the Wardei and Orma originated from one 
group,  however,  the  Wardei  were  extremely  exposed  to  the  Somali  culture  and  at  least  their 
language was highly influenced by the language of their hosts (Kelly 1990: 82, Schade 2010: 46). 
By reading Ensminger and Rutten (1991: 692) one also gets the impression that the Wardei and 
Orma culture differ, because the Wardei like the Somali did not acknowledge the Orma institutions 
and customary laws which suggested that wells “were owned by the person who had first dug the 
spot and his patrilineal descendants” (Ensminger & Rutten 1991: 684). This notion is confirmed by 
Kelly’s (1990: 82) further remarks that Wardei sometimes rather follow Somali than Orma “rules” 
of  behaviour.  The Wardei  started settling in  the Tana delta  from 1972 on (Mghanga 2010:  75; 
Townsend 1978: 294) and were according to KHRC (2002) invited by the Orma and in the 1990s 
encouraged by their aspiring MP Molu Shambaro in order to support him politically. According to 
Schade (2012: 60) the Wardei are until today (at least in some areas of the delta) still regarded as 
squatters.
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Chapter 3    Theoretical Framework
Before coming to the case study of politics and conflict in the Tana delta in 2012/2013 we shall now 
have a look at different theoretical approaches which will help to understand the situation and show 
that the conflict patterns and election politics in the Tana delta are not an exception but similar 
structures were found in other areas as well. In the first part of this chapter a definition of conflict 
will be given and it will be shown how different and complex conflicts can be. One focus in this  
section will be on so called “New Wars”, which describe especially African conflict patterns after 
the Cold War era.. In the second part the focus will be on the two political actors, politicians and 
voters, and their interests and behaviour in the game of politics. Furthermore, attention will be given 
to the way ethnicity and conflict can be part of electoral politics. In the third section the focus will 
shift  to governance problems connected to conflicts.  Here,  we will  look at  the problem of two 
coexisting systems (legal and customary) and the importance of state service provision and political 
trust for the maintenance of peace and order.
3.1 The Complexity of Conflicts
Conflicts  are  due  to  the  disparities  between  conflicting  parties.  These  disputes  are  not  only 
sensitive,  but often also very complex and difficult  to  grasp.  For that  reason we will  start  this 
section by providing and discussing several aspects which are relevant for the understanding of 
conflicts in this study. By touching on various causes of conflicts and conflict types it will be shown 
that labelling a conflict, as for example political or resource based, is not always possible, due to the 
fact that the intention behind it might be unclear and unknown. To help shedding light on the topic, 
the approach of “New Wars” will be presented as an explanation of post Cold War conflicts on the 
African continent. Due to the complexity as well as the sensitivity of this topic, it is furthermore 
argued that the choice of methodology is of special importance. 
3.1.1 Defining Conflicts
Various scholars have different perspectives on conflicts and define their object of study differently. 
By looking at the academic literature, it is clear that conflicts can be characterised in various ways, 
and therefore defining the phenomenon clearly before discussing a case study is crucial. For the 
definition used in this  study, the contributions of four scholars are of relevance: Burton (1995) 
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differentiates  between conflict  and dispute by arguing disputes  were about  negotiable  interests, 
while conflicts “develop around non-negotiable issues of human needs“ (Wagner-Pacifici & Hall 
2012: 182). Furthermore, Brubaker and Laitin (1998) who make a distinction between the terms 
conflict and violence, stress that violence is a degree of conflict.  Some other scholars explicitly 
distinguish  social  conflicts  from  other  forms:  Coser  (1967:  232)  regards  social  conflict  as  a 
“struggle over values or claims of status, power, and scarce resources“; while Obershall (1978: 291) 
stresses the importance of collectives rather than individuals in social conflicts. 
In this study a definition of conflicts shall be used that combines these four aspects: (1) conflicts 
emerge, if at least two parties have different interests and are not willing to find a compromise or 
solution; (2) conflicts do not necessarily have to be violent, but violence is regarded as an escalation 
of a conflict, which will also be referred to as clashes; (3) conflicts can emerge over values, status, 
power or any form of scarce resource; (4) the conflicts can exist between individuals or collectives, 
however, in this study the focus will be on group conflicts.
The aspect that violence is an escalation of conflict already implies that there is more to it than 
fighting. So called latent conflicts and tensions can exist without being visible or necessarily being 
expressed for many years and grievance can even be transferred over generations (Richards 2005: 
13). But not only articulated or unarticulated disparities are part of conflicts, instead, conflicts have 
to be seen in context. Unlike Simmel (1964) who regarded conflict, conflict resolution and peace as 
three different phases, I argue, that peace and conflict belong together and conflict resolution or 
conflict settlement can be seen as a transition phase, which is part of both, peace and conflict.
In the debate on conflicts a normative site of the topic is also being discussed. In general, there are 
two different camps: one side including Black (2011) is of the definite opinion that conflicts are 
wrong, bad and undesirable; other scholars also see positive effects of conflicts. Coser (1956) for 
example, suggests that conflicts often lead to change and Simmel (1964) remarks, they can have 
unifying aspects. Richards (2005: 1) critiques the former camp which suggests that conflicts are 
often seen as solely bad. He argues, if war or conflict is only regarded as something negative, it is  
often seen as “a thing in itself”, which means, it is taken out of its context. To resolve conflicts, the  
context is however crucial. Therefore he suggests, peace and conflict should rather be regarded as a 
“social project among other competing social projects” (Richards 2005: 1).
3.1.2 Causes of Conflicts and Conflict Research
Conflicts are a social phenomenon which has always been existing and evolutionist  approaches 
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even suggest that  humanity cannot  be without  conflict  (Fry 2012:  879).  According to Richards 
(2005: 5) even the conflict literature dates back to ancient times. Hence, it is not surprising that the 
literature is vast and covers various aspects of causes of conflicts. In general one could say, on 
conjunctures, where different interests, connected to needs, ideologies or identities meet, cleavages 
which bear potential for conflicts arise. Therefore, the causes can reach from religious differences 
(see Atran & Ginges 2012) and disparities in culture, ethnicity (see Kaplan 1993) and values (see 
Williams  1947: 43), over unclear legal situations, desires for power and political legitimacy (see 
Orobator  1996;  Bujra  2002),  to  economic  motives  connected  to  resources,  including  natural 
resources (see Alao 2007; Frerks 2007; Le Billon 2012). 
By looking  at  natural  resource  conflicts,  again,  one  comes  across  different  conflict  types  and 
explanations: Some scholars of the post Cold War conflict era see reasons for conflict in climate  
change or environmental degradation (see Homer-Dixon 1994; de Bruijn & van Dijk 2005), while 
others are concerned about conflicts connected to resource richness, usually commodities, where the 
conflict arises as a result of an increased interest in the specific area which is labelled the “resource 
curse” (see Auty 1993; Ross 2006). Therefore, the resource curse is an economic natural resource 
conflict. One form of natural resource conflicts, that also received much attention, is farmer/herder 
conflicts, which describes problems between pastoral groups and agriculturalists for example in 
rural areas in Africa (see Clanet & Ogilvie 2009). Here, the main problem is different interests in 
the use of natural resources, especially land and water. While the pastoralists need grazing areas and 
water points for their livestock, agriculturalists try to make a living from crop farming. Hence, if 
animals stray into farms or farmers block water corridors and grazing areas, it is likely that conflicts 
or  even  clashes  arise.  Other  scholars  see  the  main  problem  of  natural  resource  conflicts  not 
necessarily in different interests but try to tackle it from the side of growing population pressure 
(Urdal 2005).
Political conflicts, by contrast, can emerge in relation to dissatisfaction with the political system, 
like in revolutions related to the struggle for democracy in the Arab Spring (cf Michael-Matsas 
2011). Other forms of conflict which are labelled political can be related to elections, either pre-
election violence, which might arise to secure positions, or post election violence, which can be an 
expression of dissatisfaction with the election process or the results (also see chapter 2.2).26 A third 
form of political conflicts is related to poor governance, institutional failure and the lack of political 
trust (see chapter 2.4).
By looking at conflicts related to the struggle over control of a territory the classification of the 
26 For an example see the case of Kenya in chapter 3.2.
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conflict is not very clear: It could be a political conflict in the sense of a struggle for power, but in 
other cases the primary interest might be in land and therefore it could be interpreted as a conflict 
over natural resources. Similarly, the struggle for political legitimacy can be rooted in the desire for 
power, but could also be related to access to and control of resources. Therefore it is less clear,  
whether the motives are political or economic. These two examples show that causes of conflicts 
can be intertwined, difficult to fully grasp and therefore hard to define. 
Defining the causes of conflict gets even more difficult, if the conflicting parties embrace different 
cleavages - for example, if the identities of groups are manifold or if the group could fight for 
several interests. This leads us to the next important characteristic of conflicts: conflicts are often 
not only based on one cause but nowadays the academic literature acknowledges multi-causality 
(Frerks 2007: 17). Different causes of or reasons for conflicts can overlap and contribute to an 
escalation. These different causes can, however, be of varying relevance. Therefore, in the analysis 
of conflicts it is crucial to differentiate between root causes, which are the underlying problems, 
other factors that contribute, and triggers of conflicts. In the case of the Tana delta the different 
warring groups are split  along various lines, and when looking at  explanations for the conflict, 
given by displaced people, we will see that the conflict cannot clearly be defined as one specific 
type.
In regard to conflict studies, a variety of methodological approaches can be found. While, for a long 
time  the  focus  has  been  on  researching  the  causes  of  conflicts  directly,  Richards  (2005:  11) 
suggests, that the ethnographic approach, which focuses on practices, actually gives more insightful 
results. This method tries to understand conflicts by observing what people do and how they do it. It 
is argued, that practices can shed light on reasons or motives. However, I argue, that a combination 
of different methods, a multi-dimensional approach, delivers more comprehensive results. Indeed, 
due  to  the fact  that  people  might  have an interest  in  hiding the  truth  or  are  even not  entirely 
informed about the conflict, practices can give insights which might not be gotten by interviews 
only.  However,  by  interviewing  people  and  analysing  other  factors  than  practices,  further 
information and insights can be gathered. 
3.1.3 'New Wars' in Africa
According to Richards (2005: 1) post World War II conflicts were in some way or the other shaped 
by the ideological differences between East and West, until the 1980s. Therefore, the question arises 
how conflicts after the fall of the Berlin Wall can be characterised. Allen (1999: 368ff) remarks, that 
30
conflicts and war on the African continent are not a new phenomenon as such, however, conflicts 
since the 1980s have drawn new attention due to their new patterns. He characterises these 'New 
Wars'  as being more intense, with more victims, especially civilians; the emergence of extreme 
violence like genocides in individual states; an increase of interpersonal violence and insecurity; the 
use of modern weapons instead of crude ones especially in conflicts in pastoralist areas and as a 
result orgies of violence including destruction of food and other resources. Additionally, civil wars 
increased and sometimes conflicts even turned into state collapse. Furthermore, he states that the 
targeted groups of these 'New Wars' are also characteristic. They often include opposition groups, 
organisations, communities in control of resources, and vulnerable groups like women, children and 
refugees.  In  genocides,  ethnic or related groups are  being attacked (Allen 1999: 369).  Another 
feature of these 'New Wars' is state initiation or sponsorship of violence and the involvement of 
military or political leaders (Allen 1999: 371). The new violence can also be related to economic 
interests like in the resource curse. This is often the case in warlordism, in which a commander 
controls a  group through personal  authority and besides  the exercise of  violence,  the area gets 
economically exploited (Allen 1999: 371f).
Furthermore, Allen classifies African conflict literature in five categories: First he dismisses 'new 
barbarism' accounts as overgeneralised and based on “ignorance and hearsay” (1999: 372). He calls 
a second type 'economics of war' which see the cause of conflict in changing economic conditions 
and the economic crises in the 1980s. Another type is “approaches rooted in the nature of African 
political  systems”  which  usually  relate  to  neopatrimonial  politics  and  stress  an “intensified 
competition for resources, and an increased use of violence as an element of competition” (1999: 
73). The so called “globalisation approaches” explain conflict with the influence of globalisation on 
national  politics.  And  last  but  not  least  he  mentions  “approaches  using  social,  cultural  and 
individual factors” (1999: 374).
Even though conflicts on the African continent are not new as such and some of the characteristics 
mentioned by Allen might have been part of other conflicts before, like the Namibian genocide of 
the Hereros by the Germans,  this  concept  still  has some analytical value.  It  shows that certain 
aspects are part of several African conflicts and puts them into perspective. Hence the case study of 
the Tana clashes 2012-13 will later be discussed in the light of this concept. The analysis of this 
study will mainly be in line with the third type which focuses on political aspects and competition 
over  resources.  Even  though  it  would  be  interesting  to  analyse  the  clashes  from  several 
perspectives, I decided to chose this one only, due to matters of coherence and constraints of time 
and thematic focus of this study. We will later see how the conflict in the Tana delta is rooted in the 
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nature of the legal and political system, even though, other factors might also have contributed and 
should not be excluded. Due to this analytical focus we will now have a closer look at theories  
which explain political behaviour.
3.2 The Game of Politics
In the political field, elections play a central role. While aspirants hope to win elections and to get  
into power,  the voters are  the central  players  in  the voting process.  In  preparation to  elections 
politicians try to win supporters and often use different strategies to convince or even manipulate 
them.  To  explain  African  politics  it  is  often  argued,  that  the  ethnic  card  is  played.  Yet  these 
observers foremost stress one aspect of political behaviour, especially that of some aspirants, but 
they often neglect other relevant factors and reduce African politics to simple ethnic power game, 
sometimes involving violence.
In the following paragraphs the behaviour of the two political players will be explained by theories 
of  power  and  political  interests,  then,  attention  will  be  given  to  concepts  of  ethnicity  and  its 
relevance in African politics, and finally it will be connected to election violence.
3.2.1 Political Power and the Logic of Politicians
In sociological and political theory power is a central analytical concept as well as an object of 
study. Different scholars suggest various approaches and theories of the concept. In this section we 
will have a look at some aspects of political power which help to understand possible rationalities of 
politicians. 
In Niklas Luhmann's system theory, power is the central factor which determines the logic (a binary 
code) of the political system. His theory suggests, that the political system solely operates according 
to a power/non-power logic and every “communication” (action or decision) is influenced by the 
struggle for power. Even though Luhmann's theory is based on a logic without individual actors, it  
can still explain the behaviour of politicians. Therefore, the primary aim of the latter ones is to stay 
or to get in power, which means in a democracy or electoral system, that everything they do is 
oriented towards attracting voters (Kieserling 2002, 96ff).
Similarly, Machiavelli (1977: 47ff) suggests the primary aim of sovereignty (or governance) was 
preservation of power. Based on an analysis of Italian politics he concludes, that the aim justifies 
the means, no matter whether other people suffer or have to be sacrificed, the ultimate aim is power. 
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Bevc  (2007:  78)  remarks,  according  to  Machiavelli  one  can  only be  sure  to  have  secured  the 
position  if  all  other  competitors  are  somehow  eliminated.  Furthermore,  in  Machiavelli's 
understanding a sovereign should delegate all unpleasant things to other people and remain with the 
pleasant  ones  (Machiavelli  1986).  This  justifies  and  explains  why violence  might  be  used  by 
politicians to secure power and why they do not want to dirty their hands but rather incite and use  
others for the unpleasant jobs. Like shown above (see section 2.2), violence has several times been 
an instrument in Kenyan multi-party politics and in the case of the Tana delta, different politicians 
have been accused of somehow having been involved (see section 5.4.3).
Both  of  these  theories  suggest  that  power  is  the  crucial  factor  in  politics.  In  fact,  it  is  what 
politicians aim for. Access to power is given by legitimacy. And this legitimacy is often achieved 
through elections. In fair elections voters decide who should get in power. Therefore, like Luhmann 
suggests, anything aspirants or incumbents do is oriented towards winning voters. In section 3.2.3 
we will see how ethnicity is often exploited in order to secure power. 
3.2.2 Voters – Aiming for Benefits
While during a legislature the main power in decision-making is given to politicians, voters are the 
central  actors  in  the  act  of  elections.  The  decisions  of  voters  are  usually  directed  towards 
maximising their benefits. Hereby, the aims and benefits of voters can be related to three different 
aspects on which voting decisions can be based: interests, ideologies and identities (Grignon et al. 
2001: 10). Ideologies or opinions are often connected to interests or identities, therefore the focus in 
this  section will  be on theories  of  the  latter  two.  In short,  opinion voting  is  the expression of 
convictions. This means, the choice of vote is influenced by attitudes and ideologies like liberalism, 
green mindset or social-democratic attitudes, etc. but can also be based on religious convictions. 
Even if  there is a differentiation of voting patterns in the theoretical discussion, it is,  however,  
important to keep in mind that voting decisions are usually based on a combination of the three 
aspects which are in practice not so easily separable.
Several scholars have dealt with the topic of voting behaviour and therefore various theories exist to 
explain  political  action.  Generally  spoken,  two  different  fundamental  approaches  can  be 
distinguished:  (1) rational voting,  which is  often associated with interest  voting and sometimes 
ideology voting and will here be explain by Anthony Downs' theory of political action, and (2) 
theories which link identity and voting.
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3.2.2.1 The Rational Voter
Explanations of voting behaviour focusing on interest or exchange voting, suggest that there is a 
transaction between voter and candidate. This means, voters usually vote for a certain politician, 
because  he  promises  to  implement  their  interests.  It  is  an  exchange  between  the  vote  for  the 
politician and benefits for the voter. These benefits could be anything of the voter’s interest like the 
implementation of  certain  policies,  legal  regulations,  construction of  infrastructure  or  access  to 
resources or jobs etc.
Downs' (1957) theory of political action emanates from a rational voter who is a reflected actor and 
has thought through his decision. He assumes voters mainly regard and consider the past legislation 
for their choice and outweigh from which party they would have had the biggest benefit. Hence, in 
the  next  election  voters  take  decisions  that  maximise  their  benefits.  Manifestos  are  of  minor 
importance in Downs' theory (Downs 1957: 138). He also recognises voting according to a party's 
ideology as being rational. Due to the fact that it is very time consuming to follow all political 
decisions that are taken considering only the ideology of a party can reduce these costs (Downs 
1957:  141f).  Furthermore,  Downs  stresses,  the  voter  knows  best  what  brings  him  the  biggest 
benefit. Therefore, the voter does not get irritated as long as he stays rational (Downs 1957: 139). 
However,  Downs  acknowledges  that  voters  are  often  exposed  to  irritations.  In  a  moment  of 
weakness or inattentiveness, the voter can be irritated and dissuaded from his original preference by, 
for example, salesmanship or one sided reports. This brings about that political actors or elites, who 
are able to influence others, have bigger political power and get legitimised although they might not 
have  gotten  so  many votes,  if  all  voters  stayed rational.  Thus,  not  every decision  and vote  is 
maximising the voters benefit (Downs 1957: 140).
In many African countries party politics is of minor importance, but the individual politician might 
be the orientation point. Still, the rationality can be the same, only that the decision of a rational 
voter would in this case be based on the performance of the politician instead of the political party.
3.2.2.2 Voting and identity
Opposed to the rational voter theory are approaches which see identity as the central determinant 
for voting decisions. Various sociological and psychological approaches, supported by empirical 
literature of political sciences, see group identity as a driving factor in political voting behaviour.  
“Virtually all of the seminal empirical work on voting emphasizes the importance of one type of 
social identity or another for explaining why citizens cast the ballots that they do“ (Dickson & 
Scheve 2006: 6). According to Dickson and Scheve the following categories are relevant group 
34
identities which influence voting behaviour:  social  class,  religion,  ethnicity,  language and party 
membership. However, other group identities should not be excluded. Some empirical studies stress 
the importance of one identity; others acknowledge that voting behaviour is influenced by different 
identities at the same time (Dickson & Scheve 2005: 7). The reason for similar voting behaviour in 
similar  groups  can  be  interpreted  in  two  different  ways:  Some  scholars  like  Bates  (1974)  or 
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) are of the opinion that members of one or several groups of the 
categories mentioned above simply have similar political interests. Others like Horowitz (1985) for 
example assume that the correlation between social group and similar voting behaviour is being 
strengthened by psychological affiliation with the group (Dickson & Scheve 2005: 8).
In relation to African voters, Grignon et al (2001: 10) stress that African identities often get reduced 
to ethnic belonging, even though this is insufficient. Grignon et al. explain: “in Kenya the socio-
economic differentiation relevant for its politics is, to a great extent, regional in character – a result 
of colonial and post-colonial government policies together with discrepancies in access to power 
and wealth due to age, lineage or gender” (2001: 11). Therefore, they conclude that ethnicity is “one 
of the languages used to express other socio-economic or political aspirations” (Grignon et al. 2001: 
11).
3.2.3 Playing the Ethnic Card - Politicisation of Ethnicity
In many African countries ethnicity seems to be of significant importance in present day politics or 
in historical happenings and like mentioned, ethnicity is often used to explain voting behaviour on 
the aforementioned continent. Some examples for the relevance of ethnicity in politics from the 
eastern part of the continent are the genocides and guerrilla wars in Rwanda and Burundi (see van 
Hoyweghen  &  Vlassenroot  2000;  Mamdani  2001),  the  political  structures  of  Somaliland  and 
Puntland which are based on clan structures as well as traditional leadership (Walls & Kibble 2010; 
Kaplan  2008),  the  political  culture  of  Ethiopia  in  which  ethnicity  rights  seem to  be  the  most 
important  ones  (Abbink  2000)  and  it  has  often  been  argued,  that  ethnicity  is  of  significant 
importance in Kenyan politics (see Lonsdale 1993). Hence, many scholars apply the theory of neo-
patrimonialism to Kenyan politics and argue that ethnic relations are used for political interests. 
To understand the concept of neo-patrimonialism, it is good to first have a look at the concept of 
ethnicity. In theories dealing with ethnicity there is basically a distinction between two different 
camps, the primordial theories, which regard ethnicity as a given and fix category (see for example 
Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975; van den Berghe 1981) and the constructivist ones which argue ethnicity 
is a constructed identity which is flexible and only exists in relation to other groups (Lentz 1995: 
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118). The latter  one is nowadays widely accepted and supported by scholars like Barth (1969), 
Hobsbawn (1983)  or  Comaroff  and Comaroff  (2009).  Barth's  introduction  to  the  book “Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries” (1969) is one of the founding texts of this school of thought. He mainly 
stresses, that the boundaries of ethnic groups are defined by outsiders and other groups rather than 
an intrinsic culture which should better be seen as an implication or result of the group (Barth 1968: 
11f). These boundaries are not territorial but of social nature, and the group is identified as a distinct 
unit through its culture. In short, the culture does not define the group, but the culture is defined by 
the boundaries and the group is identified through its culture. Besides the external group definition, 
an  intrinsic  group  feeling  also  arises  due  to  the  use  of  practises  and  a  group-specific 
communication. He further suggests, ethnic categories would be created to simplify interactions and 
to develop organisational units (Barth 1969: 13f). While Barth tries to explain what an ethnic group 
is, Hobsbawm stresses that ethnicity and traditions are constructed or “invented” and often rather 
recent than they appear. Furthermore, he gives examples of the pre-colonial flexibility of ethnicity. 
Comaroff and Comaroff further argue that
ethnicity is neither a monolitic “thing” nor, in and of itself, an analytic construct: that 
"it" is best understood as a loose, labile repertoire of signs by means of which relations 
are constructed and communicated; through which a collective consciousness of cultural 
likeness  is  rendered  sensible;  with  reference  to  which  shared  sentiment  is  made 
substantial. (2009: 38)
Lastly, it is worth mentioning, that Calhoun (1993) for example regards ethnicity as an equivalent 
to nationalism. He stresses: “both are part of a modern set of categorical identities invoked by elites 
and other participants in political and social struggles” (Calhoun 1993: 211). 
This brings us to the politicisation of ethnicity and the neo-patrimonial theory. With the increasing 
independence of African states in the 1960s, more and more charismatic leaders like Nkrumah or 
Nyerere were elected as Presidents and in the academic literature African leader were explained by 
the Weberian ideal type of charismatic leadership (Weber 2002: 140; first published in 1921). After 
this  concept  had,  however,  not  proven  fruitful,  the  debate  turned  towards  Weber's  ideal  of 
traditional legitimisation, in particular the concept of patrimonialism (Erdmann & Engel 2007: 97; 
Weber 2002: 133). Patrimonialism stresses the importance of personal relations in politics which is 
used to explain political coherence in Africa (Erdmann & Engel 2007: 97). It is argued that kinship 
relations, which traditionally structured pre-colonial African societies, are of particular importance 
in  African  politics.  Weber's  concept  of  patrimonialism was  then  merged  with  clientelism  and 
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patronage  to  the  model  of  neo-patrimonialism.  Neo-patrimonialism  therefore  combines  the 
significance of personal relations in African politics with the interdependence between politicians 
and  voters  through  clientage  relations  (Erdmann  &  Engel  2007:  105).  With  the  inclusion  of 
clientelism, the neo-patrimonial concept becomes a dyadic construct: “it lends itself very easily to 
the formation of chains of dyads, in which the same individual is simultaneously a client in relation 
to those above him in the hierarchy and a patron in relation to those below” (Clapham 1982: 6). In a 
state the President is usually located on top of this pyramid and voters on the bottom. Due to the  
dyadic structure, every part depends on others to stay in one's held position. In order to guarantee 
support of clients, patrons use their social, economic, political and symbolic capital (Grignon et al. 
2001: 7) to maintain good and personal relation as well as to create dependency and commitment.  
According  to  the  neo-patrimonial  concept,  the  voter  receives  beneficiaries  from a  patron  and 
therefore votes for the latter one. These beneficiaries can be any support like financial, material or 
infrastructural measures, but also job offers etc. 
Grignon et al. (2001: 7f) critique the neo-patrimonial approach in several respects:
The analysis  and interpretation of electoral  processes and election results  presented 
above proceeds from the same [neo-Weberian] school of thought and suffers from a 
number  of  serious  drawbacks.  First,  the  focus  is  often  exclusively  centred  on  the 
politics of the elite, even local elite, considering the common man's understanding of it 
all  as  irrelevant.  Second,  it  assumes  that  because  there  is  no  exclusive  class-
consciousness in Africa there is no conflict between socio-economic dimensions. Then 
it perpetuates a reification of ethnicity to explain the nature and dynamics of African 
politics. It argues that this 'vertical' link refrains any 'horizontal' social stratification. It 
leaves aside the fact that identities are never exclusive and that ethnicity might well be 
the  principal  idiom  of  expression  of  contemporary  socio-economic  conflicts  and 
political ideologies. But more dangerously, the neo-Weberian methodology is always 
riddled  with  ethnocentrism,  and  often  opens  the  backdoor  for  the  return  of 
developmentalists' assumptions. 
While  for  explaining  the  position,  strategies  and  attitudes  of  elites,  this  concept  might  be 
meaningful, the applicability of the neo-patrimonial approach is not that obvious when it comes to 
attitudes of voters. It uses ethnicity as a binding and absolute form of identity and does not leave 
room for multiple group identities and the flexibility of ethnicity. Furthermore, it does not explain 
how voters decide if they have several patrons.
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John Lonsdale (1993) offers another quite similar explanation of the role of ethnicity in African 
politics  and  the  politicisation  of  culture,  however,  he  makes  the  distinction  between  “moral 
ethnicity” and “political tribalism”. Political tribalism refers to the use of ethnicity in politics, in 
order to gain group-access to resources (Lonsdale 1993: 131), while moral ethnicity is described by 
Orvis (2001: 10) as “the contested notion of what it means to be a good member of the community”. 
Lonsdale's approach gives room to regard the two separately (Lonsdale 1993: 140) which makes it a 
valuable instrument. However, political tribalism should not be reduced to being an instrument of 
getting  group-access  to  resources,  but  it  is  also  possible  that  rather  egoistic  politicians  might 
sometimes  use  the  support  of  their  ethnic  group  in  order  to  enrich  themselves  by  politicising 
ethnicity.
In this  section we have explored the concept of ethnicity and seen how it  can be relevant and 
exploited in the political context. In the following part we will now have a look at how election 
violence and ethnicity can be connected.
3.2.4 Ethnicity, Violence and Elections
Even though it is suggested that democratisation decreases the risk of interstate wars, the transition 
to democracy is likely to be accompanied by internal conflicts or civil wars (Cederman et al. 2013: 
388).  These  conflicts  apparently  often  correlate  with  ethnic  diversity  and  divisions,  however, 
election  violence  should  not  be  limited  to  the  ethnic  dimension.  Still,  due  to  the  relevance  of 
ethnicity we will now have a closer look at ethnic election violence. In general, a basic distinction 
can be made between pre- and post-election violence. Besides the temporal difference between the 
two, the motives and causes of the clashes are also of different nature: 
According to Cederman et al.  (2013: 389f) there are two main mechanisms to use pre-election 
violence as a political instrument in the struggle for success: (1) ethnic cleansing, or displacement in 
which the demos is made to coincide with an ethnos (see for example Mann 2005), or (2) instigation 
of  violence  by  “playing  the  ethnic  card”.  This  can  especially  be  the  case  if  ethnic  identities 
dominate other cleavages or if contestants try to politicise ethnicity and stress the differences to 
other groups (Mansfield & Snyder 1995: 88f). These mobilisation efforts and the appellation on 
moral ethnicity can be directed towards people who would normally not vote, or others who tend to 
support a different contestant. In what can be called hate speeches, aspirants verbally attack other 
contenders  or  other  groups  and  raise  tensions,  which  might  incite  supporters  to  actually  get 
physically active and to fight other groups in the fear of losing. Therefore, pre-election violence can 
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have two aims: unifying the group or reducing the number of opponents.
Post-election violence in contrast is mostly related to dissatisfaction towards the election outcome 
and can therefore be interpreted as protest behaviour (Anderson & Mendes 2005: 91). This might 
especially be the case if there were (perceived) irregularities, or if one or several contenders are not 
willing to accept the results. These “sore losers” might incite violence after elections. Not always 
but often it is the easiest way for the politician to turn towards their own ethnic group in case they 
want to instigate violence (Cederman et al. 2013: 391). Similarly like in the struggle for votes, the 
aspirant might try to create a “we” versus “them” atmosphere and to appeal to moral ethnicity. 
According to Anderson and Mendes (2005: 91) minorities and marginalised groups are more prone 
to post-election violence. This can be explained by the fear of being dominated by bigger ethnic 
groups; especially if ethnicity was used as a political instrument and ethnic groups seem to vote as a 
block. Mutahi Ngunyi (2008: 7) calls this ethnic outbidding and block voting in Kenya the “tyranny 
of numbers”.
Due to the fact that young democracies or states in a transition phase are prone to election violence,  
some scholars like Mansfield and Snyder (2007) suggest that “elections should be postponed until 
countries  have  reached  a  sufficient  threshold  of  internal  stability  and capacity  for  democracy” 
(Cederman et  al.  2013:  391).  Others  however  argue  that  elections  can  actually  stabilise  ethnic 
politics (Birnir 2007: 112).
3.3 Special Challenges of Governance - Hybrid Political Orders and Legal Pluralism
In the previous section we have seen that ethnicity can be exploited in election politics. This is, 
however,  not the only way in which ethnicity might be relevant in a political  context.  In most 
African  states  (with  the  exception  of  Lesoto  and  Swaziland)  the  coexistence  of  two  political 
dimensions,  the  legal  statutory system and a  second sphere  of  “traditional”  structures,  is  quite 
significant.  These  “traditional”  polities  are  usually  multiple  and  consist  of  separate  or  distinct 
political institutions, which often govern the internal affairs of a single ethnic group. Sklar calls the 
phenomenon of two coexisting political spheres “mixed governments” (2005: 16). These mixed 
governments are a result of the colonial era, in which statutory law was introduced. Before the 
European colonisation, African societies were either, kingdoms, chiefdoms, empires or stateless, 
and  had  their  own forms  of  government  (Ayittey  1991;  Quashigah  1999).  With  the  arrival  of 
colonial powers and especially the “legalisation” of it and the introduction of fix borders on the 
Berlin conference, a new system was forced upon these societies which claimed to be more valid 
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than the customary one. The colonial powers established their administrations and introduced new 
laws which were superior to the customary one. In order to get more support from the population 
the colonial powers reigned with what Mamdani (1996: 52ff) calls “Decentralised Despotims”, in 
which the British introduced appointed “local leaders” and the French made use of existing political 
structures in indirect rule. These leaders were entitled to enforce colonial law, collect taxes, and 
functioned as informants. In return, the “invented traditional leaders” enjoyed privileges, special 
attention by the administration and a powerful position (Mamdani: 1996: 56). However, they were 
often  not  quite  supported by their  people.  When the African  countries  finally got  independent, 
constitutions defined the legal situation. However, these, often rather recent, “traditional” structures 
and the real traditional leaders were still existent. Hence, in some constitutions, like in Botswana, 
Namibia  and South  Africa  traditional  leaders  are  legally  recognised  (Düsing 2002)  as  political 
actors, while other constitutions entirely ignored their existence. Since the 1990s, some of these 
traditional  structures  experience  resurgence  and  are  gaining  importance  in  current  politics 
(Engelbert 2005: 33). In this respect the following two aspects present special challenges to African 
politics:
Firstly, there are two forms of leadership, one supported by law, often called “modern” and one 
rooted in the society which is often labelled as “traditional”. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1996: 
26) argues, that these two leaderships are until today dependent on each other. While the “modern” 
one  needs  the  “traditional”  for  policy implementation,  the  latter  one  needs  the  former  for  the 
recognition of its legitimacy. Furthermore, the “modern” one has legal power, and the “traditional” 
leaders have authority even though the two aspects cannot be entirely separated. This does not mean 
that  the  national  constitutional  leaders  do  not  enjoy  the  support  of  the  population  at  all,  but 
especially if political tribalism comes in, the legal government might lack support. In these mostly 
patriarchal  societies  authority  was  often  given  due  to  age,  gender  and descent  (Ayittey 1991). 
Therefore, there is a risk, that elected leaders, even if they are well-educated, might not be accepted, 
especially by traditionalists. While the legal government is sometimes not supported and accepted 
by the people, the traditional leaders are often formally ignored and do not have a position in the 
government. Therefore, “traditional” practices of governance are undermined by statutory ones and 
like we will  see in  the case of  the  Tana delta,  for  example  traditional  mechanisms of  conflict 
settlement are not being used sufficiently, even though they were said to be quite successful.
Secondly,  many of today's  African countries  have to  deal  with legal  dualism or  pluralism as  a 
heritage  of  the  colonial  era.  While  there  is  one  standardised  statutory  law  documented  in  a 
constitution, many groups have their individual customary laws through which their communities 
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are  organised.  The  customary  laws  of  different  groups  are  (or  were  until  colonialism)  often 
undocumented (Merry 1991: 897) and can be conflicting, however, there was usually a traditional 
way to deal with the collision of different groups. Due to the nature of statutory law, which either 
does not recognise customary rules or is  superior to it,  many African societies face challenges. 
Problems especially arise, when it comes to land rights (Peters 2002: 45ff): Through the occupation 
of colonial powers, land ownership was often newly regulated and people lost their ancestral lands. 
Later, different policies, for example such related to the Worldbank's Rights Based Approach, which 
were  meant  to  spur  development  or  to  solve  problems,  even  complicated  the  situation  and 
customary regulations, which were often very flexible land rights were not totally neglected. Also, 
in terms of conflict resolution the two forms of law mostly differ. Customary law usually suggested 
compensation  and focused on reconciliation  and  social  re-integration  of  the  offender  (Zartman 
2000: 222), while statutory law often foresees punishment. This even has consequences on rulings 
in state law courts, which are sometimes not accepted. 
The disparities in these two legal and political spheres can therefore contribute to conflicts, or even 
be the root cause. Boege et al. (2008: 2ff) explain how these hybrid political orders weaken the state 
and contribute to state failure. However, the authors also stress that the traditional structures bear 
potential for solutions. In the next section we will have a closer look at institutional failure and why 
it might lead to conflicts. Later in this study we will see how the hybrid political order contributed 
to the clashes in the Tana delta.
3.4 Security as a Responsibility of the State, Political Trust and Conflicts
As  already  mentioned,  conflicts  are  not  only  considered  to  be  political  if  they  are  related  to 
elections, but also if they are rooted in institutional failure or poor governance.  By looking at the 
political theory and explanations for the emergence of the state, Hobbes is definitely one of the 
classics and “must-reads” and his elaborations can give insight in why institutional failure might 
lead to violent conflicts. In his book “Leviathan” he explains, why there is a need for the presence 
of the institution of the state. To understand Hobbes interpretation of the emergence of the state, we 
first have to look at his description of the human being: In his understanding every individual is 
equal, even if some are more clever or stronger than others, the weakest can still  overcome the 
strongest through a smart scheme. Therefore, in his view, two people who are interested in the same 
must become enemies (1651: Chapter XIII). He further concludes, the natural condition of mankind 
must be disorder through competition, mistrust and the struggle for power, which results in a “war 
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of all against all”. These times of war are not necessarily always violent but include periods of 
preparation. He describes situations of war with the following words:
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: 
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be  imported  by  sea;  no  commodious  building;  no  instruments  of  moving  and 
removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no 
account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, 
and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 
(1651: Chapter XIII)
Hence, he asserts that this condition cannot be enjoyed or desired by anybody because one has to 
live with a constant  feeling of insecurity and has to be alert  not to  be attacked. In the natural  
condition, he explains, there is also legal justice: “To this war of every man against every man, this 
also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice,  
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.“  
(Chapter XIII)
Due to the fact that everybody has the right to decide and to do whatever they like, and there is no  
restriction by law, Hobbes sees the solution in the creation of a contract. Through this contract every 
individual surrenders some of its freedom and rights and transfers them to a fictitious person or 
body, the Leviathan (Chapter XIV). This contract has to be obediently accepted otherwise it loses its 
relevance. The Leviathan is represented by the state and has the responsibility to maintain law and 
order. Hence, the state and its functioning organs are necessary to maintain peace.
Of course, Hobbes has been critiqued frequently, especially for his negative picture of the nature of 
men (Thomas 1929: 190). However, I argue, even if his description might be an exaggeration of an 
evil and selfish human being, it still points out, why the existence of the state and its organs are  
crucial for peaceful coexistence. It also explains and shows that the failure of institutions and poor 
governance  lead  to  conflicts.  In  the  words  of  Hobbes,  if  the  Leviathan  is  not  taking  its 
responsibilities, the individual is set back in its natural condition in which it has to defend itself.
If political institutions do not provide what they are supposed to provide, citizens lose trust in the 
state and it can even come to the extent of so-called state failure. Hutchinson and Johnson (2011: 
737) define state failure as the “systematic breakdown of governmental institutional legitimacy and 
authority across society”. Further, they reason that in the case of institutional failure groups might 
take  the  opportunity to  violently turn  against  the  government  which  often  results  in  civil  war. 
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Ottaway (2007: 12f) gives two main reasons for the fragility of states: (1) states can be fragile due 
to poor governance, or (2) because the population is deeply divided along, for example, ethnic or 
religious lines with a long standing history of conflict. Even if such states are well governed, it is 
difficult to stabilise them. In case of institutional failure, citizens lose their political trust which is 
“an individual's confidence in government institutions based on perceptions of their performance” 
(Hutchinson & Johnson 2011: 738) and as a consequence, conflicts can arise. The proneness to 
conflict might also be related to the fact that people do not fear to lose much if they are poor, 
neglected and the state does not provide. This provision not only refers to security and authority, but 
also infrastructure and other services like healthcare and education, etc. (Herbst 1990). Hutchinson 
and Johnson (2011: 738) argue, capability of the government to deliver services also strengthens 
political  trust  and the individual's  perception of  legitimacy,  and therefore prevents  conflict.  By 
looking  at  the  case  of  the  Tana delta  we will  see  that  the  marginalisation  and neglect  by the 
government  as  well  as  its  reluctance  to  act  contributed  to  the  extent  of  the  clashes  and  the 
escalation.
3.5 Conceptual Framework
The different theoretical aspects outlined in this chapter will help to understand the conflict and 
political  situation  under  study.  In  order  to  visualise  the  theoretical  framework,  it  has  been 
transferred into a graph, which shows how the different aspects are interconnected and relevant for 
a comprehensive understanding (see Figure 3). While the yellow circle reflects aspects of theories 
on ethnicity, the red one presents those on politics. The intersection of the two includes aspects of 
ethnic politics which was explained by the theories of neo-patrimonialism as well as moral ethnicity 
and political tribalism. A special connection is indicated between voters who might feel obliged to 
moral ethnicity and politicians who often use political tribalism as an instrument to win elections. 
This  can  also  result  in  ethnic  election  violence.  Furthermore,  the  relation  between  voters  and 
politicians is shaped by different interests. While the voter who elects the politician wants to benefit 
in one way or the other, the politician tries to attract voters because he needs their support. The blue  
circle includes different types and aspects of conflicts which partly can include aspects of ethnicity 
or political ones. Regime or system changes and institutional or state failure are always political,  
however, they do not necessarily have to be connected to conflicts. Similarly, conflicts connected to 
religion,  values  and  natural  resources  can  include  ethnic  aspects,  or  aspects  of  other  types  of 
conflicts, but do not necessarily have to. The same applies to economic and territorial conflicts and 
politics. The intersection of all three major circles is ethnic election violence which is divided in 
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pre- and post-election violence. 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Framework
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Chapter 4    Research Design and Methods of Data Collection
The data presented in the following chapters were collected in three different stages: (1) pre-conflict 
fieldwork in  the  Tana  delta  and Nairobi  (including  the  beginning  of  the  conflict),  (2)  artefact 
analysis in the Netherlands during the conflict and temporary silence or peace periods, and (3) post-
conflict  fieldwork  in  the  Tana  delta  and  Kilifi  County.  Concerning  time,  location,  sampling 
techniques and methodological considerations, these three phases were influenced by the dynamics 
in the original research location (the Tana delta) as well as the structure of the African Studies  
Research  Masters  programme.  In the  following paragraphs  an overview of  the  process  of  data 
collection with regard to choice of time and locations, research design, sampling methods, methods 
of data collection and the strengths and weaknesses of this research will be given.
4.1 Research Locations and Time
Due to the timetable of the African Studies Research Masters programme in Leiden, the field stay 
was  scheduled  for  a  period  from June  to  August  2012 and one  from January to  March  2013. 
Between the two field stays a period of course work in the Netherlands was required. This break 
coincided with the major time of clashes in the Tana delta. After the first stay in the Tana delta,  
beginning in June 2012, a few interviews with political actors staying in Nairobi were planned for 
the middle of August. Only few days after the departure from the Tana delta, the first village was 
attacked. After relative peace had returned to the area from the end of September to December 
2012, I planned to return to Garsen, where I had stayed before, however, on 22nd December 2012 
another attack happened, followed by two others in January 2013. Due to the uncertainty of the 
security situation it was decided against the initial plans, not to return to the Tana delta, but to 
conduct research in the neighbouring Kilifi County (especially in the towns Kilifi,  Malindi and 
Mambrui), where a substantial number of IDPs had fled to. Still, I could visit the area twice and two 
local research assistants (one Orma and one Pokomo) carried out a survey.
Due to the timetable of the Masters Programme, it was not possible to follow the conflict from 
Kenya,  but  in  the  meantime  information  was  gathered  online.  Throughout  my absence,  I  was 
furthermore in touch with different people from the Tana delta, who updated me on the social and 
political situation.
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4.2 Research Design
The research was based on a  mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative research methods, 
which  allowed  triangulation.  During  the  two  fieldwork  phases  53  one-on-one  interviews  were 
conducted and nine group interviews/focus group discussions were held with another  53 active 
participants and a total of about 65 other attendants. On different meetings and press conferences 
additional observations were made. Furthermore, in the post-conflict phase 150 questionnaires were 
filled. During the research phase in the Netherlands diverse Youtube clips and newspaper articles 
from different print media houses were compared and a forum on Facebook was followed.
The first fieldwork phase in the Tana delta was characterised by purely qualitative research. The 
main interest was to get to know the area and the political environment, to collect rather general 
information for a better understanding of the situation and to get to know aspirants, their agendas 
and  opinions.  Time  was  taken  to  connect  and  link  with  people  in  order  to  identify  potential 
interviewees and gate keepers. In the first phase 38 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
different  leaders  and  government  officials  (politicians  on  different  levels,  elders,  chiefs,  peace 
committee  members,  District  Officers,  the  District  Commissioner  and  religious  leaders). 
Furthermore,  in Mikameni  two peace meetings were attended,  a  transect walk was done and a 
follow up group discussion to the peace meetings was held with about 15 active and 15 passive 
participants. Another group interview was held with two Pokomo elders. Additional observations 
were  made during  four  political  rallies  or  fundraisings,  while  attending a  seminar  on  peaceful 
elections for youth leaders and a stakeholder meeting, which was attended by then Vice President 
Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka. Finally, after the first attacks, a press conference organised by Pokomo 
experts in cooperation with Tegla Lorupe Foundation was attended in Nairobi.
During the second fieldwork phase a mixed approach was followed and research was conducted 
mainly among IDPs from the Tana delta. After arriving in Nairobi, a press conference was attended 
during which several political aspirants from the area gave statements concerning the situation in 
the Tana delta. After arriving at the Coast and linking up with people, interviews were conducted. 
On the one hand 15 one-on-one semi-structured interviews as well as seven group interviews, with 
three times two, twice three, once 10 and once 14 active participants (and approximately 50 other 
attendants  who expressed  their  agreement)  could  be held  in  Kilifi  County (Kilifi,  Malindi  and 
Mambrui); and on the other hand a quantitative survey was carried out in IDP camps in the Tana 
delta and among IDPs who had already returned to their villages.
During all three research phases several informal conversations took place with residents from the 
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Tana delta including three employees of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
(IEBC) and several politicians who were also interviewed. Furthermore, via email and telephone it 
was possible to get in touch with a missionary who serves in the Tana delta and a journalist who 
visited the area several times after attacks.
4.3 Sampling
In the beginning of this research, in June 2012, the first contacts were established through other 
students  who were  also  doing research  in  the  same area  or  had  already finished their  project.  
Departing from these contacts, it was possible to get in touch with different leaders and government 
officials via the snowball method. The main aim for the first field stay was to speak with as many 
local politicians and aspirants as possible. Due to the fact that the stay in Garsen was six to eight 
months ahead of the elections, and party nominations were only held 1.5 months before the election 
day, some people were still  unsure whether or not they would contest.  Hence,  it  was relatively 
difficult to identify aspirants because many had not yet announced their candidacy. Still, as many 
politicians  and  aspirants  as  possible  were  contacted  and  finally  18  interviews  were  done. 
Furthermore,  other  leaders  were  approached  and  another  20  interviews  were  conducted  with 
government officials and others including two elders, three peace committee members, two chiefs, 
one headman and two religious leaders. 
While  staying  in  the  Netherlands  and doing  online  research  on  the  then  ongoing  conflict,  the 
decision was taken, to continue the research in Kilifi County in case the situation in the Tana delta 
was perceived to be too insecure. Kilifi County had become a place of refuge for many IDPs and 
was therefore a suitable alternative as research location to continue with the activities. After the 
arrival in Kilifi a team from SIL (Summer Institute for Linguistics) which was originally based in 
Idsowe, but had fled the area in August 2012 due to the conflict, was of big help: The SIL team of  
both Pokomo and Orma origin helped finding other  IDPs or  people who could link me to the 
research population in the county and helped translating interviews. Finally, a total number of 106 
IDPs participated actively in one-on-one or group interviews. In order to get a broad picture of the 
conflict and a better understanding, different groups of people were approached: elderly and young 
adults, Orma, Lower Pokomo and Upper Pokomo (therefore both, pastoralists and farmers as well 
as Muslims and Christians were covered),  well  educated people and illiterate ones, women and 
men, and people who were present during attacks and others who had fled out of fear. In some cases 
it was possible to meet with a bigger or smaller group of IDPs from one village or an area which 
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gave the opportunity to conduct group interviews.
According to the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) statement on 11th of January 2013, more than 
34,000 IDPs had been displaced from their homes since August 2012. According to the Tana Delta 
District Development Plan 2008-2012 (Kenya 2009: 8) 51.5% of the residents are below 18 years, 
which  means,  they  are  not  allowed  to  vote.  Therefore,  the  research  population  of  the  second 
research phase (including the survey) consists of the other 48.5% which approximately constitute 
16,490 IDPs. Usually a Confidence Level of 95% and a Confidence Interval of +/- 5 points is 
recommended for quantitative surveys. This means, according to the formula explained by Bartlett 
et al (2001) 375 respondents would have been required for the survey. However, due to time and 
financial  limitations,  a  Confidence Interval  of +/-  8 points was used,  which led to a minimum 
number of 149 questionnaires: 
       (t)² · (p)(q) (1.96)² · (0.5)(0.5)
(d)² (0.05)²
ss  =         = = 149
         (t)² · (p)(q) (1.96)² · (0.5)(0.5)
1+      1+
    (d)² (0.05)²
          Population 16,490
Though,  in  order  to  get  a  balance  between  the  two  communities  (farmers  and  herders)  150 
questionnaires were filled.
Due to the limited administrative registration of people, a random sampling for the survey was not 
possible. In fact, because of the sensitivity of the topic and the trauma many people went through, 
the assistants mainly had to rely on the willingness of respondents to participate at all. Still, they did 
a  purposive  non-random  sampling  (see  Panacek  &  Thompson  2007:  78)  and  looked  for 
representatives from different groups. Hereby they mainly tried to get an ethnic (75 Orma and 67 
Pokomo +  8  Giriama)  and  gender  balance  (73  male  and  77 female).  They also  made  sure  to 
interview people of different age groups (between 18 and 82 years old) and from different home 
villages. Concerning ethnicity, the focus was on the Orma and Pokomo communities because those 
two groups were mainly indicated of having been involved in the clashes. Still, other communities 
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 ss = sample size
 t = value for selected alpha level 
      of 0.025 in each tail = 1.96 
 (p)(q) = estimate of variance = 0.25
 d = acceptable margin of error 
       for mean being estimated = 0.05
 Population = total of IDPs = 16490
were affected as well and hence, the 8 interviews with Giriama of the agricultural community are 
justified. 
4.4 Research Methods and Data Collection
As already mentioned above, data has been collected with the following methods:
• semi-structured one-on-one interview
• group interview and group discussion
• observation
• transect walk
• survey
• media analysis
The variety of methods was important due to the complexity of the topic, like outlined insection 
3.1  .2.  In  semi-structured  group  and  one-on-one  interviews  it  was  possible  to  get  a  better 
understanding of the whole situation and people could elaborate and explain their  perspectives. 
While one-on-one interviews gave a good impression about the individual experience and view 
point, in group interviews the information was mostly confirmed or complemented by the other 
participants, which gave a rich picture. The survey adds value to the research because it supports the 
qualitative interviews and includes a bigger group of respondents. Doing a transect walk helped to 
understand the problems and gave a better impression about the actual situation in the village.27 
Observations especially on peace meetings made it possible to have a look on practices and the 
media analysis on the one hand disclosed information about the clashes, but on the other hand also 
showed which details were given to the public and how the conflict was portrayed.
Most interviews were conducted with the help of interpreters, unless the interviewees were well 
educated  (especially  politicians  and  government  officials  as  well  as  other  leaders).  If  the 
respondents,  however,  did  not  feel  comfortable  to  speak  English,  interviews  were  preferably 
conducted in Kiswahili or otherwise in Kipokomo or Kiorma. The preference for Kiswahili as an 
alternative interview language was due to my own language skills, which enabled me to follow 
most of the interviews independently. However, in order to make sure I understood the respondents 
entirely correct,  the  interpreters  still  assisted  me  by translating.  Throughout  the  six  months  of 
27 The transect walk took about 1.5 hours and was mainly conducted with the local  Assistant Chief.  On the way 
different people engaged in the walk and after having examined the area issues were discussed in a meeting with  
members from the local Pokomo and Wardei communities. Both, the Pokomo and the Wardei part of the village 
were visited but the main focus was on the site of conflict, farms affected by the conflict and how different farms  
expanded in what was formerly grazing zones. About 15 members from both communities engaged in the discussion 
and two one on one interviews followed.
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research I worked with three Orma and two Pokomo assistants in different locations. Especially 
during my second field stay I always made sure that I was accompanied by a Pokomo interpreter 
when interviewing Pokomo respondents and working with an Orma assistant when speaking with 
Orma. This was crucial due to the sensitivity of the topic. The two assistants who carried out the 
survey in the Tana were also advised to only interview members of their own community.28 For 
both, semi-structured interviews with leaders and semi-structured interviews and group interviews 
with IDPs standardised guidelines were used which helped to cover the most important topics, but 
also gave room for further questions. After developing the questionnaire (see appendix) as a tool, it 
was discussed with several people from the Tana delta as well as others and pre-tested before last 
adjustments were made. The facilitators were asked to translate carefully and to make further notes 
if it was necessary.
During the first field stay some interviews were recorded with a digital recorder. However, even 
though they gave their consent, it  was obvious, that interviewees did not feel comfortable with 
recording because they hesitated to answer from time to time. Therefore, after a few attempts, the 
recorder was not used for interviews anymore and the information was only documented by note 
taking.29 During observations on peace meetings or other events it was, however, possible to record. 
Important parts of the recordings were later translated with the help of an assistant. Besides giving 
attention  to  speeches,  on  peace  meetings  and  rallies,  observations  were  done  about  how  the 
meetings were organised, who attended them and who was given time to speak.
On the transect walk the area surrounding Mikameni, where tensions arose in the middle of July,  
was examined. On the one hour walk different fields,  water points and grassing corridors were 
visited.  Also,  the  dynamics  of  changing  “ownership”30 claims  and  the  settlement  of  the  two 
communities (Pokomo and Wardei) in the area was discussed.
4.5 Strengths and Limitations
One strength of this research is the mixed approach of data collection which gave the possibility to 
triangulate the data. The qualitative methods made it possible to get a good and broad understanding 
of the topic and to gain insight in different perspectives. With the additional quantitative survey it is 
28 Which  meant  the  Orma  assistant  could  only  interview  people  who  would  traditionally  consider  themselves  
pastoralists, but mainly ethnic Orma, and the Pokomo assistant only people of communities who were traditionally 
farmers, especially Pokomo.
29 In fact, several people told me without being asked that they were very happy I did not use a recorder.
30 Land in the Tana delta  is  foremost either  Community Land or Public Land.  This means officially none of the  
residents is owning land. However,  traditionally land is being claimed and over the time people from different  
communities started competing over this land.
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possible to speak for a broader group of respondents. With answers from 150 participants in the 
survey and 106 respondents in interviews the research is speaking for a substantial group.
The time frame of the research was on the one hand limiting, but on the other hand the possibility to 
have two field stays was very enriching. Due to research activities before and after the conflict, it 
was possible to first see parts of the area under research interest and to get an understanding of the 
situation before the conflict  escalated.  The second field stay started right  after  the last  attacks, 
which gave the possibility to look back on the conflict and to collect details from fresh memories. 
However,  it  was  impossible  to  conduct  research during  the conflict  and the  fact  that  the  post-
conflict phase began immediately after the last attacks was not only beneficial. Due to the temporal 
closeness of the research and the clashes, some respondents did not feel free to speak or even felt 
investigated by the questions. It is likely, that other information could have been collected if the 
reflection period was longer and the research conducted a bit later. Also, the fact that the research 
was done before the elections might have been a limitation: It is possible that people would have 
felt freer to speak after the elections. Another time-related obstacle to the research was that it had to 
be conducted under time pressure, before many IDPs who fled to Kilifi went back to their homes in 
the Tana delta for the elections on 4th March 2013.
A further limitation to this research is that the main focus in the second field stay was on ethnic 
Pokomo and Orma. No Wardei had been interviewed and none of the other minority groups, except 
a few Giriama. The insight of other groups from the Tana delta could have disclosed very valuable 
information as well. It was especially missed out on the position and views of the Wardei, who are 
the third biggest group in the Tana delta. Due to the fact that none of the other two groups has the  
absolute majority in the area, their view point would have been of relevance especially with regard 
to the elections.
The spatial restriction, not to be present in the Tana delta after August 2012, limited the research as 
well because it was impossible to visit villages in the area and to get a more visual impression. 
However, on the other hand, IDPs staying outside the affected area might have felt freer to speak, 
because they were less threatened by possible future attacks. 
Lastly, the analysis of this research was limited due to the fact that interviews could not be recorded 
(because of the sensitivity of the topic).  Recorded interviews would have made a more precise 
analysis possible, however, after some respondents hesitated to speak, even though they agreed on 
recording, it was more reasonable not to use the recorder in order to get more valid information. 
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Chapter 5    Conflicts in the Tana Delta
The clashes in the Tana delta,  which escalated in 2012 received attention nationally as well  as 
internationally. Different media houses speculated whether or not the conflict should be seen as pre- 
election violence in connection to the general elections of March 2013. Due to its closeness to these 
elections and the failure of the government and police to react appropriately, the fear of another 
countrywide escalation of violence as in 2007 was raised.
As we have seen above, conflicts can exist without necessarily being visible in violence. Hence, the 
beginning of the conflict cannot clearly be defined, but if anything than only the start of the clashes.  
Besides  the involvement  of  violence,  another  characteristic  to  differentiate  between conflicts  is 
whether  these are  involving individuals only or groups.  In the latter  case,  ethnicity might be a 
further sub-classification when two ethnic groups, like the Pokomo and the Orma, are involved. 
Analysing the conflict should also focus on the trigger that turned the latent conflict into a manifest  
one. During interviews with IDPs, when asked about the trigger of the most recent clashes in the 
Tana delta, most respondents referred to the incidences in or near Kau in the middle of August 
2012. However, several respondents (especially Pokomo) stressed that tension arose earlier already 
and the escalation was partly a result of poor governance.31 It was significant that most respondents 
accused the other group of having started the conflict and even if the causes were various, some 
community-specific viewpoints were recognised.32 
In this chapter we will have a look at the clashes from different angles: First, we will get some 
background information about past clashes and forms of conflict resolution in the Tana delta which 
were discussed in literature, before we turn towards the initial tensions which led up to the clashes 
in 2012. Thirdly a time line will be presented that summarises detailed information about each of 
the known incidences. Subsequently, additional information for specific attacks will be discussed 
which illustrate certain patterns or where context information is crucial for the understanding. The 
following section will provide a range of explanations of the conflict, with special attention to the 
Orma and Pokomo views on natural resources, poor governance and links to the election. Lastly, 
31 Some Orma , though, stated that the conflict started abruptly and there were no signs in advance.
32 In interviews several triggers were mentioned and also statements about the first incidences of the clashes were  
various. Apparently, the chronology of the incidences was not in detail present in people's minds, but it is worth  
mentioning, that the own community was always perceived as having been attacked first. Also, the news reports  
were not consistent and even Red Cross statements were partly fragmentary. I tried getting access to security and 
peace reports from the DC's office in Minjila however, I was denied access. The most detailed list of incidences was 
compiled  by  KNCHR  (2012).  The  chronology  presented  here  is  based  on  reports  from  the  afore  mentioned 
organisations, reports from respondents, as well as newspaper reports (Nation and Standard).
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solutions to end this conflict as provided by the respondents will be presented and discussed. 
5.1 Conflicts and Conflict Settlement – An Overview from the 19th Century to 2002
Miller (1981) mentions that tensions between farmers and pastoralists were recorded since the 19 th 
century.  These usually occurred when herdsmen came to the delta in search for water for their 
livestock and some animals strayed into farms starting to graze and trample in the fields. However, 
Townsend  (1978:  290)  also  mentions  occasional  Pokomo  attacks  on  the  Orma,  which  were, 
however,  much more rare,  and resulted in  a  peace agreement,  in which the Orma promised to 
reform. Another, more significant conflict in the mid and late 19 th century were Somali and Maasai 
raids, first on the Orma only, but later also attacking Pokomo who sided with the Orma (Bunger 
1973: 18; Miller 1981: 80). Furthermore, KNBS (2009a: 61) reports about a killing in 1904 by 
Somali and in 1933 one person was killed by an Arab.
The  next  reported  conflict  escalated  in  Pumwani  in  1949,  due  to  the  construction  of  the  first 
mosque.  In this  religion-sparked conflict  between the Muslim Orma and Christian Pokomo the 
mosque was demolished twice and Bunger (1973: 75) reports about fatalities which according to 
him were not confirmed by official reports. Martin (2012: 173) also refers to fights in 1949 between 
Orma and Pokomo and cites a colonial intelligence report which documents that one Pokomo man 
was killed and an Orma was also said to have died, but his body disappeared.
In 1955 a fight between Malakote and Somali was reported due to Somali cattle grazing in the 
shambas of Malakote (KNBS 2009a: 61). Pilly Martin (2007: 78) mentions another incidence in 
1980 when Orma killed two Pokomo farmers at the Ngao irrigation scheme. Townsend (1978: 294) 
reports, due to the interests of Orma and Pokomo in different parts of the land (Pokomo stayed at 
the riverine and Orma did not eye to settle there) the two groups almost never disputed over land. 
However, in case cattle strayed into a farm deaths on both sides could be recorded.
Before colonialism, the people of the Tana delta had customary rules and traditional regulations to 
solve conflicts. In general, though, they lived in relatively peaceful and symbiotic coexistence. The 
traditional form of conflict mitigation between Pokomo and Orma was called  Ibisa. According to 
Martin (2012: 190) Ibisa was a performed ceremony, in which the quarrelling communities shared a 
meal (the pastoralists contributed meat and farmers rice), discussed the causes of the conflict as well 
as  the  perpetrators  and  a  prayer  would  be  held.  This  process  ensured  reconciliation  and  new 
offenders would be cursed. The central role in this traditional form of conflict settlement would be 
taken by the elders of both groups, who had the authority to speak for their communities.
During  colonialism,  the  administration  avoided  conflict  between  different  ethnic  groups  by 
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restricting them to ethnic reserves and reducing the movement of people and animals to a minimum. 
Due to the colonial rule, and the introduction of statutory law, an alienation of customary practices 
started and the coexistence of customary and statutory law resulted in confusion (Schade 2012: 29).
From 1963 to 1967 the  shifta-war33 took place,  in which the Kenyan ethnic Somali  fought  for 
secession to join the “hypothetical Greater-Somalia” (Kagwanja 2003: 134). In the Tana delta the so 
called shifta-attacks, in which Somali bandits raided other pastoralists, robbed buses as well as other 
vehicles and attacked Pokomo, lasted until the 1990s which is why the area was long perceived as 
very insecure. These bandits were feared and even the government was relatively powerless against 
them. In fact, some officials rather tried to get a share of the loot than confronting the shiftas with 
the law (Kagwanja 2003: 135). Towards the end of the shifta attacks, other groups like Orma and 
Wardei  were  also  involved  in  banditry  (MUHURI  1999:  28).  Furthermore,  Kagwanja  states, 
politicians of all major ethnic groups hired bandits in the run-up to the elections in 1992 and 1997. 
KHRC (2002) argues, the main aim of these political shifta attacks was to rob and/or destroy voter 
cards of supporters of the opponents. Some of the voter cards were handed out to supporters of the 
respective candidate with the condition to cast the vote for him.
In the night of 2nd January 1999, Hussein Dado, an Orma from Oda, who was then the District 
Commissioner of Baringo, was attacked by shiftas, while travelling to his home village (MUHURI 
1999: 5f). As a consequence of this attack, a few days later “a large contingent of government 
security” visited Danisa C where Galje'el Somali had settled (Kagwanja 2003: 133), and started 
shooting and threatening the community who's citizenship was contested until they left the area 
(MUHURI 1999: 5f).
In the following year,  about 70 people died in clashes between Orma and Pokomo. The ethnic 
skirmishes, in which then Orma and Wardei fought on one side and Pokomo on the other, continued 
in 2001 and came to an end in January 2002 when more than 130 people had died and 3,405 were 
displaced. Furthermore, women were raped by attackers and after the conflict the population was 
harassed by security officers (Martin 2012: 175ff). One rather major attack of the Pokomo on the 
Wardei took place at Gafuru where they revenged for earlier assaults. After the Wardei revenged at 
Maweni, the two groups started living a relative peaceful coexistence (Mghanga 2010: 75). The area 
had never seen a conflict of such extent before. Despite the traditional rules of war (Martin 2007: 
107), women and children were not spared and food stores had been destroyed. Also, it was the first 
time that small firearms were used in a conflict between these groups. Due to the porous borders 
with the unstable countries Somalia and Ethiopia, weapons were relative easily accessible. In the 
33 Shifta is Somali and means banditry.
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KHRC report (2002) it is further stated, that Orma and Wardei hired militias from outside Kenya 
and got help from their “brothers” in Bura and Galole. In return, Martin (2012: 177) argues, due to 
the fact that farmers are generally less prepared for war than pastoralists, the Pokomo were looking 
for supranatural support  Kaya Bombo from Digo Mijikenda in Kwale and trained their youths in 
traditional fighting techniques. The causes for this conflict were diverse, however, a main factor 
was  the  introduction  of  a  land  adjudication  programme,  which  was  strongly  opposed  by  the 
pastoralists. The farmers by contrast were hoping for an end to the on-going farmer/herder disputes 
by  getting  title  deeds,  which  would  have  made  them  the  legal  owners  of  their  farms.  The 
pastoralists,  however,  feared  they would  lose  access  to  dry season pasture  in  the  delta  and be 
restricted to a few water corridors for their livestock. Other factors that might have contributed were 
a  preceding drought  and a  subsequent  tense situation,  the  unclear  borders  to  Ijara  District,  the 
increase of foreigners, especially Wardei, who had been invited by politicians in order to win the 
upcoming elections, as well as the general preparedness (especially of pastoralists) to fight even 
with firearms (Martin 2012; KHRC 2002). By the end of the conflict, the pastoralists themselves 
were  divided  because  the  Wardei  wanted  more  political  representation  and  the  Orma  started 
blaming them for having been the drivers of the conflict. This also affected the election result, in the 
sense that the Orma who would have needed the support of the Wardei to succeed again, had to give 
the National Assembly post to the Pokomo (KHRC 2002). 
According to Pickmeier (2012: 74) local peace committees were established after the clashes in 
2001 to sensitise the population and to spread peace. He further states, other responsibilities of these 
peace committees were to settle disputes and to engage in finding solutions. One type of conflict 
they had to settle frequently were farmer/herder conflicts, but according to Pickmeier the number of 
conflicts between local and foreign pastoralists was rising. Furthermore, he argues, another way of 
promoting peace was mixed schooling, inter-tribal marriages and inter-community activities, due to 
the fact that personal relations were beneficial for peace. According to Guyo (2009: 39ff), women 
had also a special role in spreading peace, especially in transferring the right values to children and 
taking an advisory role in conflicts.  In addition Pokomo women were also actively engaged in 
conflict settlement for example in marriages or heritage matters.
Taya  Weiss  (2004)  presents  the  objectives  of  the  Tana  River  Peace,  Development  and 
Reconciliation committee (TRPDC). According to Weiss, the committee is empowered 
to establish, enhance and empower community participation in peace building from the 
grassroots  levels;  to  strengthen  cordial  relations  with  the  neighbouring  districts;  to 
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enhance  community  awareness  on  proper  utilisation  of  the  existing  resources;  to 
undertake  participatory  research  on  the  causes  of  conflict  between  the  various 
communities within and outside the district; to liaise with the district security committee 
on  ways  of  building  peace  and conflict  intervention  strategies;  (and)  to  initiate  and 
implement development programmes that harmonize the communities living within the 
district. (Weiss 2004: 90f)
She  further  states,  that  the  sub-committees  consist  of  different  representatives  (youth,  women, 
elders, and chiefs) from the local communities.
Martin (2012) further reports about peace meetings held by the government or NGOs. She states, 
however, the impact of these meetings was negligible, due to the fact that representatives attending 
these meetings were often not supported by their communities and sometimes simply chosen by the 
organiser. Furthermore, she claims these meetings were not taken seriously if they were spatially 
held  outside  the  conflict  area,  because  this  gave  residents  the  impression  something would  be 
hidden (Martin 2012: 187f).
In  the  end  of  the  2001  conflict,  President  Moi  visited  the  affected  area  and  called  upon  the 
communities to settle the conflict. Also, the involved parties started feeling the consequences of the 
conflict and the clashes finally came to an end in 2002 (Martin 2012: 188; KHRC 2002). In the end, 
the land adjudication programme had been abandoned. The Pokomo suggested however, individual 
land  allocation  would  be  a  crucial  step  to  a  peaceful  future.  Another  suggestion  to  settle  the 
conflicts in the Tana delta was to strictly keep the cattle out of the delta and during the dry spell,  
when the animals had to come to the delta, livestock should carefully be monitored. Furthermore, 
more security from the government was requested. Pokomo elders also insisted, that the “killers 
should be brought to book” (Martin 2012: 188). Other suggestions included that conflicts between 
individuals should not be ethnicised, regular peace meetings such as the Ibisa should be held and 
every location was to have at least two water corridors.
5.2 Initial Tensions in 2012
After  having gained some context  information,  in  the rest  of  the chapter  we will  focus  on the 
clashes in 2012/2013. Before discussing the actual clashes it is important to have a look at the rising 
tensions leading to the escalation of the conflict. In the beginning of 2012 several cases of livestock 
that had entered farms or killed cattle were reported to the police or the administration mainly in 
Kilelengwani area. Sometimes these incidents also caused human deaths. For example, in April 
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2012 a Pokomo man was killed in Kilelengwani apparently because of a farmer/herder conflict over 
access to grazing. It was assumed that he was killed by Orma. A local headman reported, following 
the  murder  in  April  peace  meetings  between  the  two  groups  had  been  intensified  and  were 
frequently held in order to solve the problems and to level the tensions. However, in May an Orma 
was found beheaded and towards the end of May another Pokomo was killed in Kilelengwani A, the 
Orma part of the village. After these tensions in Kilelengwani, problems arose upstream between 
the Pokomo and a Wardei community. On 9th of July livestock strayed into a farm in Mikameni and 
when the farmer told the herdsboy to remove the animals which were grazing in his fields, the latter 
one was not willing to take the animals out of the farm. The situation finally escalated, when the 
two called their community and the conflict was taken on a community level instead of being solved 
as a conflict between two individuals. Besides injuries with crude weapons and shots in the air the 
conflict did not escalate further. However, people reported that they were scared to sleep in their 
houses in fear of the other group raiding the village and burning their homes. Hence, they spent the 
nights in the bush where they felt more secure, due to the fact that the other group did not know 
where to find them and some men had to stay awake during the nights to guard the village. Two 
days after the tension arose (on 12th of July) the District Peace Committee went to the village to 
mediate and to calm the situation down. This meeting was followed by another peace meeting, 
however, two weeks later especially the Pokomo still complained that nothing had changed. They 
still did not dare to spend the nights in the village, firearms were not withdrawn and cattle were still  
grazing in their fields.34 
The next incidence was reported in Tarasaa where cattle were found dead after they had eaten 
poisoned watermelons in a farm. While the herder complained the farmer had killed his cattle, the 
latter one argued it was not his fault if cattle ate something they were not supposed to eat. Just few 
days later livestock was found in a farm in Mwenje (Kipini location) and consequently slashed to 
death in the beginning of August (3rd to 5th of August). Also, on 4th of August in Kalota (Chara 
location) a Pokomo was forced by suspected Orma to surrender his valuables including a fishing 
gear, and an Orma was killed in his farm in Idho (Kilelengwani location) probably by one of his  
Pokomo friends. On the following day, on 5th of August a Wardei herdsboy was killed in Onido 
(Kilelengwani). It is unclear who killed him because both the Pokomo and the Orma communities 
accused the other group of having killed the boy for political reasons. While the Orma said the 
Pokomo wanted to bring mistrust between the Orma and the Wardei by blaming the Orma for the 
34 In a transect walk I got the opportunity to assure myself of the situation and to see the destroyed crops. Following 
the examination of the area we had a discussion with the two groups, in which the Wardei leaders assured the  
situation normalised and they were satisfied, while the Pokomo complained of new offences from the Wardei and  
they uttered their fear of attacks.
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death, the Pokomo claimed the Orma killed the boy to create a common enemy of the pastoralist  
groups, to unite them and to reach a power sharing agreement for the elections. The father, Hassan 
Khurtumo, an appointed councillor, decided not to investigate it any further, because it could not 
bring back his son. Instead, without being asked, the Orma announced to revenge for the Wardei. 
After these initial tensions and the failure of the administration to act appropriately, the residents in 
the Tana delta had lost their political trust and took the right in their own hands. Hence the situation 
escalated in Kau, followed by bigger tit-for-tat attacks from the Orma and Pokomo communities as 
well as smaller incidences. This confirms the literature presented in the theoretical framework that 
the institutional failure and the lack of political trust can lead to the escalation of conflicts.
5.3 Timeline of the Clashes in 2012-2013
13.08.12 Kau (Pokomo) Big number of cattle (approximately 300) found in a Pokomo farm 
and hacked to death.
14.08.12 Kau (Pokomo) Attack on the Pokomo village by Orma, three Pokomo died (two 
men, one woman), 110 houses burnt.
14.-
17.08.12
Magarini District in 
Kilifi County 
(Giriama)
Animals were taken into farms without the consent of the farmer. 
On 17th armed pastoralists were guarding the animals in farms.
17.08.12 Hewani (Pokomo) An Orma cutting down a farm and cattle grazing in it; threatening 
the Pokomo farmers who confronted him.
22.08.12 Riketa (Orma) Dawn attack 53 Orma killed (34 women, 13 children and six men), 
22 injured, 80 houses burnt, 453 head of cattle killed others went 
missing. No attackers left behind.
Ngao (Pokomo) Attack on Pokomo youth in the surrounding of the village – three 
boys killed.
23.08.12 Hewani (Pokomo) Gunshots were heard from surrounding Orma villages
24.08.12 Magarini (Giriama) Pastoralists driving cattle in farms, and guarding the situation with 
guns.
25.08.12 Idsowe (Pokomo) – 
Garsen 
(cosmopolitan)
Cattle belonging to a Wardei hacked to death.
Hewani (Pokomo) Further threatening of the Pokomo community.
30.08.12 Pokomo herdsmen killed.
01.09.12 Kikomo (Orma) - 
Semikaro (Pokomo)
40 goats stolen from a Pokomo herdsboy and a Pokomo teacher 
killed.
07.09.12 Chamwanamuma 
(Pokomo)
Dawn attack two Watta men and 17 Pokomo killed (13 men, three 
women and one child), 10 injured, 95 houses burnt, 200 heads of 
cattle and 400 goats lost.
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08.09.12 Darga Galge and 
Bora Moyo
Clashes in which two Orma and one Pokomo died.
09.09.12 Kone village One person shot, probably a Pokomo.
10.09.12 Kilelengwani A 
(Orma)
Attacked, 38 people killed (16 men, eight women, five children 
and nine police officers); eight people injured; police vehicles set 
on fire; nine police guns and 580 bullets stolen; 167 houses burnt.
11.09.12 Semikaro (Pokomo) Four Pokomo killed 27 houses looted.
Laini – Chara 
(Pokomo) 
20 houses burnt.
Nduru (Pokomo) 90 houses burnt.
Shirikisho 
(Pokomo)
109 houses burnt.
Before 
18.09.12
Ozi (Pokomo) 67 houses burnt, other property destroyed (farms, machines, 
storages) and harassment of people by GSU (General Service 
Unit). Some were said to have died when the village was razed.
21.12.12 Kipao (Orma) 41 killed (11 men, 6 women, 13 children and 11 aggressors), 45 
injured, 45 houses burnt
Administrative Police officer went missing with a G3 rifle and 60 
rounds of ammunition.
unknown Bandi A Pokomo motorbike driver was beaten up.
28.12.12 
(?)
Semikaro (Pokomo) One Pokomo elder abducted by Orma youths, possibly killed.
Daru Two Orma robbed off their canoes.
09.01.13 Nduru (Pokomo and 
Orma)
11 killed (five Pokomo, six Orma, including at least two women 
and one child), 11 houses burnt, several injured.
10.01.13 Kibusu (Pokomo 11 killed (five children, two women, three men), 19 houses burnt.
16.01.13 Oda (Orma part) Attack on Mungatana, no-one was injured.
5.4 The Attacks – Some Key Events
This chronology gives an overview of the attacks, the locations, ethnicity, the numbers of victims as 
well as damages of property. In Figure 4 most villages which were affected by the clashes can be 
found.  To understand  the  conflict  in  context  and to  see  why certain  attacks  were  carried  out, 
additional  details  and  background  information  is,  however,  necessary.  In  the  following  section 
selected key attacks will be explained in further detail and information will be given on aspects 
which probably contributed and led to the attacks. Also, an attempt will be made to explain why 
certain villages were targeted and which reactions followed. The following section is based on a 
mixture of information from interviews mainly with IDPs, as well as reports composed by KNCHR, 
Kenya Red Cross and different newspaper articles.
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Figure 4: Map - Tana Delta Clashes (adapted from Pickmeier &Rutten 2013, ASC Infosheet 16)
5.4.1 Kau
In Kau tension arose in the middle of August 2012. While the Pokomo claim that big herds of cattle 
(approximately 300 heads) were driven into a farm in Kau, the Orma insist they were grazing their 
cattle on a migratory route which might have been converted into a farm. According to the Pokomo 
the  rice  farm had,  however,  existed  for  decades  and  was  clearly  recognisable  as  a  farm.  The 
Pokomo further reported that when they confronted the herders the situation escalated, the armed 
herders opened fire before fleeing and later complained to the administration Pokomo had stolen 
their cows. According to KNCHR (2012: 12), however, some Orma argued when they were grazing 
their cows, an armed group of Pokomo attacked them and stole their cattle, slaughtered 50 on the 
spot and drove others away. In my own interviews with members of the Orma community it was  
also reported that cattle was driven away and about 200 were slaughtered in Ozi forest near Kau. 
According to the Orma community the Pokomo wanted to provoke a conflict and knew if they stole 
the cattle, the pastoralists would follow and open the fire. Regardless of which group provoked the 
other, it is certain that on the following day Kau village was attacked and three Pokomo died. The 
attackers  were  said  of  having  been  dressed  in  “what  looked  like  official  security  regalia 
(camouflage uniform) and had firearms, in the 2001 conflict Orma raiders or their militias were 
dressed similarly (KHRC 2002). According to a group of Pokomo, members of the administration 
even accompanied the raiders, which is why they first thought the Orma came to reconcile. Due to 
the fact, that the village was burnt down, almost 2,000 people lost their homes. However, most of 
the  villagers  had  left  the  village  some hours  before,  in  anticipation  of  an  attack.  Furthermore, 
suspicion that the Orma had planned the clashes had risen among the Pokomo when a known Orma 
posted a war declaration on Facebook, only shortly after the Kau attack: 
We are done with the so called Kau village. 8 dead, several injured,  some in Ngao 
hospital, the village is no more, just smoke & ashes covering the whole area. We are 
heading to the next village, Ozi. We shall teach you the values of livestock & you will 
never repeat what you did again. This is the mother of all battles. We are morans & not 
coward agriculturalists as you thought. No marines no military will stop us. We are very 
friendly people but we immediately turn into carnivals once you touch our livestock 
because they are our life!
The number of victims is not identical with the number given by Kenya Red Cross, it seems like the 
attackers expected to have killed more. Still, this post shows the aggression behind the attack and 
that the trigger for the attack on Kau village was the killing of cows, which was confirmed in 
numerous interviews with Orma. Also, 73% of Orma respondents in the survey stated that they 
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believe the clashes were triggered by unexplained killing of people or cattle. A day after the post  
was uploaded, it was however deleted by one of the administrators of the forum, due to the fear he 
message could raise tension and incite other attacks. In an interview with a quite open and well 
educated Orma, it was stated that the message given in the Facebook post was not only the opinion 
of one single person, but many tribesmen would agree with the content of the post.  He further 
explained, how, in his opinion, important cattle were for an Orma and why their reaction was so 
strong: “If you invest in something, your money, time, energy, resources, everything, it becomes 
very important for you. You feel for the cows”. The cow is central to the Orma culture and both 
their economic and cultural wealth.35 
Pictures of Facebook were taken and some Pokomo youth forwarded it to the local administration 
and government with the pledge to investigate it and to protect them. Additionally, some Pokomo 
volunteers started training in war techniques. They went to see some Digo waganga36 who oathed 
them. Oathing is a traditional preparation for war in which a person binds himself to protect the 
community.  In  the  2001/2002 conflict  the  Pokomo also  asked  their  “Mijikenda  brothers”37 for 
supernatural support and protection (Martin  2012: 175).  If  somebody under  oath carries out an 
attack, he is not regarded as an offender and there is the belief that oathing protects one from being 
injured, even if shot by a bullet. Therefore, oathing makes the person confident and fearless. Many 
Orma were convinced the Pokomo were trained by the MRC, the Pokomo, however, negated the 
claim and assured the MRC had nothing to do with the conflict.38 Instead, a Pokomo mentioned that 
those Pokomo who were fighting in 2001 trained the new volunteers. According to Human Rights 
Watch, the MRC has, however, a military wing, which was involved in the Tana clashes in both, 
training the Pokomo and fighting alongside (HRW 2013: 18).39
For 16th August a peace meeting was scheduled in the area, however, due to the fear of another 
attack the Pokomo were not willing to participate in a dialogue. They demanded that illegal firearms 
should be surrendered first, otherwise they felt too insecure. To stabilise the situation and to protect 
the population 100 security officers were deployed to the Tana delta.
35 This can be extended to the Wardei culture. in Mikameni a Wardei councillor suggested a farmer should bind a cow 
to a tree if it strays into his farm but not kill it. When he made this statement, some Wardei, however got nervous,  
started protesting and expressed that even binding the cow to a tree was seen as harming their animals.
36 The Swahili word waganga can be translated as witch doctor.
37 Like mentioned above, due to the fact that their languages and cultures are similar, (a part of) the Pokomo and the  
Mijikenda groups probably descended from the same group. Therefore they can fairly understand each other, which 
gives them a feeling of brotherhood.
38 The involvement of the MRC will be further discussed in section 5.4.
39 It is stated that three MRC members confirmed the existence of this military wing and the involvement in the Tana 
clashes.
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5.4.2 Riketa
Two days following the end of Ramadan (August 20th),  the government had still  not started to 
investigate  the  violence,  but  had  only  deployed  the  aforementioned  security  officers  of  the 
paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU). On that 22nd August a Pokomo group attacked Riketa, a 
quite isolated Orma village which was not secured by the extra security officers. Riketa is located in 
a real the wetland area of the Tana delta, surrounded by water and swamps and, therefore, hardly 
accessible without a boat. The village might have been chosen due to its isolated location and the 
absence of security, but the assumption that the attackers of Kau village had found refuge in Riketa 
was probably the main reason. The attackers came from the direction of Kau and Ozi and made use 
of one or more speed boats to reach the village, but the familiar sound of engines seems not to have 
frightened the village population. Reports about the numbers of raiders varied greatly between 50 
and 200, but the description that they were wearing red ribbons around their heads was consistent.  
In the attack, first the outer ring of houses was set on fire and when people tried to flee they were  
attacked with crude weapons like machetes, spears, axes etc. A total of 53 people died, especially 
women and children. Some respondents to the KNCHR fact-finding mission also mentioned the use 
of firearms of the type AK47 but all victims were either slaughtered with crude weapons or burnt 
beyond recognition. The whole operation seemed to be well planned and the attackers had distinct 
roles (KNCHR 2012: 16) during the 20 minutes attack, which is why so many people were killed.  
The unusual high number of women and children among the victims can be explained by the fact 
that people living in Riketa  diversified their  livelihoods also by fishing and therefore the male 
population  had probably already left  the  village  when the  attack  was carried  out.  There  were,  
however,  also  other  speculations:  attacking  women  and  children  was  said  to  be  a  strategy  to 
displace the community because like one respondent put it, “the pain would be too big to stay”.  
There were even assumptions by Orma that a Somali group, the Goshi, advised the Pokomo to use 
this strategy if they wanted to displace the Orma. Another assumption for the killing of women and 
children was this to be a strategy to reduce the number of Orma because the next generation would 
be smaller and there were not as many women to reproduce.
The  survivors  mostly  fled  to  the  neighbouring  village  Dide  Waride,  where  an  IDP camp was 
established. On the next day a government delegation40 visited the area and on 24th August the Prime 
Minister and presidential aspirant Raila Odinga visited Dide Waride to express his condolence and 
to assure that the government was taking care of justice and security.
40 The  delegation  included  the  area  MP  Danson  Mungatana,  Esther  Murugi,  (Minister  for  States  for  Special 
Programmes),  Mzalendo Kibunjia (Chairperson of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)), 
Mathew Iteere (Commissioner of Police) and Samuel Kilele (Coast Provincial Commissioner).
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5.4.3 Kikomo
The incidence in Kikomo shall be given because it seems to be exemplary for the reaction of the 
administration and police on attacks. On 30th August 2012 a Pokomo herdsboy was attacked by 
Orma pastoralists at Kikomo village and the raiders drove away 40 goats the boy was taking care of. 
After he raised alarm a group of Pokomo followed the Orma raiders to demand the goats back. 
When the two groups met on each other clashes arose and one Pokomo teacher, who was one of the 
owners of the animals, died on the spot. As an instrument of pressure the Pokomo drove away a 
herd of 103 heads of cattle belonging to an Orma and brought them to the next police station, where 
they asked the officer in charge not to return the cattle before the 40 goats were found. The District  
Commissioner (DC), however, advised the assistant chief, who was supposed to take care of the 
cattle, to return the herd and to make sure the goats were found (Nation 02/09/2012).
5.4.4 Chamwanamuma and Hewani
Preceding the attack on Chamwanamuma, Pokomo from Hewani had been threatened since 17 th 
August and tension had been high in Salama location. Shots were fired in the air in neighbouring 
Orma villages and a pastoralist was cutting down crops in a farm and was grazing his cattle in the  
same (KNCHR 2012: 17f). When the latter one was confronted by farmers, he threatened them by 
saying the Orma planned “to wipe out all the Pokomo in the area” and claimed that every Orma 
village had contributed 10 youths for an Orma militia. Several Orma confirmed in interviews that 
every village contributed a  number of young warriors.41 Many Pokomo from Hewani  left  their 
homes out of fear and first fled to Oda and some of them later to Chamwanamuma which was 
perceived to be quite secure.
In the beginning of September 2012 peace meetings were held in Garsen in the presence of different 
religious, political and traditional leaders. As a result of the three day meeting, a peace agreement 
was signed on 6th September. Despite the peace agreement Chamwanamuma was attacked on the 
following  day.  During  the  days  prior  to  the  attack  Pokomo  had  reported  gunshots  from 
neighbouring Orma villages  like Kikomo,  however,  no action was taken by the police.  On the 
morning of 7th September an estimated 400 attackers raided Chamwanamuma. The attackers were 
armed  with  firearms  like  AK47,  G3  and other  automatic  guns,  others  were  armed  with  crude 
weapons like spears (KNCHR 2012: 20). According to the Nation (09/09/2012) the attackers were 
dressed in police jungle attire. Some of them were identified as neighbours and “friends”, many 
41 These warriors were said to herd the cattle in times of peace, but to be trained to fight in case of attacks or times of  
war. 
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were, however, strangers (KNCHR 2012: 20).
5.4.5 Kilelengwani 
Only few days after the Chamwanamuma attack Kilelengwani A, an Orma village, was raided at 
dawn even though security was heightened by a police post. The attackers, who were said to have 
come from Kau and Ozi, divided into two groups: while one group attacked the police station at the  
local school, in which they hacked the police officers to death and set the vehicles on fire, the other 
group torched the houses in the village and killed residents, they even attacked those who had fled 
to the mosque. Also, the attackers drove cattle away and killed some in the village. Furthermore, 
nine police guns went missing. The police arrived at Kilelengwani after two hours. Most injuries 
stemmed from crude weapons (like in the attack in Riketa), however, some victims also had gunshot 
wounds. Some of the attackers were identified as neighbours and “friends”, other were unknown 
strangers. Like in Riketa the attackers were wearing red ribbons on their heads and this time also 
white strips of cloth around their waists. It was assumed, that the attackers cut the victims at the 
entry point of bullets in order to hide the real cause of death (KNCHR 2012: 15). This was also 
mentioned  by Orma respondents  in  interviews,  who assumed  the  attackers  wanted  to  hide  the 
possession of illegal firearms. Especially the attack on the police station and the killing of the 
security triggered outrage in the Kenyan population, government and media due to the fact that 
outsiders,  and especially  those  who were  supposed to  stabilise  the  situation  and to  protect  the 
population were murdered as well. However, it was assumed, the attackers would have killed many 
more in case the police post had not been there. As we will see below, the Pokomo expected and 
wanted to provoke exactly this reaction from the public and hoped the clashes and the situation in 
the Tana delta would be given more attention. 
5.4.6 Ozi
On 18th September the discovery of two mass graves which were surrounded by “the stench of 
decomposing bodies” was reported (Nation 19/09/2012). For several days it was unclear how many 
bodies were inside the two graves, because, before opening the holes, which were covered with 
freshly dug earth and twigs, forensic specialists had to arrive. For the time waiting the graves, from 
which a path led to the nearby river, and which were located in the forest about 500 meters from 
Ozi, were guarded by soldiers day and night. It was expected, that Kilelengwani raiders who had 
died and were suspected to have come from Ozi, had been buried in these graves. Therefore the 
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expectations were high who the raiders actually were, however, when the graves were opened, only 
a single foot and marks that bodies had recently been laying inside, were found. The empty graves  
raised many questions due to the fact, that since their discovery the graves were guarded around the 
clock.
Due to the fact, that Pokomo from Ozi were suspected of having been involved in the Kilelengwani 
attack, it was one of the first villages which should be disarmed by the GSU. When the soldiers 
came to the village and did not find any firearms, they, however, started harassing the residents and 
destroyed their properties: In interviews it was reported about indignity, assault and murder. The 
accounts  of  eye  witnesses  included  beating,  breaking  limbs,  rape,  one  woman  was  forced  to 
undress, lay on the ground and soldiers stepped on her back. Some people who tried to flee from the 
harassment drowned in the river or were shot when they ran away. Also, 67 houses were looted by 
the GSU in Ozi village and farms were set on fire. The burning of houses by the GSU in Ozi village 
was brought up in parliament by the area MP Mungatana, IDPs from the village brought it up in an 
interview and a journalist who witnessed the whole situation confirmed it.42 Additionally, machines 
like a grain mill  were destroyed and fish and rice storages were burnt.  The incumbent Danson 
Mungatana forwarded the complaints of the population to the government on 18th September and 
asked the acting Internal Security Minister and Minister of Defence,  Yusuf Haji,  to explain the 
methods of the GSU or whether the troops were infiltrated by outsiders (Nation 23/08/2012). A 
week later Katoo ole Metito, who was in the meantime (on 24 th August) appointed as Minister for 
Internal Security and Provincial Affairs stated the local population had looted the village and the 
GSU was not involved in it (Nation 23/08/2012).
5.4.7 Kipao and Ngao
On the same day of the Riketa attack, Pokomo youth from Ngao, were attacked by people from the 
neighbouring Kipao village (an Orma centre) and three of them were killed. The others managed to 
hide and were rescued later that day. These incidences were never reported officially, but villagers 
from  both  places  Ngao  and  Kipao  confirmed  the  facts.  The  two  villages  have  long-standing 
disparities which started in the 1980s with the killing of two Pokomo at Ngao irrigation scheme 
(Martin 2007).
After a period of relative calm in the Tana delta, between end of September and end of December 
42 In a phone conversation the journalist explained that he was not allowed to accompany the soldiers, however, he saw 
how they invaded the village, smoke started to arise from the burning houses and how the soldiers left the village.
66
2012, Kipao was attacked shortly before Christmas in the morning of 21st December.43 During the 
days preceding the attack, gunshots had been heard from Kipao. While people from the village 
insisted that there were no gunshots and claimed, if guns were fired, it might have been in Ngao, 
people from the neighbouring Orma and Pokomo villages were sure that they heard gunshots from 
Kipao. Hence, the administration and security based in Tarasaa visited Kipao on 18th December and 
asked the villagers to voluntarily surrender the guns within three days, otherwise the GSU would 
come back and forcefully withdraw the weapons or  burn down the village.  After  this  visit  the 
population  of  Kipao  hid  their  weapons,  especially  firearms,  in  the  bush.  Different  from other 
attacks, Kipao village was, according to the Orma, raided without any warning or rumours. When 
the village was attacked in the early morning of 21st, the unarmed villagers at first thought the GSU 
had come to harass them, however, after most had already fled and hid in the bush, the men were 
called back and returned with weapons to fight the attackers. One man described the raiders had 
been  dressed  in  brown uniforms,  which  explains,  why the  villagers  confused  them with  GSU 
officials. However, when the attackers started killing people, the villagers realised it could not be 
the GSU. While the Orma insisted that they were attacked by Pokomo youths from neighbouring 
villages, especially Ngao and Tarasaa, the Pokomo claimed they did not know anything about a 
planned attack and were as surprised as the Orma themselves. Instead the Pokomo assumed the 
Orma had hired militias for  the clashes  but  had not  paid them and therefore their  own militia 
attacked  Kipao.  But  for  the  first  time  after  an  Orma  village  had  been  attacked,  some  of  the 
assailants were left behind, which were in fact youth from Ngao. Due to the fact that the bodies  
were  guarded  by armed  Orma  youths  who refused the  government  and humanitarian  agencies 
access to the bodies, the attackers could not be identified during the day and in the evening after the 
Orma victims were buried the villagers burnt the corpses (Nation 23/12/2012).  After the Kipao 
attack,  indeed some high school  students  from Ngao,  who had come home for  holidays,  were 
missing. The involvement of the young Pokomo was explained by the possibility that they were 
recruited by the militia for support and the youth took the chance to retaliate for the loss of three 
friends in August 2012 without telling the elders or anyone else.
The Pokomo argued they would have never carried out the attack and that many reasons spoke 
against them as raiders of Kipao: (1) The raiders were dressed in brown uniforms which was usually 
the  dress-code  of  attackers  in  Pokomo  villages.  The  attackers  of  Orma  villages  were  instead 
described of having worn red ribbons on their head. Hence, either, the Pokomo also tailored similar 
uniforms, or the Orma were attacked by their own militia. (2) The attackers were using a different 
43 The attack on Kipao happened two days after voter registration was closed, however it is unclear if there was a link  
to it.
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strategy  than  in  other  attacks  carried  out  by  Pokomo.  While  the  Pokomo  usually  started  by 
surrounding  the  village,  setting  the  outer  houses  on  fire  and  then  killing  people  mostly  with 
machetes, the Kipao attack began with shots in the air and when people left their houses they were 
attacked. Furthermore, the attack seemed not to be as well planned as the other ones because some 
of the raiders were left behind. (3) Unlike other Pokomo attacks which were (mainly) armed with 
crude  weapons,  the  Kipao attackers  were using firearms.  (4)  Pokomo from Ngao argued,  they 
would never have planned an attack few days before Christmas. After the clashes in August and 
September, the villagers from Ngao, which were influenced by the presence of German missionaries 
in the late 19th and early 20th century, were looking forward to a peaceful Christmas celebration. 
When the attack happened, relatives who lived outside the Tana delta had already arrived for visits 
and people were in the middle of their Christmas preparations. Therefore, they would have risked 
the security of their friends and family and they argued, if they wanted to attack Kipao, it would 
have been more logical to carry out the attack after the visitors had left again. (5) Last but not least, 
people from Ngao were proposing that it would have been almost impossible for such a big group, 
to leave the GSU-guarded village without being noticed. Other than many other villages Ngao was 
guarded by a large GSU post to secure the district hospital.
5.4.8 Nduru
Nduru village consists of an Orma and a Pokomo part, which are separated by a small distance. In 
September 2012 90 houses were looted in the Pokomo part and most Pokomo had fled. Until Kenya 
Red Cross started to help with the reconstruction of the village in December 2012, the people had 
not returned but lived in IDP camps. On the morning of 9th January 2013 five Pokomo and six Orma 
died in a confrontation. The administration, news reports and the Orma reported that Pokomo this 
time attacked the Orma village. It was said the attackers from Anasa and Semikaro arrived in the 
dawn from a street which had not been secured. First, the Orma residents fought the raiders in the 
village where six Orma and two Pokomo died. As the attackers were fleeing another three Pokomo 
were killed. However, in interviews Pokomo from Nduru village told a different perspective: they 
reported, due to the fact that Kenya Red Cross had started to reconstruct the village in collaboration  
with the IDPs they were camping at the Pokomo side of the village. They claimed, on the morning 
of 9th January a group of Orma came to the village, started destructing the rebuilt part and wanted to 
steal the building material. Some of the Pokomo hid in a Kenya Red Cross car, others confronted 
the raiders. Then, the Pokomo followed the Orma to their village where the situation escalated.
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5.4.9 Kibusu
The attack on Kibusu came only a day after the clashes in Nduru. The villagers, foremost Pokomo, 
had already been warned that an attack was planned and they turned towards the DC and police to  
inform them as well as to ask for security. A group from Kibusu reported they were denied security 
with the explanation that the GSU officers had just come back from Nduru and had to rest first. In a  
conversation the DC explained me that the villagers could not tell him when they would likely be 
attacked and due to limited personnel, the DC could not deploy security every time there were 
warnings.  The next  day at  7  am the village  was attacked.  The attackers  were said of  carrying 
sophisticated guns like AK47 as well as rudimentary weapons (Nation 14/01/2013). According to 
the villagers  the attackers first  shot  school  children who were on their  way to the class  room, 
including one boy who was collecting fire wood in a tree, who was as the villagers described shot  
like a bird. These first shots near the school compound warned the rest of the residents of whom 
many were able to flee. Still, six other people died and 19 houses were looted. Despite the fact that 
Kibusu  is  located  less  than  five  kilometres  from  Minjila,  where  the  police  and  district 
administration are stationed from where Kibusu can even be seen, it took more than two hours for 
assistance to arrive. After the villagers had buried their victims most of them fled to Idsowe or 
Malindi. A group of IDPs in Malindi reported that the attackers had later returned once more to 
Kibusu and looted more houses after the residents had left.
5.4.10 Oda
After the attack on Kibusu, a press conference was held with several political aspirants from the 
Pokomo, Orma and Wardei communities. The conference was organised in cooperation with the 
Kenya Red Cross in Nairobi and all of the political speakers vying for the gubernatorial or National 
Assembly seats. Present were Danson Mungatana (Lower Pokomo), Hussein Dado (Orma), Molu 
Shambaro (Orma), Adam Barisa (Upper Pokomo), Ali Wario Guyo (Orma), and Ali Bure (Wardei). 
The intention of the conference was to present a picture of unity among the political leaders, to 
address the communities and government and ask for support and to show that peace in the area was 
more important than the political victory. Furthermore, it was announced that the leaders would 
hold joint peace rallies together with the Kenya Red Cross Secretary General Abbas Gullet in the 
affected areas in the days ahead. The first meeting was supposed to be held in Tarasaa, which is 
predominantly Pokomo and the second rally was scheduled for Oda, Hussein Dado's home village, 
where many Orma live. Other than agreed on, the Orma aspirants did, however, not turn up to the 
meeting in Tarasaa and neither reacted on attempts to contact them. When Mungatana and Gullet, 
69
accompanied by the DC, moved on to Oda, where they hoped to join the Orma leaders, an angry 
crowd armed with spears  tried to  attack Mungatana's  car.  He could,  however,  flee in  the DC's 
vehicle. Hussein Dado stated that the Orma community was not prepared to meet the MP (Standard 
17/01/2013).  In interviews members  of the Orma community explained that people were angry 
because it was rumoured that the MP and other Pokomo had said that the conflict would only end if 
the Orma would leave the area.44 After this threat of the area MP the question arose, why the Orma 
politicians at the press conference first announced to hold joint peace rallies to express how serious 
they were about their peace efforts, but when they should actually had to show up they did not. 
5.5 The Rationales, Explanations and Different Positions
Let us now look at  the different  perspectives  and explanations on the conflict.  Hereby,  special 
attention will  be given to  the  rationales  of  the  two warring  groups.  This  is  important  to  get  a 
comprehensive picture and to understand why the two groups 
actually  believed  to  be  fight.  In  the  following  two  parts  the 
different explanations of the commu-nities will be summarised 
and presented. In the survey both groups argued that the other 
community started the conflict (see Table 1) and the majority of 
both groups argued they were only defending themselves and 
fighting to show the other group they could not destroy their 
livelihoods without consequences. Furthermore, the Pokomo 
fought for natural resources while the second main reason for 
the  Orma was  revenge  (see  Table  2)45.  In  fact,  two Orma 
explained, in their childhood they were taught with games to 
revenge. Therefore, in case Orma had not yet revenged peace 
agreements were regarded as almost invalid after a Pokomo 
attack.
In  the  survey respondents  were  asked to  identify different 
groups and in which way they were involved in the clashes. 
31 of 150 respondents did not want to give an answer or had 
44 The Orma understood this as a war declaration in which the Pokomo announced to fight them until they left. Several  
Pokomo, however, explained in interviews, due to the fact that they expect frequent invasions of animals in Pokomo 
farms, or Orma claiming the traditional Pokomo land, the conflict would not end, because the Pokomo would not  
back down.
45 The average opinion could range between 2 (strong agreement) and -2 (strong disagreement). This is also applicable  
for similar tables in the following sections.
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Orma Pokomo
Natural Resources -0.6 1.7
Revenge 1.8 -0.1
Intimidation 0.1 -1.1
Displacement -1.2 -1
Hatred -0.01 -1.7
Pure violence -0.6 -1.9
Creation of an enemy -0.4 -1.9
Provocation -0.8 -2
Defence 1.9 1.7
Large scale projects -0.5 -1.9
Table 2: Regarding the clashes in general,  
what are the motives/reasons for your  
group? Accumulated weighed answers.
Orma Pokomo No idea
Orma 0% 100% 0%
Pokomo/
Giriama 89.3% 0% 10.7%
Table 1: Which community started the  
clashes?
no idea. By looking at the other 119 questionnaires, most significant was that more than 50% of 
those who gave an answer indicated that chiefs were the main inciters, politicians and businessmen 
the financiers, politicians and elders the planners and organisers, and youth were mainly involved in 
carrying out the attacks, especially in fighting and looting houses (see Table 3).
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  O
rganising/planning
  Inciting
  Financing
  Physical fighting
  U
se of firearm
s
  U
se of crude w
eapons
   D
efence only
  C
attle raiding
  C
attle killing
  D
estroying farm
s
  Burning houses
  A
busing people
  K
idnapping people
  O
thers
Politicians 36 9 51 - - - - - - - - - - -
Elders 47 27 12 - 1 - - - - - - - - 4
Chiefs 13 67 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other government 
officials 3 3 5 - 2 - - - - - - - - -
Police - 1 - - 33 - 17 - - - - - - 5
GSU - 1 1 - 2 - 60 - - - 1 - 1 5
Businessmen - - 34 - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 2
Investors 1 5 9 - - - - - - - - - - -
Conservationists - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - -
NGOs - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - -
Youth 17 11 - 55 19 21 - 15 19 20 41 7 - -
Well educated people 5 2 - 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 2 1 - -
Less educated people - - - 1 - - - 2 - - 1 2 - 2
Poor people - - 2 3 - - - 12 - - - - - -
Wealthy people 4 - 26 - - - - - - - - - - -
People from the area 1 - - - - - 5 - - - - 1 - -
People from outside - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1
People who have been 
affected by violations - - - - 2 - 5 - - - - - - 1
Relatives of victims 1 - - 2 - - 4 - 1 - - - - 1
Lower Pokomo 4 - - 21 - - - 1 6 - 1 - - 1
Upper Pokomo 5 5 3 22 3 3 1 3 5 3 3 2 - 2
Orma 12 12 12 20 14 14 33 14 1 15 13 3 - -
People of other ethnic 
groups - - - 3 - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1
Militias - - - 2 11 16 - 3 25 2 7 9 9 14
Christians - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - -
Muslims - - - - - - - - 4 - 1 - - -
Farmers - - - 3 - - - 8 43 1 1 - - -
Local pastoralists - - - 1 - - 3 - - 39 - - - -
Foreign pastoralists - - - 1 - - 2 2 - 39 - - - -
People from mixed 
livelihoods - 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - -
More than ¼ ¼ – 1/8 1/8 – 1/12 1/12 – 1/24 Less than 1/24
Table 3: Who was involved in which way?
In the following paragraphs, the conflict will be presented from the perspectives of the respective 
group (Pokomo and Orma) divided in three major topics, (1) natural resources, (2) poor governance, 
as well as (3) involvement of politicians and the relevance of the elections. These narratives were 
collected in open interviews. Especially Pokomo elders linked the conflict to the history, therefore, 
their historical perspective will also be included. The two viewpoints are based on several group 
and one-on-one interviews. Probably not every individual of the ethnic group would agree on the 
rationales, but due to the fact that the aspects appeared in several interviews with people of different 
characteristics (gender, home village, age etc.) they are regarded as group rationales rather than 
individual accounts. It is likely that the rationales are products of interactions and retelling, but due 
to the fact that they shape the perception of the respective groups and their perspectives on the 
conflict, they are of big relevance for understanding the conflict. Liisa Malkki (1995: 45f) called the 
mix of historical facts and believes of Hutu refugees in Tanzania mythico-histories. The mythical 
part of these narratives is mainly the very positive self-portrayal. A similar phenomenon can be 
found in the perspectives of the Orma and Pokomo on the history and reasons for the clashes. Both 
groups  present  themselves  as  the  saviours  of  the  others  and of  having  been victimised.  These 
mythico-histories are crucial to understand why the two groups believe to fight and what might be 
the root cause of the conflict.
5.5.1 Natural Resources
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, conflicts between farmers and herders related to natural 
resources are not an exception due to the fact that the two groups have different needs regarding 
land and water. The pastoralist and agriculturalist communities living in the Tana delta traditionally 
have different  land tenure systems:  While  the pastoralists  share and own land communally the 
farming groups own land on an individual basis, to guarantee the individual that he will get the 
harvest and no-one else will claim it. For pastoralists communal land ownership is crucial, due to 
the fact that they need wide grazing areas for their livestock and the pasture needs to recover before 
an area is entered again. 
Before  colonialism,  the  two  groups  had  clear  regulations  how to  handle  their  differences  and 
through negotiation solutions were found. However, due to colonial and post-colonial policies these 
rules were confused and are now (often) not regarded anymore. But the statutory land tenure system 
which now coexists with the other two complicates the legal situation, especially because it is often 
implemented with reluctance. Issues connected to land rights are for both communities a central 
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factor in the conflict  and 51% of 
the  survey  respondents  were 
convinced that the conflict started 
as  a  natural  resource  conflict, 
while  only  22%  thought  the 
conflict  was  politically  instigated 
from the beginning (see Table  4). 
In the following two sections the 
rationales  and  positions  of  the 
Pokomo and the Orma community, 
regarding natural resources in the 
Tana  delta  clashes  will  be 
presented. 
5.5.1.1 The Pokomo Perspective
According to the Pokomo, they are the rightful inhabitants of the Tana delta. When the Pokomo 
arrived in the area, they only found some Sanye hunter gatherers with which they shared the area 
and lived together peacefully. The Sanye were living in the forests while the Pokomo settled along 
the riverbanks and lakes. The Orma arrived in the Tana area when they moved southwards from 
Ethiopia,  on their  flight  from the  Somali.  When they reached the  river  Tana,  the  Orma met  a 
Pokomo elder who allowed them, out of generosity, to cross the river and to stay. However, the 
Pokomo soon discovered that the Orma were not a friendly and peace loving group. The Orma stole 
from the Pokomo and occasionally killed one of them. It was explained, before an Orma warrior 
wanted to marry, he had to prove his strength by killing a lion or a human. If he killed a human he 
cut the genitals as a trophy and carried them home to prove his success.46 Hence, the Pokomo used 
to fear the Orma and ran away from them or hid when an Orma came to the village. The Pokomo 
blamed the elder who invited the Orma to stay for their fearful life and replaced him. The new 
leader spoke with the Orma, demanded they had to stay away from the Pokomo and told them off to 
the hinterland. In case of any offence, the elders of the two communities came together, held a 
ceremony,  discussed the  case and looked for  a  solution.  During the  dry spell,  when there was 
drought in the area where the Orma stayed, the Orma used to send a message to the Pokomo to ask 
for permission to get access to the river waters or to come to the delta. Hence, the Pokomo leader 
gathered the elders together who discussed where they could spare a piece of land until rain would 
46 This practice was confirmed by Bunger (1973: 22).
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No 
- / -- maybe
Yes
+ / ++
accumulated 
weighted 
answers
The clashes were politically 
instigated from the beginning. 56% 22% 22% -0.5
The clashes were not planned 
but started because of normal 
resource conflicts between 
farmers and pastoralists.
26.2% 22.8% 51% 0.7
The clashes were not triggered 
by natural resources but by 
anger and hatred.
60.5% 27.5% 12% -0.8
The conflict was connected to 
large scale projects in the area. 61.7% 16.1% 22.2% -0.8
The conflict was connected to 
a land survey. 47% 14.8% 38.2% -0.3
My community attacked the 
other group to stop their 
frequent violations.
7.4% 17% 65.5% 1.2
Table 4: Statements about the beginning, trigger and causes of the clashes
come. In case the Orma only needed access to the river, they had to sacrifice one cow, slaughter it  
and give it  to the Pokomo. However,  if they asked for a grazing area in the delta,  they had to 
slaughter seven cows, one for each Pokomo village and to provide them with milk throughout the 
time of their stay. In case, the Orma were permitted to the delta, the Pokomo were responsible to 
cross the Orma and their animals over the river. As soon as the rainy season started, the Orma had to 
return to the hinterland. 
When the colonialists arrived, the Pokomo leader approached the administration and asked them to 
keep the Orma in the hinterlands,  otherwise the Pokomo would not collaborate.  Following this 
request, the colonialists divided the Orma in two groups and sent one of them to the northern part 
near Wayu and the other group was sent to a rather southern part at Assa. Furthermore, the groups 
were asked to appoint  chiefs who were supposed to collect  taxes and be the right hand of the 
administration.  The Northern  group appointed  a  well-regarded Orma while  the  Southern  group 
chose the son of an Akamba who had neither much insight, nor authority in the group. The choice 
was taken because the group assumed the colonialists were looking for a spy. These chiefs were,  
however, given responsibility in, for example, collecting taxes. Hence, the southern Orma group 
regretted their choice and ran away from their chief to the area of Oda-Wachu and Bilisa.  The 
District Commissioner Lambert advised the chief to follow his group, which is why he settled at 
Nduru  and  continued  with  his  responsibilities.  The  colonialists  established  migratory  corridors 
called malka on which the Orma could take their cattle to the river, but only during the dry spell. 
However, after independence, the Orma who had settled in the South, refused to leave the delta. A 
Pokomo elder stated, the Orma with whom they are now in conflict are “the same trouble makers” 
as those who were not willing to cooperate with the colonial administration and ran away from their 
chief. From this historical perspective, a main problem is, in the eyes of the Pokomo, that the norms 
and regulations,  how to share the natural  resources,  are no longer  practised.  Instead,  the Orma 
started forcing their way to the water and into the delta without the permission of the Pokomo and 
often it ends in destroyed Pokomo farms.
While it  was initially impossible to stay in the delta throughout the year and the rainy season, 
especially if one wanted to keep livestock, the settlement of Orma in the delta was supported by 
changing climate  conditions.  The delta  was  used  to  be  marshy and  was  flooded  twice  a  year, 
however, due to different environmental changes47 the water masses reduced and the water level in 
the river and delta lowered. Hence the flies and diseases reduced as well and unless before, it was 
47 Like  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  these  environmental  changes  were  caused  by  different  factors  like  the 
construction of several hydropower dams. The claim these changes were connected to climate change was only  
based on the respondents perceptions.
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now possible to stay there, sometimes even during the rainy season. Therefore the Orma established 
villages close to where the Pokomo used to farm. Due to the environmental changes, and the fact 
that flood irrigation got less reliable, farming became more labour and time intense and with time 
the Pokomo had to reduce the areas they were farming. However, if the Pokomo would have had 
access to new affordable technologies, the farmers could have maintained the size of their fields. 
But due to the fact that they had to reduce, the Pokomo started to become even poorer.
Besides the reduced harvest, the Pokomo also blame the Orma herders and their cattle for their 
impoverishment. After the Orma forced their way into the delta and established villages on what 
was perceived as Pokomo land, they also started using the farms as grazing areas. When the farmers 
were  not  around,  pastoralists  came  with  their  animals  which  started  grazing  the  crops  and 
destroying the harvest.  Before the farmer  came back to  his  farm,  the  pastoralist  and his  cattle 
disappeared and left a cleared field. As soon as the farmer confronted the pastoralist, the latter one 
asked how the farmer could prove it was his animals that were in the farm. According to Pokomo 
elders, in such cases both, farmers and pastoralists, started grouping up and this is how the conflict 
between the two ethnic groups originally started.  Hence the clashes  are  not  seen as  a  separate 
conflict, but one escalation of a bigger problem and the Orma who came from Assa are seen as the 
main offenders. The Orma are, by the Pokomo, until now seen as foreigners, visitors and trouble-
makers “in someone else's land” who do not respect the rules of the original inhabitants.
According  to  the  Pokomo  accounts  the  whole  situation  was  worsened  when  under  Moi's 
government new locations were created, of which some were named after Orma villages. Kipao and 
Galili location for example had formerly been part of Ngao location and the land in these - what the  
Orma now call - “Orma locations” was cultivated by the Pokomo. The Pokomo had farmed along 
the riverbanks and in the delta, even if many of their villages were across the river and sometimes 
quite a few kilometres from their farms. Some of the Pokomo from Ngao, for example, had and still 
have their farms in areas which now belong to Kipao or Galili location. Since these farms were 
then, however, in “Orma locations” Orma from the respective areas started claiming the land. This 
mainly became an issue because the Orma also started diversifying their livelihoods and became 
agro-pastoralists. According to the Pokomo, the Orma took over their farms without the consent of 
the owner and sometimes the Pokomo farmers were chased out of their farms by armed Orma. 
The Pokomo decided not to fear the Orma anymore and not to hide from them as in the beginning 
when  the  Orma  had  just  arrived.  Now,  the  Pokomo  started  fighting  back,  which  occasionally 
resulted in clashes. Furthermore, the Pokomo had the impression, the Orma wanted to displace them 
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entirely and chase them out of their ancestral land. In order to show the Orma that they would not 
back down, and that the Orma had to stop invading farms, the Pokomo first slaughtered cattle and 
after the Kau attack and the declaration on Facebook, they trained their volunteers and attacked 
Riketa. In line of this natural resource conflict the cruelty shown in the attack was meant to shock  
the Orma and to stop them from ongoing and future offences. 
Due to the fact that the initial conflict started as a farmer/herder and natural resource conflict, and 
livestock frequently strays into farms the Pokomo believe the conflict will not end unless the two 
groups will be separated. Because the Pokomo see themselves as the rightful inhabitants of the area, 
they claim their farms back and argue the Orma should return to the hinterland.
5.5.1.2 The Orma Perspective
Other than the Pokomo who claim they gave the Orma space to escape from the Somali and in 
return the Orma made their life difficult, the Orma say they protected the Pokomo frequently from 
enemies and fought among others these Somali.
According to an Orma respondent the conflict between the Orma and Pokomo started in the 1960s 
after independence but farmer/herder conflicts already existed during the 19th century. The latter 
ones were, however, solved by the elders of both groups. Another Orma respondent explained that 
in those days life was much better for both groups. There was much more rain than nowadays, the 
Orma had big herds of cattle and the Pokomo farmed on bigger fields. He commented, “Life was 
precious”. However, due to different factors like epidemics and droughts the Orma lost parts of their 
herds and the Pokomo had to reduce their farms because of environmental changes and the lack of 
water. He further explained, nowadays land in the Tana delta is laying idle and there is sufficient 
pasture and farming land for both communities. Therefore, he does not believe that the conflict 
started as a normal farmer/herder conflict, but he assumes that there must have been more behind 
the clashes. Instead, he suggested one or both groups shall be displaced from the delta. Also, in 
Table 2 we saw, that the Orma actually did not see their attacks so much caused by disputes over  
natural resources.48
The fear, uttered by this Orma, that there were plans to displace the Orma community from the Tana 
delta, either by the Pokomo, possibly in cooperation with the MRC, or the government and foreign 
investors, was expressed by all Orma respondents in semi-structured interviews. Also, in the survey, 
besides one, all Orma respondents were convinced the Pokomo wanted to displace them from the 
delta. This feeling was enhanced by the utterance of Pokomo who said the war would only end if  
48 Only nine Orma respondents said the conflict was related to natural resources, 26 were impartial and 40 respondents  
were convinced the conflict was not a natural resource conflict.
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the Orma left the Tana delta and went back to Assa where they came from. The Orma understood 
this comment as a declaration that the Pokomo would fight them until they were gone. One other 
major reason why the Orma believed there might be plans to displace them was that the Pokomo 
and the government both were interested in using the Tana delta for agricultural large scale projects 
to increase economic growth. The Orma, however, fear to lose their grazing areas and therefore 
oppose such projects. In semi- structured interviews Orma respondents mentioned that they did not 
want  to leave the delta,  on the one hand because they started to  practice agro-pastoralism and 
needed the fertile area for farming, on the other hand, staying with cattle in a fertile area is much 
more convenient than practising a nomadic lifestyle in search of pasture and water. If they stayed in  
the delta their children could go to school and the herdsmen did not have to travel long distances. 
Instead, the Orma have established, what they call in Kiorma, an urune, a “cattle camp” in the delta. 
The urune was  described as  an area  in  which  many herders  camped with  their  livestock.  The 
herders from different villages were said to live in a camp of huts where they had designated areas 
to graze the cattle. Due to the fact that the area was wide and fertile, there was enough pasture for 
everyone, they did not have to travel long distances and did not get in conflict with other pastoralist  
groups.
Furthermore, the Orma claim the Pokomo were not present in the actual delta. On the one hand, the 
Pokomo villages were on the south-western side of the river and on the other hand the land in the 
delta was in “Orma locations”. Hence, most of those Pokomo who farmed in the delta or on the 
north-eastern side of the river, were actually claiming Orma land. Due to the fact that the land is 
disputed  and  the  Pokomo  claimed  even  the  farms  in  “Orma  locations”,  the  Orma  supported 
communal  land adjudication  in  which  the  Orma communities  could  officially  hold  the  land in 
“Orma locations”. If the Pokomo wanted to privatise land in their own locations they would not 
mind, however the land in “Orma locations” should be given to the Orma community. 
Another problem mentioned by some Orma respondents, especially in relation to the problems in 
Kau, was that the Pokomo expanded their farms on animal migratory routes. The Orma gave room 
for the possibility that the cattle in Kau was found in a farm, however, only because the water way 
was blocked. 
One other aspect connected to land ownership and natural resources is that the Orma complain they 
were not regarded and respected as one of the indigenous groups in the area. The MRC did not 
explicitly mention them as one of the coastal groups (see chapter 2.1) and they claimed a document 
existed in which the MRC demanded the Orma should leave the Tana delta. According to these 
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respondents, the MRC recruited people in the Tana delta in the beginning of 2012 and while the 
Pokomo supported the MRC, the Orma did not, because they were not recognised as one of the 
indigenous coastal people. Furthermore, the Orma did not want to support the MRC because the 
latter one did not consult them and neither did they “recognise pastoralism as an income generating 
activity”.  Hence,  one respondent,  who also reported to the inquiry commission,  was wondering 
whether or not the MRC regarded the Orma as human beings. Due to the fact that the Pokomo 
supported them, they concluded, the MRC fought on the side of the Pokomo, trained warriors in Ozi 
forest and armed them. In fact, there were two interpretations: (1) the Pokomo asked the MRC, in 
return for their support, to compose a document that the Orma should be displaced from the Tana 
delta and to fight on their side; and (2) the conflict was in the first place started because the Orma 
did not support the MRC.
5.5.2 Government Reaction, Poor Governance and Institutional Failure
Throughout and after the clashes, the government has often 
been  accused  of  not  having  reacted  appropriately  to  the 
skirmishes.  In  the  survey  respondents  uttered  their 
dissatisfaction  by only rating  the  presence  of  high  ranking 
officials  and GSU as  slightly effective.  All  other  measures 
were seen as rather ineffective (see Table 5).
It  is  argued,  that  in  the  early  stage  of  the  conflict  when 
tensions  arose  due  to  the  destruction  of  property,  the 
government failed to react appropriately. Macharia, who was 
then the DO1 and acting DC in the area, was several times 
accused by respondents of not having handled the situation well. It was said, his administration did 
not hold offenders responsible through compensation or it was handled with reluctance and if an 
offender was arrested, he was usually released either on the same day or after one night. Due to the 
fact  that  people  were  not  compensated  for  their  losses,  tension  increased  and  they  got  the 
impression the only solution was to take the right in their own hands if the administration was not 
protecting them. Also, respondents on both sides mentioned doubts about the credibility of reports 
composed by the administration during the initial tensions and the actual clashes. This might partly 
be connected to the different perceptions on land ownership and the usage of natural resources (see 
above), but also expresses, how little the political trust within both groups was, which can according 
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Peace meetings -0.01
Presence of high officials 0.2
GSU 0.1
Curfew -0.01
Disarmament -1
Establishment of new police posts -0.4
Arresting people -1.95
Tana Inquiry Commission -0.2
Aid -0.2
Table 5: Effectiveness of government  
measures. Accumulated weighed answers.
to Hutchinson and Johnston (2011: 738) lead to the escalation of conflicts. 
When  the  conflict  escalated,  peace  meetings  between  the  two  warring  communities  were 
intensified. During these peace meetings an attempt was made to calm the situation down and to  
create a dialogue between the groups, to solve issues and to find solutions. However, the peace 
committees were said of not having had enough authority and support in the groups which made the 
peace meetings  a  rather  weak tool.  After  peace  talks  in  the  beginning of  September 2012,  for 
example,  a  peace  agreement  was  signed by elders  of  each  group,  however,  the  following  day 
Chamwanamuma was attacked.
Besides the aforementioned attempts to settle the issues, the police arrested suspects during the 
conflict. But according to respondents, like during the initial tensions most of the suspects were 
released shortly after or they were even arrested without any proof for their involvement. Besides 
ordinary suspects, the government also arrested several chiefs and an appointed councillor, as well 
as  Galole  MP Dhadho  Godhana  who  was  released  on  bail.  After  the  attack  on  Kilelengwani 
President Kibaki ordered a dusk-to-dawn curfew on 10th September and on 12th September a 2,000 
man strong force was ordered to the Tana delta including 1,300 fresh GSU graduates to stabilise the 
situation and disarm the population. The disarmament was unfortunately not as successful as hoped 
for and besides crude weapons only few illegal firearms were withdrawn, mainly in the northern 
part of the county. The curfew in combination with the heightened security seemed to work well, 
until Kipao was attacked in the early morning hours of 21st December 2012.
On 13th September 2012 a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate the clashes was created and 
started their investigations, which were supposed to take one month, in the beginning of October. 
After an extension until December 2012, the responsible Lady Justice Grace Nzioka was attacked in 
Nairobi on 23rd January. Among other items, her electronic devices were stolen and it was assumed 
the attackers wanted to hide the truth about the Tana clashes. She assured, however, that the report 
was save  and the  document  was  handed over  to  the  President  on  21st May 2013.  To date  the 
promised report has, however, not been made accessible to the wider public.
5.5.2.1 The Pokomo Perspective
Apart from the natural resources issue another aspect raised by several Pokomo respondents, which 
according to them contributed to the escalation and intensity of the conflict, was poor governance 
and the assumption that the Orma bribed the administration. They argued, due to the fact that the 
Orma were wealthier, the latter ones have the means to silence the administration and to buy their 
goodwill.  Hence,  the  Pokomo  felt  that  they  were  not  protected  by the  administration  and  the 
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officials did not take their complaints seriously. Instead, they had the impression administration and 
security were harsher on the Pokomo on whom, from their own perspective, the administration also 
put most blame. It was explained that the government usually tried to appeal at the goodwill of the 
Pokomo and told them not to retaliate. However, after the violations increased, the government did 
not make any attempt to protect the Pokomo, to take action or to force the Orma to compensate for 
the damages, they saw themselves in a situation where they had to take the right in their own hands. 
Similarly like with the land issue, the Pokomo did not see any other way to accomplish change in 
the  system  than  organising  big  attacks  and  drawing  the  attention  of  the  public  and  the 
administration to the problems in the Tana delta. Several respondents argued that this was also the 
reason for attacking the police post in Kilelengwani; even though the clashes were already going on 
for one month, the government had not taken action. Hence, these big attacks could be seen as a cry 
for  help.  Like  expected,  the  killing  of  the  police  post  triggered  government  actions  like  the 
deployment  of  security,  a  dusk-to-dawn curfew  and  an  inquiry  commission  was  authorised  to 
investigate the clashes. 
This feeling of being neglected by the government and Orma bribing officials, continued throughout 
the clashes. Before Kibusu was attacked, the villagers who had been warned the night before, asked 
for security, but they were denied any support (see section 5.2.9). The Pokomo complained further, 
even though it was obvious that the Orma had illegal firearms, the GSU was mainly disarming 
Pokomo and looking for the nine police guns. Also, it was said, on peace meetings the focus was 
partly put on the nine firearms instead of the numerous illegal guns the pastoralists were holding. 
Two Pokomo respondents assumed that the government did not disarm the Orma because they were 
taking care  of  cattle  owned by high government  officials.  Also,  several  Pokomo suggested the 
police and GSU might be scared of the armed Orma themselves, because their firearms were partly 
more sophisticated than the police guns.  Furthermore,  according to the Pokomo perception,  the 
police arrested more Pokomo suspects than Orma ones and if Orma suspects were arrested, they 
were released shortly after.  Hence,  the Pokomo concluded that the Orma must have bribed the 
administration and security offices or the government supported the Orma or, like a Pokomo elder 
once put it, “the Orma must be a government project”. In fact, the Pokomo had the impression to 
have  two enemies:  the  government  and the  Orma.  This  feeling  was not  only produced by the 
negligence nut also by the looting of houses as well as other property and the harassment in Ozi 
village by GSU officers. Hence, the Pokomo had the impression that the government planned to 
displace them and leave the delta to the Orma, even though, according to the Pokomo, the Tana 
delta was their ancestral land and the Orma used to live in the hinterland in near Assa and Wayu.
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Besides blaming the government for not taking action before and during the conflict, the Pokomo 
also complained that the government failed to provide services in the area. This includes providing 
sufficient  security  if  there  is  no  conflict,  improving  the  infrastructure,  promoting  education, 
providing  health  facilities,  and  bringing  development  projects  to  the  area  which  benefit  the 
population of the Tana delta. Thus, the political trust of the Pokomo was already minimal, which 
probably also contributed to the escalation.
5.5.2.2 The Orma Perspective
Similarly  like  the  Pokomo,  the  Orma also  felt  neglected  by the  government  and  civil  society 
organisations. However, the Orma mainly accused Danson Mungatana, the incumbent area MP, of 
not  having  been  impartial  during  the  10  years  when  he  was  their  representative.  The  Orma 
expressed  their  impression  of  not  having  benefited  from the  Constituency  Development  Fund 
(CDF). They felt neglected in the number of students who were supported, they complained no 
secondary  school  and  dispensaries  had  been  built  in  Orma  villages  and  also  the  Orma  were 
disadvantaged because their villages were not connected to the power lines, even if their villages 
were next to it. Furthermore, it was said Mungatana had placed his people in the CDF committee 
and a case was in court against him because of mismanagement of the funds. Additionally, the Orma 
suspected mainly Mungatana's family and village had benefited from the CDF money. Besides the 
neglect  by  Mungatana,  the  Orma  also  complained  they  were  disadvantaged  because  the  only 
hospital in the district was in a Pokomo village and they, furthermore, did not receive as much aid 
and assistance as the Pokomo, from organisations like Kenya Red Cross. They complained, while 
Kenya Red Cross started re-building Pokomo houses, they did not do the same in Orma villages. 
Another aspect raised several times was that the Orma saw themselves less represented in the media 
and claimed, the attacks of Orma villages were given less attention. 
Besides the neglect by politicians and the civil society, Orma also complained that administration 
and police were corrupt. Other than the Pokomo they were wondering why the 1200 GSU officers, 
who were disarming the population, had not found the nine police guns. Hence, they assumed the 
Pokomo must have bribed them. However, the Orma also complained that the suspects of the Kipao 
attack  were  released  too  quickly  and  the  administration  would  not  arrest  the  perpetrators. 
Furthermore, it was said the Nduru attack was carried out relatively close to a police post, however, 
the police did not take action and protect the residents.
Additionally, the Orma suspected the Pokomo were collaborating with the government and GSU for 
the Kipao attack. They were wondering why else the attack was carried out exactly on the day when 
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the GSU was supposed to come and disarm them. This was also given as the reason, why the Orma 
denied the administration access to the village and did not even want to speak with the DC or PC 
(Provincial Commissioner).
Also, almost all Orma respondents complained the peace meetings held by the administration were 
useless because people were not serious about what they said in peace meetings and furthermore, 
they  could  only  be  effective  if  they  were  actually  held  by  elders.  Hence,  most  measures  the 
government and administration took were in the eyes of the Orma useless or unsuccessful. The only 
measure in which much hope was put into was the inquiry commission.
5.5.3 Involvement of Politicians and the Relevance of the Elections
The  major  set  of  public  accusations  took  place  between  the  acting  Internal  Security  Minister, 
Defense Minister and Ijara MP Yusuf Haji and the Assistant Livestock Minister and Galole MP 
Dhadho Godhana. On 21st August the Nation49 reported Godhana had said: “Clashes in Tana River 
are not all about water and pasture; there is more to it than what we hear or see. We need the 
National  Security  Intelligence  Service  to  investigate  this  clashes  that  have  become  the  norm 
especially as we approach the general elections” (Nation 21/08/2012). Two days later, the Nation 
reported Haji accused Godhana of not being cooperative in resolving the root causes of the clashes 
and  the  latter  one  had  been  “snubbing  security  and  peace  talks”  (Nation  23/08/2012).  Also, 
Godhana  was  accused  of  having  held  a  meeting  in  the  Tana  delta  to  plan  attacks.  Godhana, 
however, denied the claims he had refused to cooperate or having had a role in the clashes and 
having held a secret meeting. Instead, he demanded Haji's role in the clashes should be investigated, 
and accused him of having plans to expand Ijara District into what is now Tana River (see below). 
On 7th September 2012 Godhana said on National TV that the war was not over until Yusuf Haji was 
sacked. This was regarded as incitement of his people to fight and on 12th September he himself was 
sacked as Assistant Minister, arrested and released on a 500,000 KSH cash bail. His hearing was 
scheduled for 2nd October and finally on 16th January 2013 he was cleared.
In the last weeks before the elections several Kenyan media stations organised presidential debates 
in which a question on security especially in relation to the clashes in the Tana delta was posed. 
While Peter Kenneth rather spoke about the general security situation and how he would invest in 
this  sector,  other  aspirants  tried to  approach the clashes  in  the Tana delta  directly:  Presidential 
candidate Musalia Mudavadi, originating from western Kenya, who had in August uttered that he 
49 The Nation is one of the major Kenyan daily newspapers.
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did not see the causes of conflict in a struggle for resources but a struggle for power stated that 
people were “beginning to jostle for political positions, either trying to use clan or ethnic based 
strategies to try and build support for themselves but it is a very costly way of playing politics in  
this country because we lose lives” (Nation 25/08/2012). He focused in the presidential debate on 
the economic situation of the people and lack of communication between the warring groups. He 
further said the conflict was largely resource based and politicians capitalised on it to inflame the 
situation. Martha Karua saw the root causes of the conflict in poverty and the underdevelopment of 
the  area.  As  solutions  she  suggested  to  improve  the  infrastructure  and  better  technology  was 
necessary to control such situations. Furthermore, she mentioned that on the one hand the moral of 
police officers had to be raised, on the other hand, the local population needed to be cooperative in 
peace efforts. Raila Odinga's main concern was about border issues. He said, first the international 
boundaries  to  neighbouring  unstable  countries  had  to  be  secured,  but  also  the  border  conflict 
between  Garissa  and  Tana  River  had  to  be  resolved.  Additionally,  he  saw  the  need  of  better  
disciplining  and  equipping  police  officers,  poverty  elimination  and  he  stated  especially  for 
pastoralists the diversification of livelihoods was crucial because their lifestyle was unsustainable. 
Paul  Muite  repeated  that  poverty was the  root  cause of  the  problem and in  his  view,  security 
personnel had to be deployed to such areas to control the situation and to prevent that people took 
the right in their own hands. Mohammed Abduba Dida, was wondering why the intelligence reports 
did not give more information about the clashes if it was even known when illegal poachers killed 
elephants. Furthermore, he stressed that the perpetrators were from outside the area and moved into 
Tana River  for  the clashes.  He saw a main reason for  the weak security situation and in  poor 
governance. James ole Kiyiapi stressed the Security and Police was not well coordinated and before 
tackling the root causes one had to end the clashes and to save lives, however, the government 
missed to do that. Furthermore, like others before him, he also mentioned one of the main problems 
for insecurity in the country was corruption. Finally, Uhuru Kenyatta saw the causes of the conflict 
in  disputes over  boundaries,  resources and social  aspects.  To tackle the problems he suggested 
different development projects and improvement of the economy.
5.5.3.1 The Pokomo Perspective
According to the farmer community, the Orma mainly wanted to unite their own group, intimidate 
the others, displace them from the delta and they mainly suspected the Orma of fighting to gain 
political power (see Table 6).
The Pokomo mainly held the two politicians Yusuf Haji a Somali from North-Eastern Province, and 
Hussein Dado, an Orma leader who was aspiring the gubernatorial seat, accountable for the clashes 
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and accused them of having planned the skirmishes. The two 
were said to have known each other from their time working in 
the  civil  service  and  to  have  planned  the  clashes  together. 
Furthermore Ali  Wario Guyo,  a  young (30 year  old)  Orma, 
who  was  contesting  for  the  National  Assembly,  was  also 
indicated to have been involved. 
According to the Pokomo, Yusuf Haji had two main interests 
in the conflict. On the one hand he had big herds of cattle in 
the Tana delta, which in case of the implementation of large 
scale  agricultural  projects  or  a  land privatisation  policy had to  be  shifted  and did  not  get  the 
nutritious pasture for the wetlands anymore. It was argued that Haji had an interest in the elections 
being won by the Orma community and the skirmishes could have benefited his interests because it  
was more likely that the land was adjudicated or the area was used for agricultural projects if the 
Pokomo were strong in the new county government and won the gubernatorial seat. On the other 
hand, it was claimed the disputed border between the Ijara District, of which Haji was the MP, and 
Tana River District was a reason for the conflict. It was argued Haji wanted to move the border 
between  the  two  districts  to  the  river  because  he  needed  the  area  for  planned  development 
projects.50 Hence, the Pokomo assumed, Haji on the one hand had incited and instigated the conflict, 
but also contributed financially by paying militias and arming them with KDF firearms, of which 
bullets were found on the ground after Chamwanamuma was attacked. Furthermore, it was assumed 
Haji was in his position as head of the two ministries for Provincial Affairs and Internal Security as 
well as Defence in charge of the security personnel and the administration, which he controlled and 
advised.  Furthermore,  his  position  as  the  head  of  intelligence  gave  him  the  opportunity  to 
manipulate which information was made public. It was further suggested, that Haji did not only 
give orders to mainly disarm Pokomo villages, but also advised to let the Kipao raiders escape, who 
according to the Pokomo had stolen a substantial number of cows as compensation for the missing 
payment (see section 5.3.7) and otherwise Haji would have been held responsible and had to pay for 
it.
Dado was also accused of having had two interests in the clashes. It was assumed Dado wanted to 
benefit from the clashes for the elections to win the Governor seat by uniting the pastoralists and 
displacing the Pokomo.  Similarly the possible  involvement  of  Ali  Wario Guyo was mentioned. 
50 The border dispute exists already since Ijara District was created in the year 2000, due to the fact, that parts of it  
belonged to Tana River District.
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Unification of the own group 1.2
Intimidation of the other group 1.6
Gain of political power 1.7
To show strength -0.1
Stop the other of destroying 
livelihoods -1.1
Displacing the other from the 
Tana delta 1.9
Burning of IDs and Voter cards -1.3
Table 6: What are the aims of the other  
group? Accumulated weighed answers.
Before the clashes the Orma leaders tried to unite the pastoralists for the elections and to reach a 
power sharing agreement especially with the Wardei. According to different Orma aspirants, they 
were hoping the pastoralists would win all seats and in particular those for forming the Tana River 
County government. To this aim, it was reported, Ali Wario in collaboration with two other people 
had founded a pastoralist lobby group called “Let All Tana Tribes Unite” (Standard 09/12/2012). 
Hence, the Pokomo assumed the Orma wanted to unite the pastoralists by presenting the Pokomo as 
a  common  enemy and  by blaming  them to  have  initiated  the  conflict  and  in  the  case  of  the 
Khurtumo boy,  having attacked even a Wardei.  Therefore,  according to the Pokomo,  the Orma 
presented themselves as being on the side of the Wardei and claimed to retaliate for them. The 
creation of a common enemy is not an uncommon strategy in elections, and could have benefited 
the Orma.  From the perspective of  the Pokomo this  was necessary because the two pastoralist 
groups were not in good terms and had differences as well. Furthermore, the Pokomo believed the 
Orma wanted to displace them and to reduce the number of Pokomo voters to win the elections. In 
the survey 97% (63 out of 65) of the Pokomo were convinced the Orma were fighting to displace 
them.
Furthermore,  several  Pokomo  respondents  suspected  Dado  also  had  a  personal  interest  in  the 
conflict. It was explained that Dado was born by an Orma mother but his biological father who had 
abandoned the two was a Pokomo. Hence, the Pokomo assumed the Orma would not see him as a 
real Orma and he had to proof it by his behaviour. Dado's social father was, however, said to have 
been an Orma, but he had killed a Pokomo boy and was consequently murdered by the boy's father 
and Hussein  Dado,  unluckily,  had  witnessed it  when he  himself  was a  young boy.  Hence,  the 
Pokomo assumed, since that moment Hussein Dado hated the Pokomo and he planned to retaliate, 
even though several members of the Pokomo elite were said to have supported Dado in his career.51 
In 1999 when he was shot in his leg by shiftas, he was said of having carried firearms to his home 
village Oda, where he stored them in a shack. It was argued, as the DC of Baringo, he had on the  
one hand access to the weapons and on the other hand as a government official he would not be 
checked by the  police.  It  was  argued these  weapons  were  used  to  arm the  Orma in  the  2001 
conflict.52 The Pokomo argued further, when they realised after the clashes in 2001 that Dado was 
still planning to make their lives difficult, they sent a letter to the President to request Dado to be 
taken  out  of  the  country.  Hence,  he  was  transferred  to  Namibia  as  an  ambassador.  However, 
51 Among those who supported him were, according to respondents, the former MP Israel Lekwa Daido and Hussein  
Dado's Pokomo step brother and once Head of Civil Service Fares Kuindwa.
52 This was also reported to the inquiry commission, however, Hussein Dado argued, as a DC he could not have carried 
weapons to the Tana delta (Nation 10/12/2012).
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according to the Pokomo, after he was making problems as an envoy, he was called back to the 
country and was employed as the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources.53 For the 
2007 election he left his position and contested as an MP (see below). Due to the fact that he had, in 
the eyes of the Pokomo, always made trouble, it was argued that he would probably also have been 
involved in the clashes in 2012/2013 and he was even accused of having armed the Orma again.
Another aspect where politics comes in is that the Pokomo assumed the clashes were financed with 
money collected in harambee (fundraisings) to which several higher politicians were invited and the 
Orma had planned the conflict long before. In the months preceding the conflict several harambees 
had been held by the Orma community, to which they had invited high politicians including George 
Saitoti, Uhuru Kenyatta and Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka. The money was supposed to be used for 
education projects and especially scholarships for students, however, the Pokomo claim it was used 
to arm the Orma community like it was also assumed for the conflict in 2001 (Martin 2012: 175).
5.5.3.2 The Orma Perspective
The opinions of Orma interviewees in qualitative interviews were divided about whether or not the 
conflict had also happened if the elections were not so close and those who assumed the elections 
were a central factor, suggested the Pokomo feared to loose in the election. It was mainly assumed 
that the Pokomo feared not to receive any seat in case the pastoralist groups united, because the two 
groups  had  already allied  after  the  2007 election  and appointed  only pastoralists  as  additional 
councillors. Hence, they argued, the Pokomo wanted to divide the pastoralists, especially the Orma 
and  Wardei,  and  to  show  strength  through  the  conflict,  as  well  as  to  unite  their  own  group.  
Alternatively, the Orma assumed, the Pokomo tried to reduce the number of voters by killing Orma,  
displacing them and by burning their Identification Cards (IDs), when looting the houses in Riketa 
and Kilelengwani (see Table 7). 
The Orma argued, in order to bring mistrust between them and 
the  Wardei  community  and  to  divide  them  politically,  the 
Pokomo killed the Wardei boy and later blamed the Orma for it. 
Furthermore, the Orma accused the Pokomo of having planned 
to fight the Orma, but keeping good relations with the Wardei 
in order to give the latter ones the impression the Orma were 
“the problem”. Hence, the Pokomo only attacked Orma villages 
and kept trading with the Wardei. Mungatana's choice to ask a 
53 At the time Dado was called back, Mungatana was the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, and could possibly 
have been contributed to Dado's removal, however, no further information could be found in this respect.
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Unification of the own group 0.8
Intimidation of the other group -0.6
Gain of political power 1.5
To show strength 1.4
Stop the other of destroying 
livelihoods -1.4
Displacing the other from the 
Tana delta 1.9
Burning of IDs and Voter cards 1.9
Table :7 What are the aims of the other  
group? Accumulated weighed answers.
Wardei to be his running mate was also interpreted as part of this strategy. Besides making the 
Wardei becoming suspicious of the Orma, they further assumed the Pokomo wanted to make the 
Orma feel disappointed if the Wardei did not support them in the conflict and therefore spoil the 
relationship.
Orma respondents suggested the Pokomo feared the competition of Orma not only in politics, but 
also in their recent entry in higher education. Thus the Orma assumed the Pokomo were afraid to 
lose their jobs, political positions and government offices. Hence, they concluded, in order to stop 
the  Orma from accessing  quality  education,  the  Pokomo killed  animals  and  started  economic-
warfare. 
Regarding  individual  politicians  the  Orma  mainly  accused  Danson  Mungatana  and  Dhadho 
Godhana  as  masterminds  behind  the  clashes.  However,  Mungatana  was  regarded  as  the  main 
initiator.  While most of the accusations concerning Dhadho Godhana were related to what was 
stated in the media (see chapter 5.5) some of the Orma respondents assumed Godhana and the 
Upper Pokomo had been used by Mungatana for his intentions. Due to the fact that the Upper 
Pokomo were less educated it was claimed that Mungatana had manipulated them to fight for him, 
however, the Upper Pokomo finally wanted him to show how committed he was for an alliance of 
the two Pokomo sections and he had to send some Lower Pokomo to attack Kipao. According to the 
Orma Mungatana's interest was mainly in staying in politics and to gain power by being elected as 
Governor. An Orma respondent explained: “The Governor will be the President of the county and 
can decide what happens with the land”. Hence, they feared either the land in the Tana delta would 
be used for large scale agricultural projects and/or land adjudication would progress and they would 
in both cases lose grazing areas. Concretely, there were rumours among the Orma community that 
Kenyatta had planned to lease the delta to Qatar for sugar growth. Thus, he supported Mungatana in 
his race for the governorship, in order to be able to later control the fertile delta through Mungatana. 
Mungatana  himself  needed  Kenyatta's  financial  support  because  he  was  financially  weak. 
Furthermore, Mungatana was accused of having financed the clashes with CDF money. On the one 
hand, it was said a CDF car was frequently seen in the area before an attack happened, on the other  
hand Orma respondents claimed Mungatana had paid his Pokomo youth with CDF money to attack 
Orma villages. The assumption Mungatana was the initiator of the conflict was mainly based on the 
general feeling of having been neglected by the MP and the impression that he had marginalised the 
Orma  community.  The  fact  that  the  clashes  were  close  to  the  elections  and  that  some  of  the 
suspected attackers came from Ngao, Mungatana's home village, was seen as a confirmation of the 
initial suspicions. In fact, the Kipao attack was said to have been planned by Mungatana, or at least 
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they complained he did not prevent it even though he must have know of the plans. Furthermore, 
the Orma accused Mungatana, as the Member of Parliament for the delta area, of not having visited 
Orma villages after they were attacked.
5.6 Solutions to the Conflict
After having looked at the perspectives of the two warring communities on the conflict and the 
opinions  of  presidential  aspirants,  we  will  now  shift  the  focus  on  solutions  and  how  further 
escalations  could  be  prevented.  While  we have  already seen  in  Table  5  that  most  government 
reactions to the conflict, which were short term solutions, were seen as rather ineffective, we will  
now mainly look at suggestions for middle and long term solutions. In semi-structured interviews 
Pokomo respondents  made two main suggestions:  (1) the spatial  separation of  the two groups, 
which means the Orma should leave the delta and/or (2) land adjudication that the Pokomo farmers 
could hold title deeds of their ancestral farms, conflicts over land rights would stop and the Pokomo 
could get  loans to  start  small  businesses  and to  improve their  living conditions.  Regarding the 
economic situation large scale projects were also welcomed by the Pokomo, however, only if the 
local population could benefit from it, like by way of an outgrower scheme. The next aspect which 
was  mentioned  as  a  crucial  measure  was  the  reduction  of  corruption  and  the  assurance  of 
impartiality of the government. Lastly, the Pokomo asked for an increase of security personnel and 
disarmament especially of people holding illegal firearms. 
The Orma by contrast were foremost demanding communal land allocation in which the “Orma 
locations” would legally be allocated to the Orma community. Most Orma were very clear that they 
did not want to leave the delta and an increase of water points in the hinterland, which would make 
it possible that their cattle could stay and graze outside the delta, was not entirely opposed but a  
sceptical reaction was given and the respondents did not seem enthusiastic about this idea. Some 
Orma, though agreed that a spatial separation of the two groups would solve many problems. First  
of all, however, some Orma respondents demanded the Pokomo to be disarmed and to be returned 
to their villages because they would otherwise fear new attacks. They argued, while the Pokomo 
were living in IDP camps, the latter ones did not have to fear a counter attack, but when they 
returned the Orma saw themselves assured that the Pokomo would not make new plans, because 
they would see it as a sign the Pokomo moved on and returned to normal life. Furthermore, most  
Orma were convinced that peace committees were ineffective. Peace negotiations had, in their view, 
to be held by the elders. The members of peace committees were not seen of having authority and 
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were said of not being serious about their peace efforts. In public the committees would pretend to 
promote peace, but in fact, as soon as they were with their own community, they would even incite  
people to fight. The need for increased security,  especially security posts in Orma villages was 
remarked frequently. While the Pokomo complained before the clashes that there were no police 
posts in Orma villages, the Orma complained about the same after the clashes. In fact, many Orma 
respondents were pessimistic about durable peace, especially if a Pokomo won the governorship, 
however, the Pokomo expected to encounter difficulties if an Orma won the election, especially if it 
was Hussein Dado.
In general, peace initiatives through committees and common activities were, if at all, only seen as a 
possibility to strengthen good relations if the two groups had already found peace. But as long as 
anger and hatred dominated the feelings of the Tana delta residents, such measures were said to be 
useless. However, both groups saw potential in the peace committees. While, like mentioned, the 
Orma suggested only elders should be involved in peace negotiations, the Pokomo suggested the 
committees were not effective because not enough women and youth were involved. According to 
Guyo (2009: 38ff) women from both groups were involved in spreading peace on the grass-root 
level, and had an advisory role. However, while Orma women do not have a direct role in the peace  
negotiations and decision making process, Pokomo women can be the central players. Furthermore, 
the research conducted by Pickmeier (2012: 74) revealed that peace initiatives had a positive impact 
on the prevention of violent conflicts and were effective in settling disputes. However, his research 
was conducted after almost 10 years of relative peace in the area and did therefore not cover the role 
of  peace  committees  in  violent  clashes.  Even  if  the  respondents  of  my  research  were  more 
pessimistic, the results confirm Pickmeier's findings 
(2012: 75) that mixed schooling and shared cultural 
activities could strengthen peace (during the absence 
of conflict).
Looking  at  Table  8 the  single  most  important 
solution,  according  to  both  communities,  is  the 
clarification  of  land  rights.  Unfortunately  the  two 
groups claim the same land and while Orma would 
like to hold the land communally the Pokomo would 
like to receive individual title deeds of their ancestral 
land.  Furthermore,  more  water  points,  grazing 
corridors and by-laws are seen as suitable solutions 
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No Yes 
Land allocation 4.0% 96.0%
Inter  community  activities  i.e. 
sport activities 61.1% 38.9%
More or regular peace meetings 18.8% 81.2%
Increase inter-ethnic schooling 61.7% 38.3%
More water points 28.2% 71.8%
More grazing corridors 19.5% 80.5%
More by-laws 22.1% 77.9%
Reduce corruption 19.5% 80.5%
Alternative livelihood strategies 78.5% 21.5%
Reduce large scale projects 61.1% 38.9%
Increase large scale projects 61.1% 38.9%
More inter-marriage 76.5 % 23.5 %
Table 8: Effectiveness of solutions?
to  prevent  farmer/herder  conflicts.  However,  not  only  the  natural  resource  conflicts  should  be 
solved, but 80% confirmed that corruption was a problem and should be fought. Hence, besides 
solving problems connected to natural resources, a focus should also be put on good governance. 
Other  than in the case of an immediate  reaction to the clashes,  peace meetings  in a long-term 
perspective to prevent other escalations were seen as relatively effective.54
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has given an overview of conflicts  in the Tana delta and especially the clashes in 
2012/2013. After giving a brief history of conflicts in the area the initial tensions that added to the 
built up to the clashes were described. Already from the beginning of 2012 different incidences of 
invaded farms or cattle killed were reported and in a few cases even human lives were lost. These 
tensions,  which  increased  in  the  beginning  of  August  2012,  were  not  handled  well  by  the 
administration and led to the escalation in Kau. The incidence in Kau was defined as escalation 
because  of  the  shift  from the  involvement  of  mainly  individuals  to  a  group  level.  Already in 
Mikameni in the middle of July a conflict between two individuals was transferred into one between 
the two local groups, however, other than in Kau, the situation in Mikameni could be calmed down 
and an escalation was prevented. After the escalation in Kau, the propaganda of further attacks on 
the Pokomo community and the continuation of the non-interference policy of the government, the 
Pokomo decided to hit back after the end of Ramadan in order to intimidate the Orma community of 
attacking again. However, several tit-for-tat attacks followed besides which smaller incidences were 
recorded, until the government interfered by deploying security personnel and imposing a dusk-to-
dawn curfew. Instead of stabilising the situation,  the GSU was reported of having harassed the 
population and even burnt down (part of) Ozi village. Still, after the arrival of the GSU the situation 
first  calmed down for  a  few months  until  Kipao village  was attacked only a  few days  before  
Christmas. While the Orma say it was carried out by their Pokomo neighbours, the Pokomo argue 
they did not plan the attack, instead it was done by militias the Orma had hired but not paid as 
promised. The few Pokomo youth who were probably among the attackers, were instead said of 
having been hired by the militias. In the beginning of January 2013 an attack on Nduru village 
followed, which is  split  in an Orma and a Pokomo part,  and the latter  one was burnt down in 
September  2012  already.  According  to  official  statements,  the  attack  was  carried  out  by  the 
Pokomo, but the latter ones claimed, when they started rebuilding the village, members from the 
54 In the first presidential debate several aspirants also suggested possible solutions to the problems in the Tana. These  
were already presented in chapter 5.4.3.
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Orma community tried to destroy their work and to steal the building materials, which is when they 
followed them and fought them in the Orma part of the village. Last but not least, Kibusu a Lower  
Pokomo village was attacked only one day later. 
Like the reports about attacks, the reasons for the clashes were also disputed and IDPs of the two 
groups presented their different perspectives in group and one-on-one interviews . Hereby topics 
which  reappeared  in  several  interviews  were  summarised  and  given  as  different  rationales  or 
mythico-histories, due to the fact, that they include facts on the one hand, but a subjective view 
point  which presented the own group as  the victimised one.  With regard to  the fact  that  these 
mythico-histories are reality for the two groups, but also oppose each other, they can give a better 
understanding of why the conflict escalated or the groups believed to fight, but at the same time 
should be regarded as subjective and community-centred. The different explanations were grouped 
in topics related to natural resource conflicts, poor governance and the involvement of politicians as 
well  as  the  relevance  of  the  elections.  Significant  was  that  all  three  elements  appeared  in  the 
narratives of members from both groups and either of the two feared to be displaced and said they 
only defended themselves and their position.
Lastly,  suggested solutions to these clashes and preventions of further conflicts were presented. 
Besides others, members of both groups suggested they should get land rights according to their 
land tenure systems and/or voices were raised that the two groups had to be separated from each 
other  in  order  to  avoid  conflicts  because  their  interests  were  incompatible.  It  is,  however, 
problematic that the two groups want to own the same land. Furthermore, it was argued corruption 
had to be reduced, security increased and a state of normality restored (including disarmament) in 
order for peace to return. While the peace committees were partly seen as helpful, especially in 
situations of peace, their structure was criticised in contradicting ways due to the different cultures 
of the two groups: the Orma only regarded peace negotiations between elders as valid, while the 
Pokomo saw the need of further engagement of women and youth. Inter-community activities on 
contrast,  were not regarded as very useful because they could only strengthen good relations if 
positive feelings were already existing. Last but not least, both groups were hoping for peace if the 
election was over and especially if an aspirant from the own group won the Governor seat. The list 
of possible solutions also confirms the importance of the three different perspectives on the conflict 
and the relevance of disputes over natural resources, poor governance, and the elections, as causes, 
even if the perspectives were the specific perceptions of the two groups.
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Chapter 6    Election Politics
After having analysed the conflict, we will now turn towards the general and presidential elections 
which were held on 4th March 2013, in order to understand how the conflict influenced the voting 
behaviour and opinions of voters. To get a more comprehensive picture of election politics in Tana 
River County, we will, however, first have a look at the political history of the county. Besides the 
changes of constituency boundaries, the different aspirants and election outcomes, attention will 
also be given to important campaign topics and especially the influence and relevance of violence 
for the election outcomes. Thereafter the 2013 election in Garsen constituency will be discussed 
with  short  glances  into the  incidents  in  the  other  two constituencies.  First  we will  look at  the 
nomination and election process itself, then the different campaign topics will be presented, and 
lastly the election outcome will be discussed and analysed. At this juncture different voting patterns 
will be regarded and attention will be given to the consequences of the clashes on the outcome and 
voting behaviour. 
6.1 Political History of Tana River County
When Kenya became independent in 1963, Tana River was given only one constituency which was 
represented by an Upper Pokomo, Japhet Zakharia Kase (KADU). These independence elections 
were followed by the so called “Little  General  Elections” in  1966. These were conducted in  a 
limited number of constituencies, because 29 incumbent MPs had changed their party membership 
to the newly founded Kenya People's Union (KPU), which opposed Kenyatta's policies favouring 
the rich elite. To stop parliamentarians to support the KPU, Kenyatta came up with a constitutional 
amendment which “required any MP who resigned from the political party that sponsored him in a 
winning election to also resign from his parliamentary seat and seek fresh mandate from the voters“ 
(Hyden & Leys 1972: 394). Due to the fact that the Tana River constituency had been split in two 
new constituencies, voters in the Tana River District had to cast the ballot as well. In this special  
election Japhet Kase, during whose term the Hola district hospital was built, was re-elected for Tana 
South constituency and an Orma, Abdu Shongolo Wakole, won the race in Tana North constituency.  
In 1968, under Kase's rule, the first secondary school in Tana River District was built in Tarasaa. In 
the following election of 1969 Kase contested for Tana North and won the seat, while Martin Tola  
Jilo, a Lower Pokomo, won the post in Tana South. In 1974 the two election winners in Tana River 
were Abdi Mohammed Galgalo, the first Orma in the South, and Mohamed Omar Said Soba, of the 
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Malakote  ethnic  group,  was  declared  the  winner  in  the 
North.  The  latter  one  stayed  in  power  until  1988.  The 
southern seat, however, was in the following two elections 
won  by  Daiddo  Israel  Lekwa,  another  Lower  Pokomo. 
When he was reelected in 1983, race between the first four 
contestants was quite close (see Table 9). During Lekwa's 
second  legislature  the  construction  of  the  new  Garsen 
causeway  by  China  Roads  and  Bridges  Engineering 
Company was started. In 1988 the two constituencies were 
renamed into Garsen constituency in the south and Galole constituency in the north of Tana River 
District. In these last single-party elections only one aspirant contested for the Orma community 
and one for the Pokomo in Garsen constituency. This time the Orma aspirant Abdi Wakole, who 
ended fourth in 1983 won the election. In the new Galole constituency the former Tana South MP 
(1974) Abdi Mohammed Galgalo, an Orma, who challenged the incumbent Soba, won the 1988 
election with 60% of the votes.
In 1992, when the first multiparty elections were held, Yuda Komora, a Pokomo teacher and former 
Permanent  Secretary,  was  elected  in  his  third  attempt  with  the  support  of  46% of  the  voting 
population. One reason for his success was said to have been the backing of the Pokomo council of 
elders, the Gasa. However, it should not be neglected that Komora was running on a KANU ticket, 
which was in these, and the following elections, the only successful party in Tana River District. 
FORD-Kenya  was  in  its  first  election  also  greatly  supported  in  this  district,  especially  in  the 
hinterland. In Galole constituency Komora's fellow KANU member Tolla Kofa Mugava, an Upper 
Pokomo, won the race with 59% of the votes and stayed in office for a total of three legislatures. 
Among the top campaign issues in the 1997 election in Galole were the renovation of the Hola 
district hospital, which was built in 1966 and the revival of Bura and Hola irrigation schemes which 
had been working well in the 1960s and 70s but had collapsed in 1990 (KNBS 2009a: 61). The 
desired economic boost that should come from the two schemes was already a central topic in the 
1992 election, but during the five year legislature KANU had failed to deliver. Still, Mugava was 
re-elected with an overwhelming majority of almost 80% of the votes.
According  to  Kagwanja  and KHCR,  several  Tana  politicians  made  use  of  bandits  for  election 
purposes in the 1990s, who robbed or destroyed voter cards of opponents (KHRC 2002; Kagwanja 
2003: 135; MUHURI 1999: 29). While KHRC reports the bandits from North Eastern had been 
93
Name Ethnicity Outcome %
Israel Daiddo Lower Pokomo 3,641 28.02
Yuda Komora Lower Pokomo 3,335 25.66
Mohammed 
Galgalo Orma 3,167 24.38
Abdi Wakole Orma 2,774 21.35
Salim Islam unknown 76 0.59
Table 9: Election results Tana South 1983 
(The Economic Review 27 Oct – 3 Nov 1997)
used  by politicians  of  all  ethnic  groups,  Kalasingha,  the  Shirkisho  Party  aspirant  in  the  1997 
elections reported, that some of the bandits belonged to the families of politicians, especially from 
the pastoralist communities (MUHURI 1999: 31).
In 1997 a new constituency, Bura, predominantly inherited by the Orma community, was added as 
the third constituency in the Tana River District. Bura, located in the northern region of Tana River 
District was created out of parts of Galole and Garsen constituency. In the 1997 elections one of the 
major topics was insecurity especially related to banditry, as well as the economic status of the Bura 
region.  The  elections  in  1997  were  won  by  the  former  KANU  Galole  MP Mohammed  Abdi 
Galgalo.
The campaigns in the 1997 election in Garsen constituency mainly centred around the topics of 
unemployment, education and the road network in the area, but the communication network, the 
lack of heath facilities, insecurity due to banditry as well as the general economic status of Tana 
River District and especially failing irrigation schemes were also of relevance. Besides these topics, 
which were especially important for the younger educated generation, the decision of the respective 
councils of elders and ethnicity in general were also said to have been deciding factors. In Garsen, 
the incumbent Komora lost the party nominations for KANU in 1997 when Molu Shambaro, his 
FORD-Kenya  competitor  in  the  1992 elections,  won the  support  of  the  ruling  party.  With  the 
additional backing of the Matadeda, the Orma council of elders, Shambaro succeeded in winning 
the elections. According to a KHRC report (2002) Shambaro's victory was furthermore based on the 
support of the fellow Wardei and Gal'jeel Somali pastoralists, whom he had encouraged to migrate 
to Garsen and “assisted in the registration of those [...]  who did not have Kenyan identity and 
voters' cards“ (KHRC 2002). Different than other authors Alamin Mazrui (2001: 279) states in his 
chapter on the 1997 elections at the Coast, that there is also a politicised religious affiliation in the  
Pokomo community,  which leads to  a  rather  trans-ethnic religious  consciousness  and results  in 
Upper  Pokomo  sometimes  voting  for  their  Muslim  fellows  from  the  pastoralist  communities. 
During Shambaro’s legislature the construction of the Garsen-Hola road was stalled in 1998. This 
might have contributed to his political waterloo in the 2002 election, but more likely was caused by 
the violent conflict of 2001. As mentioned above, the conflict started in relation to the sensitive land 
adjudication policy (gazetted in 1997 and started in 2000 in Ngao, where the clashes began) which 
was opposed by the Orma community. According to Martin (2012: 187) the Orma and Wardei were, 
however also, in conflict by the end of the clashes. While she states that the Wardei demanded more 
government representation, the Orma started blaming the Wardei of being “the conflict drivers” and 
“threatened some of the Wardei that if they did not cooperate they would expose the fact that they 
94
came from Somalia, fuelling the government anti-terrorist policy and encampment policy (of all 
refugees)”. Hence, Martin concludes, the Wardei contested with their own candidate during both, 
the 2002 and 2007 elections, which benefited the Pokomo to win the two elections. The conflict 
resolution and peace building process were surely a decisive factor for the nomination and election 
of candidates. The 32 year old lawyer and ethnic Lower Pokomo Danson Mungatana, who won the 
elections, for example, offered free legal services after the clashes and one of the other contenders, 
the Upper Pokomo Badiribu Mandara was chosen as peace envoy by President Moi. Besides land 
adjudication (the cause of the conflict), the conflict itself, security issues and the peace building 
process, as well as the economy of the Tana Delta District were major topics. For example, the 
collapsed TARDA rice irrigation scheme, which led to impoverishment of the people, and the poor 
livestock marketing facilities were of central  importance.  Furthermore,  the local population had 
been hoping in vain for better infrastructure and development like tarmacked roads, piped water, 
electricity, and telephone lines. In the year 2002 neither the towns of Tarasaa, nor Garsen or Hola 
were connected to the electricity network.  Mungatana and five other contestants,  who were all 
disappointed by the KANU government and its reaction to the conflict (mainly a non-interference 
policy)  had decided to  choose one amongst  them who should run on an  opposition  ticket  and 
challenge the KANU aspirant. It was expected that the Pokomo elders would support the KANU 
aspirant, due to the party's dominance in the region. However, in the KANU party nomination both 
Pokomo candidates, the former head of Civil Service Fares Kuindwa and Mandara Badiribu were 
defeated  by  their  Orma  opponent,  the  incumbent  Molu  Shambaro.  He,  however,  lost  to  the 
opposition  candidate  Danson  Buya  Mungatana  (NARC),  who  had  expressed,  like  many  other 
Pokomo, his support for the land adjudication process.
The young politician was re-elected in 2007 when he was challenged among others by Tuneya 
Hussein Dado, his strongest Orma competitor, Mohamed Galgalo (Orma), Molu Shambaro (Orma), 
Mungatana's  predecessor,  Mandara  Badiribu  (Upper  Pokomo)  and  Joel  Ruhu,  another  Lower 
Pokomo aspirant. The central topics in these elections were, again, land adjudication, infrastructure, 
security and the economic situation including the irrigation schemes, and eradication of poverty. 
Furthermore, in connection to the discussions concerning the new constitution and the referendum 
about this document in 2005, majimboism and the long-time marginalisation of the coast were also 
central to these elections. In the 2005 referendum, the population in Garsen constituency voted with 
76%, in Bura with 88%, and in Galole with 90% against the new constitution.  A revised draft, 
which was finally decided upon in the 2010 referendum, was, however, supported with 77% in both 
Garsen and Galole and in Bura with an overwhelming 90%. As a member of the Parliamentary 
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Select Committee on the Constitution, the area MP Mungatana had a central role in writing this 
draft. 
Even though, there was no major conflict in Garsen constituency, neither before nor after the 2007 
general elections, irregularities on the election day were still noted. Several respondents remarked 
that tension arose after some ballot boxes were counted and Mungatana, this time running on a 
NARC-Kenya ticket, was leading. Starting with a peaceful demonstration by ODM supporters, the 
situation escalated when ballot boxes were thrown into the river and burnt along the main road in 
Garsen. Other ballot boxes were said to have been 
flown  in,  however,  their  origin  was  unclear  and 
several  eyewitnesses  independently  reported  that 
Hussein Dado, who realised he had probably lost the 
election  started  shooting  in  the  tallying  centre. 
Nobody was hurt, but the confusion resulted in an 
unclear  election  outcome.  Dado  filed  an  election 
petition  against  Mungatana  in  the  High  Court  on 
22nd January  2008,  which  he  later  withdrew. 
Respondents  suggested  that  he  was  fearing 
consequences  from  his  own  behaviour  on  the 
election  day.  Furthermore,  there  were  complaints  that  the  election  results  were  not  properly 
announced  and  officially  reported  in  a  newspaper.  However,  the  published  numbers  indicated 
Mungatana as the clear winner of the election (see Table 10). 
The Orma also lost their position in parliament in other constituencies in Tana River. In Bura Ali 
Wario55, an Orma affiliated to KANU, had won the seat in 2002. The campaign topics were mainly 
connected  to  livestock  marketing,  water  and  pasture  for  livestock  and  the  revival  of  the  Bura 
irrigation scheme to secure food production and boost the local economy. In 2007, however, the 
Wardei  aspirant  Dr.  Abdi  Nuh Nassir  took the seat  on an ODM-Kenya ticket.  His  victory was 
challenged in an election petition filed by Wario's KANU agent, because, when opened for the 
recount, only very few ballot boxes were sealed with counterfoils inside. Also, it was remarked, that 
only one of 16 ballot  boxes from Ngamano polling station contained a register of the detailed 
number of voters. Due to the lack of evidence the election petition was, however, dismissed (Kenya 
55 Two politicians in Tana River County are called Ali Wario. The one referred to here is the more senior one who is  
politically active in Bura while the other one is from Garsen constituency. To differentiate the two, the one from 
Bura will be called Ali Wario, while the other one has a third name and will therefore be referred ta as Ali Wario 
Guyo.
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Name Ethnicity Party Outcome %
Danson B. 
Mungatana
Lower 
Pokomo NARC-K 7,519 33.39
Tuneya H. 
Dado Orma ODM 4,741 21.05
Abdi 
Mohamed 
Galgalo
Orma KADDU 4,404 19.56
Molu G. 
Shambaro Orma KANU 3,825 16.98
Mandara B. 
Badiribu 
Upper 
Pokomo SPK 627 2.78
others 1,405 6.24
Table 10: Election results Garsen 2007(Weis 2008)
2008: 18).
The Galole constituency changed hands in  2007 when Mugava was defeated by his challenger 
Dhadho Godhana,  a  retired  army major  who had served in  the  military for  18  years  until  his 
retirement in September 2007. Godhana challenged his fellow Upper Pokomo on an ODM ticket, 
while Mugava had changed from his long time KANU support to a PNU affiliation.  The 2007 
elections  in  Galole  were  preceded  by  a  conflict  between  the  pastoralist  Orma  and  Wardei 
communities which was said of having been closely connected to the election. The conflict started 
in Bura where three Orma men were killed at Dakaji in Hiriman division. The violence spread to 
Galole when the Orma revenged with a counter attack in Bangale where six Wardei men were left  
dead. According to the Aridland Bulletin (Kenya 2007a - October) these counter attacks continued 
with more deaths in Bangale and Galole at least for a month. The Galole seat for the National 
Assembly went again to the Upper Pokomo community, when Godhana won the elections, leaving 
the Orma with no MP in the whole of the Tana region from 2007 onwards. Still they might have 
profited somehow in the Galole constituency as Godhana, supported by a capable team managed the 
CDF  money  quite  well.  His  constituency  was  ranked  among  the  top  five  in  CDF  money 
management in the country in February 2013. In addition, he managed to revive the collapsed Hola 
irrigation scheme in 2009, which had been an election topic since 1992.
6.2 Elections 2013
The elections in 2013 were awaited with different feelings. On the one hand, with the elections the 
constitutional change to a devolved system would be implemented, on the other hand, the positive 
atmosphere was dampened by the fear of renewed election violence like in 2007. However, besides 
a few cases (mainly at the Coast in Mombasa and Kilifi County, which were blamed on the MRC) 
the  elections  were held peacefully.  During the week after  the elections,  when the  country was 
awaiting the results which were announced in the course of the week, schools were closed, people 
mainly remained in their houses and even buses between for example Mombasa and Nairobi did not 
operate.
It was already expected that the presidential election would be a two-horse-race between the two 
big coalitions Jubilee and CORD. Jubilee was supported by TNA, URP, NARC and Republican 
Congress, with Uhuru Kenyatta as presidential aspirant and William Ruto as his deputy. CORD on 
the other hand was an alliance of ODM, WDM-K, FORD-K and 11 other parties56 who supported 
56 Kenya  Social  Congress,  The  Independent  Party,  KADDU-Asili,  Peoples  Democratic  Party,  Mkenya  Solidarity 
Movement,  Chama Cha Uzalendo, United Democratic Movement,  Chama Cha Wananchi,  Federal  Party Kenya, 
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Raila Odinga and Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka as President and Deputy.57 Like we will see below, 
these two alliances were also the most supported ones in Tana River County.
In the following sections we will mainly focus on Garsen constituency, which was the area under 
study. The election outcomes in Galole and Bura were, however, similar. The presidential votes 
were in all three constituencies mainly given to Odinga and Kenyatta (see below) and the final  
winners  of  county  positions  were  also  the  most  supported  ones  in  Garsen  constituency. 
Furthermore, like in Garsen, in the other two constituencies almost all winners were from either the 
Orma or the Wardei communities and only very few County Representatives were won by Pokomo 
aspirants, which is why some of the defeated candidates wanted to challenge the results in court. 
Due to the fact that the election results for Tana River County are not yet published (apart from the 
presidential ones) a comparison between the three constituencies is not possible and the precise 
county  results  for  the  county  positions  (Senator,  Governor  and  Women  Representative)  are 
unknown as well. However, I could make hold of the results of Garsen constituency, which will be 
discussed below.
6.2.1 Nomination of Aspirants and Elections in Garsen Constituency
According to  the  new Kenyan constitution  political  aspirants  on  the  different  levels  can  either 
contest with the support of a party, or as an independent candidate, however, most candidates seek 
the support of a political party. Furthermore, the aspirants have to meet other requirements like the 
leadership and integrity threshold, being a registered voter and, depending on the position, having a 
certain level of education (County Representatives, MPs and Senators need to have at least some 
form of post-secondary qualifications while the Governor has to hold a university degree). In the 
Tana delta all aspirants contested with the support of a political party, from which some received 
financial support and others affiliated with a party in hope for more votes or because independent 
aspirants had to show support of a number of people (County Representatives need to have 500, MP 
and Senator 1,000, Governor 2,000 supporters). Before the party nominations the aspirants from the 
Orma, Wardei and Pokomo groups in the Tana delta, however, first searched support from members 
of  their  communities.  Aspirants  from the  pastoralist  groups  remarked  that  the  decision  of  the 
council of elders was of major importance in the choice of a candidate and they also determined 
with which party the candidate  should contest.  A Wardei explained, however,  the elders would 
Labor Party Kenya, and Muungano Development Movement Party of Kenya.
57 Other presidential aspirants were Musalia Mudavadi, Peter Kenneth, Martha Karua, Paul Muite, James ole Kiyiapi  
and Mohamed Abduba Dida.
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consult with the community before taking a decision. Among the Pokomo the candidacy is first of 
all an individual decision, even though most aspirants look for support from the community. In this 
case they introduce themselves and their policies to groups of youth, women and elders first in the 
home village and then in other villages and areas which are part of the constituency. After each 
group decided and gave their consent for the candidacy, the aspirant looks for support of a party, 
unless he/she is already a member of one. Even though it was said that the elders have the final say 
most aspirants remarked in the end it was the decision of the individual to withdraw the candidacy 
or to contest and let the voter decide. While in the case of the pastoralists the decision of the elders 
was regarded as crucial, the Pokomo said that in their case the elders, women and youth would only 
give recommendations which are not binding. 
Even though the constitution foresees that candidates had to decide for one party at least 90 days 
before the election day,  the party nominations were only held in  January 2013, which made it 
impossible for a candidate who lost the nomination, to contest with another party. According to a 
report  in  the  Standard,  the  only  two  parties  which  held  public  party  elections  for  the  party 
nominations were TNA and ODM. The aspirants for Governor, Senator, Women Representative and 
the MP seats for the three constituencies were all won unopposed (Standard 20/02/2013). After the 
party nomination the candidates had to prepare a range of papers and certificates to register with the 
IEBC, a smooth process in Garsen constituency.
One week before the elections the IEBC held mock elections to test the equipment and be aware of 
challenges which could be faced during the election day. In this test the electronic voter system, 
which identified the voters by taking and comparing finger prints, worked well but the IEBC staff 
realised that the election could be challenging due to the high illiteracy rate of the population. Even 
though  the  IEBC  had  invested  in  voter  education,  the  complexity  of  the  elections  in  which 
representatives on six levels had to be elected was considered to be very problematic. Besides the 
challenge that the illiterate voters were not able to read the names of the aspirants and needed 
assistance by clerks and party agents, the many ballot papers to be cast and finding the respective 
box, although marked with colours, also seemed to confuse many voters.
Like in  almost  every other  part  of  the country the election day was held peacefully in  Garsen 
constituency, even though people had to wait patiently for several hours in long cues. This shows 
that the willingness to make use of their democratic right was high and people started waiting from 
the early morning hours even before the polling stations opened at 6 am. Some polling stations 
delayed, however, due to the fact that there were problems with the electronic voter system. A voter 
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from Ngao, who was among the first in the line, reported the local IEBC team could not even access 
the system because they did not have the right password to the computer. Hence, the IEBC staff had 
to resort to the manual register, which did, unfortunately, not contain all names and some voters had 
to return home without voting. In a newspaper article the Nation reported about one case of a voter 
who had confirmed his registration with the IEBC service before the election day, but after queuing 
for several hours his name could not be found on the list. Hence, some individuals were wondering 
if the system was in fact manipulated to guarantee the victory of a few politicians. 
After  the elections,  the voters  were also waiting patiently for  the results.  However,  the Star,  a 
Kenyan daily reported on 9th March the IEBC was forced to announce the Governor in Hola, before 
the results were verified, when “hundreds of supporters of candidates had run out of patience” after 
camping outside the tallying centre (Star 09/03/2013). The newspaper further stated that the aspirant 
Hussein  Dado  could  not  bear  it  any  longer  and  “stormed  the  temporary  office  of  the  county 
returning officer Abdulatif Hassan demanding an explanation” (Star 09/03/2013). 
6.2.3 Major Topics During the 2013 Election Campaign
Before presenting the election campaign topics, it is worth 
to  have a closer  look at  the campaign season in general. 
Already in the course of 2012 the presidential aspirants and 
their  supporters  toured  through  the  country  and  donated 
money in harambees. In Garsen constituency the pastoralist 
community held harambees in May and June to which they 
invited  different  politicians  (Saitoti  in  May  before  his 
accident, and Kenyatta (Figure 5) and Kalonzo (Figure 6) in 
June)  whom  they  asked  to  support  their  students  with 
financial  means;  Kenyatta  for  example  contributed  Ksh 
1,000,000.  Furthermore,  the  politicians  also  organised 
meals (Figure 7) for the communities which were attended 
by several hundred people. Eight month before the election 
date,  politicians  were,  however,  not  allowed  to  attend 
harambees anymore. Hence, Ruto (Figure  8) for example, 
who  held  a  rally  in  July  only  gave  a  generous  meal. 
Additionally, t-shirts and caps were handed out, not only by 
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Figure 5: Harambee with Kenyatta
Figure 6: Rally with Kalonzo
Figure 7: Pastoralists waiting for a meal  
sponsored by Kenyatta
presidential  aspirants,  but  also  by  others  like  MP 
candidates. The direct distribution of money to individuals 
was only observed once by an MP aspirant, who asked not 
to  be named.  However,  he argued it  was not bribery but 
rather a cultural norm that more wealthy members of the 
community who  visited  their  families  and  friends  would 
bring presents or some money especially for the elderly to support them and to express respect and 
gratitude. The fact that he did not want to be named shows, however, that he was aware his action 
was not entirely in accordance with the elections code of conduct, even more since this incidence 
took place within the six month restriction. After the clashes escalated in August 2012, politicians 
were prohibited to campaign in Tana River for a limited time, due to the fear they could increase 
tension. The functions did, however, not only serve to distribute handouts, but the communities got 
the opportunity to present their concerns to the politicians and to perform their traditional dances. 
Like  in  previous  elections,  the  major  campaign  topics  in  2013  were  mainly  related  to  the 
marginalisation and underdevelopment of Tana River County, which were also seen as root causes 
of the conflict. On several occasions such as political rallies, functions or other meetings where 
politicians were present the residents complained, for example, about the lack of health facilities in 
the  area.  The  only  district  hospital  available  was  to  be  found  in  Ngao  and  in  many villages, 
especially Orma ones, even dispensaries and delivery rooms were missing. This situation forces the 
population to travel long distances to get services, which is, however, especially in emergencies, 
difficult in the area, because of the bad road network and the lack of ambulance services. But even 
if an ambulance was available, in many areas of the Tana delta people would not be in the position 
to call it because the mobile phone network coverage was insufficient, let alone the connection to 
landlines.
Another major campaign topic was the low level of education in the area, the lack of schools and 
especially the absence of institutions for higher education. The whole county had only one poly-
technique and no single university branch. The residents argued, if institutes for higher education 
were present, the awareness of the importance of education would increase and people who do not 
want  to leave their  families while  going to  school could still  improve their  future employment 
opportunities by taking a course. But also the lack of secondary schools, especially in Orma villages 
was mentioned. Besides the hope for economic empowerment through education it was argued that 
an educated and consequently less ethnocentric population would be less likely involved in clashes. 
Furthermore, by empowering people to work in other sectors than livestock herding and agricultural 
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Figure 8: Rally with Ruto in Garsen
production,  the  farmer/herder  conflicts  could  also  be  reduced.  Connected  to  the  conflict,  the 
population also demanded better security and more police presence, especially in Orma villages. 
Also, many respondents were looking for a candidate who would be able to unite the groups living 
in the delta or somebody who could resolve the disparities between the groups, like the unclear land 
rights.  The  issuing of  title  deeds  was  furthermore  mentioned as  a  crucial  precondition  for  the 
economic development and empowerment of the residents. At least the Pokomo hoped to get loans 
from the bank to invest in small businesses if they received title deeds.
Another  important  topic  connected  to  the  economic  situation  in  the  county  was  the  need  for 
employment opportunities. The two main communities (farmers and pastoralists) have, however, 
different interests regarding projects and land use in the delta, but the two groups have one thing in 
common, they both oppose projects from which they do not benefit. The farmers, who are looking 
for economic growth through agricultural projects, regarded the low income jobs like in the TARDA 
irrigation scheme, in which a peasant worker earns Ksh 200 per day as an opportunity to get some 
additional income, but it was not seen as a possibility for permanent employment. Instead they were 
demanding an outgrower area, in which facilities would be provided and could be used by locals for 
a fee. The harvest could then partly be used for personal needs and the rest be sold to either the  
investor or on the market. With an outgrower area the problem of food insecurity would also be 
minimised or even eliminated and the residents did not have to rely on relief food anymore. The 
pastoralists, however, oppose any form of large scale project in the heart of the delta due to the fact  
that they fear to lose their crucial grazing areas. They rather suggested to improve the economic 
situation of the district by creating a conservation area and constructing facilities to attract tourists. 
In this case the area could still be used as a source of pasture for wildlife and livestock and bring 
additional income through eco-tourism. The pastoralists could continue using the delta as a grazing 
area and at  the same time they would ensure to  maintain the biodiversity in  the sixth Kenyan 
Ramsar  site.58 In  case  the  delta  becomes  a  conservation  area,  it  depends,  however,  on  the 
conservation plan whether or not the pastoralists will be allowed to use the delta as a grazing area to 
the extend they wish. The conservation plans which were suggested so far are more likely not to be 
supported by the pastoralists because their access to the delta would be too limited.
58 This suggestion would, however, not improve the food security in the area and contradicts the Kenya Vision 2030 
which  foresees  the  area  as  one  of  the  new  production  areas  to  bring  economic  growth  to  the  country.  The 
government plans are, however, not the only deciding factor, even if most of the area is Public Land. Residents from 
the Tana delta had filed a case to fight for the right of having a say in what happens with the area and the court  
ruling from 4th February 2013 decided that the communities living in the district have to be consulted before land 
would be given to investors and projects could be implemented. The ruling demanded that the communities and 
other interested parties had to be involved in the creation of short, middle and long term development land use plans 
and the necessity of a master land use plan has been pointed out.
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Let us now look at the election results and possible explanations of the outcome.
6.2.4 Outcome and Explanation
With a total population of approximately 240,000 people, Tana River County had 79,456 registered 
voters (31,663 in Garsen, 25,973 in Bura and 21,820 in Galole – Mars Group Kenya 2013). Already 
on the election day the IEBC announced that the voter turnout in the volatile area was high, and 
looking at the presidential election results, which is probably the one with the lowest participation 
(at least this was the case in Garsen constituency), 64,589 people cast the ballot, which is 81% of  
the registered voters for the whole of the county. In Garsen constituency, the conflict prone area, the 
outcome was, however, a bit lower varying between 77% for the presidential election and 79% for 
the MP. Even if the voter turnout was high, the voter registration was relatively low in the area: only 
65% of the registration target was achieved and if this is taken into consideration, only about 58% 
of the targeted population went to vote in Tana River County.
The presidential votes were, like in the rest of the country, 
overwhelmingly cast for the two front runners Odinga and 
Kenyatta  and  like  in  many  areas  of  minority  groups, 
Odinga  was  leading  (see  Table  11).  Both  communities 
voted for the two presidential aspirants and there were no 
big differences in terms of preference. Probably due to the 
fact  that  the  Orma elders  decided  in  June  2012 to  support  Odinga's  running mate  Kalonzo,  a 
substantial  number of  votes  from the pastoralist  community was given to  the CORD coalition. 
However, Odinga made a comment in the presidential debate, which might have cost him votes 
from the Tana pastoralists. When he had to comment on the Tana clashes, he dismissed pastoralism 
as unsustainable and said diversification of livelihoods was necessary. Further, he commented there 
was still a cowboy mentality like in pre-industrial America. Kenyatta on the other hand suggested 
different vetting programmes and projects to make the cattle keeping industry more economic and 
beneficial. Like the Orma, the Pokomo votes were split as well. On the one hand, Mungatana, this 
time running on a TNA ticket for the position of Governor, was supported by Kenyatta and not in 
good terms with Odinga. Ngirachu (Nation 26/06/2011) remarks, “The lawyer distinguished himself 
as  one of  Mr Odinga's  harshest  critics” after  the 2002 election and aligned himself  with other 
Kibaki supporters like Martha Karua. In return, it was said, Odinga called Mungatana a barking dog 
and compared the two ethnic groups Luo and Pokomo as elephants and frogs, to point out that the 
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Name Garsen Hola Galole Total
Kenyatta 30.9 23.3 48.8 34,7
Odinga 65.3 72.6 47.4 61.4
Others 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.9
Table 11: Presidential election 2013, Garsen  
constituency (Mars Group Kenya 2013)
interests of the Pokomo did not bother him as much, which might have cost him the support of a  
number of Pokomo voters. On the other hand, Wellington Godo and Dhadho Godhana, two rather 
popular Pokomo MP aspirants, were vying on an ODM ticket, which probably gave Odinga support 
in the Pokomo community.
The seat for the National Assembly representative was highly 
contested. Ten aspirants were trying to win the seat of which 
seven were ethnic Pokomo, two Orma and only one Wardei. 
Table  12 shows that Ibrahim Sane (URP) from the Wardei 
minority group won the election for the National Assembly. 
In  an  analysis  of  the  results  from  the  different  polling 
stations,  it  was  obvious  that  residents  from Orma villages 
mainly voted for Sane, even if some cast their ballot for Ali 
Wario Guyo who was the initial choice of the elders, and few votes went to Bakero Tuma. Even 
though Ali  Wario Guyo was supported by the elders,  he was not  necessarily the choice of the 
people. By some he was regarded as a young leader, but other Orma were not convinced he would 
be the right person for the position. Hence, a division of the Orma votes could have been expected, 
however, due to the fact that an actual power-sharing agreement between the Orma and the Wardei 
was never mentioned, the overwhelming support of the Wardei candidate Sane and his victory was 
quite surprising to many. The Pokomo votes were divided between mainly two candidates, Joel 
Ruhu and Wellington Godo, but the other Pokomo aspirants still received a total of more than 16% 
of the votes. The Pokomo community was split over support for the two Lower Pokomo aspirants, 
i.e., Ruhu and Godo ahead of the elections. Few weeks before the elections the council of elders 
decided to  give  out  a  recommendation  for  Ruhu.  Due to  the  fact  that  they feared  to  lose  the 
elections if the group did not unite the votes Ruhu was said to be chosen by the elders because 
Godo came from the same village the previous two Pokomo MPs originated from. However, Ruhu 
was not fully supported by the community, due to the fact that he was considered to have too many 
interests in the area, possibly also because of his position as director of the Bedford Biofuel large 
scale jatropha project (see Chapter 2.2.2). Overall, 51.8% of all votes cast were given to Pokomo 
aspirants,  which  means  that  if  these  votes  had  not  been  distributed  among  seven  Pokomo 
candidates,  they could  possibly have  won the  position  of  member  of  parliament.  The  division 
between Upper and Lower Pokomo did not seem to have been important in the election of a specific 
Pokomo MP aspirant. Instead, in some cases almost entire villages voted for one candidate, like in 
Kau and Ozi and in others, like Idsowe regardless of the Upper-Lower Pokomo divide tendencies of 
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Name Party Ethnicity %
Sane URP Wardei 37.2
Ruhu FORD-K Lower Pokomo 23.3
Godo ODM Lower Pokomo 12.3
Wario WDM-K Orma 8
Tuma UDFP Orma 3
Other Other Upper + Lower Pokomo 16.2
Table 12: National Assembly election 2013
villages for one candidate or the other there were tendencies of polling stations for one candidate or 
the other recognisable. For example Kau and Ozi voted almost entirely for Joel Ruhu, in Idsowe and 
Ngao more than 75% cast their ballot for Godo and in Gadeni Primary School almost all voters 
voted for Irene Matsawi Fibe.
Although the election for the national Assembly was important, all eyes were set on the position of 
Governor.  Under  the old constitution the presidential  elections were accompanied by a winner-
takes-all atmosphere. This time this attitude was noticeable for the election of Governor and County 
Representatives in Tana River. Adam Badiribu, an aspirant from the Upper Pokomo community for 
the Governor position,  explained  some residents  of  Tana River  had interpreted devolution as  a 
means  of  ethic  self-governance  (East  African  15/09/2012).  Furthermore,  some  considered  the 
position of the new Governor was like that of becoming the President of the county which would 
make this person very powerful and able to decide on all development initiatives in the area. In 
consideration of the governance of previous Kenyan Presidents, this could indeed be associated 
with  ethnic  self-governance.  Other  respondents  confirmed  that  the  position  of  Governor  was 
regarded as a very powerful one and the incumbent could take decisions about crucial issues such as 
land policies. Also, some Orma feared if a Pokomo would win this position the land in the delta 
would  be  leased  to  foreign  investors  for  large  scale  projects.59 In  a  discussion  among  young 
educated  Pokomo  they  came  to  the  conclusion  Mungatana  would  be  the  best  choice  as  first  
Governor of the county. Although they saw some of his weaknesses they argued that, as a lawyer, he 
would have the right education to set up good laws for the county and he had the experience and 
skills to establish the necessary structures. Other Pokomo also saw the establishment of county laws 
as the main factor why these elections were so important. Due to the fact, that the society in Tana 
River was still deeply divided along ethnic lines, both groups feared if a candidate from the other 
community won the Governor seat the county resources would be distribute among the winner 
group and the others would not get a share of the cake. Hence, it was even questioned if devolution 
was a  better  option for the area than the centralised system in which decisions were taken by 
someone  else  and  not  the  local  ethnic  groups  would  have  to  decide  about  the  allocation  and 
distribution of the resources. However, some Pokomo argued that devolution was not the reason for 
the conflict but rather a factor which intensified it.
The Governor race was expected to be fought mainly between Garsen MP Danson Mungatana and 
59 This perspective, however, does not take into account that most of the area is Public Land which means not the 
county council but the National Land Commission is the body in charge of it. Also, a big part of the delta was 
already given to TARDA, however, since the sugar cane project collapsed as a consequence of the El Niño rains, the 
area is laying idle. 
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former Ambassador Hussein Dado - the two most popular 
aspirants in their own communities, but at the same time 
also  the  two  who  were  most  disliked  by  the  other 
community.  Even though it was expected that either of 
the  two  would  win  the  position,  three  other  aspirants, 
Mandara  Badiribu,  Adam Dhidha  and Molu  Shambaro 
still contested as well, but the seat was finally won by the 
Orma Hussein Dado (see Table  13). In the up-run to the election, the fight for the Governor post 
brought  tension  between  Mungatana  and  the  Upper  Pokomo  Galole  MP  Dhadho  Godhana. 
According to the latter one, the two had an agreement Mungatana would support Godhana for the 
Governor,  and in  return  he would  receive  Godhana's  support  as  Senator.  However,  Mungatana 
denied such an agreement and contested as Governor himself, which is why Godhana decided not to 
run for a county position but rather to try to get re-elected as Galole MP. The dispute between the 
two might have been one reason why many Upper Pokomo did not vote for Mungatana but rather 
for Adam Dhidha who is an Upper Pokomo himself. However, it was also said, Adam Dhidha had 
referred to the religious divide in his campaigns in the northern part of the county, and propagated it 
would be better to vote for him (a Muslim) than for the Christian Mungatana because Muslims had 
to stand together and even if as a consequence an Orma won, they were still governed by another 
Muslim. Furthermore, there were rumours among the Lower Pokomo that Dhidha had been bought 
by the Orma to split the Pokomo votes. In return, it was said, he was promised to be appointed to 
the county government, where he was given a position in the executive. Therefore, some Lower 
Pokomo blamed Dhidha for Mungatana's loss and argued, if he seriously wanted the seat, he should 
have campaigned in the southern part  of  the county as  well  and presented a  clear  agenda like 
Mungatana did in the north. Mungatana's second Pokomo competitor Badiribu was also given a 
position  in  the  county  executive,  which  raised  suspicion  against  him  as  well.  The  two  Orma 
aspirants Molu Shambaro and Hussein Dado were said to be not in good terms, even though they 
are related by blood. Hence some Orma assumed, Shambaro wanted to split the votes of the Orma 
community, because he preferred anyone else in the position over Dado. The Orma council of elders 
was, however, split over this decision. While their choice for the MP was already clear in June, they 
took more time for the decision whom they would support as Governor and according to some 
respondents, the council could not agree on the best candidate. The Orma community, especially the 
youth, widely supported the younger Dado, as Shambaro had lost the trust of many Orma when he 
was MP from 1997-2002.
106
Name Party Ethnicity %
Dado WDM-K Orma 42.4
Mungatana TNA Lower Pokomo 31.1
Shambaro URP Orma 10
Dhidha ODM Upper Pokomo 8.9
Badiribu NARC-K Upper Pokomo 7.6
Table 13: Governor election 2013
The  election  for  Women  Representative  and  Senator  were  not  given  as  much  attention  and 
importance as the MP and Governor. By the end of August only Shedrack Osiah Hiribae, who was 
working in the county executive, was known as aspirant for the Senator post and Halima Ware Duri, 
a DC from the South Coast had decided to run as Women Representative. Even shortly before the 
elections several people stated for these two positions they were not sure who to vote for because 
they did hardly know most  of the aspirants.  However,  some of the former MPs or former MP 
aspirants  in  Tana,  like  Mohamed  Omar  Said  Soba,  Mohamed  Galgalo  Abdi  or  Michael  Justin 
Nkaduda tried their luck this time for the Senator seat. The former MP Mohamed Galgalo Abdi was 
the only aspirant from the Orma community, and Ali Abdi Bule the only Wardei. The former MP 
Mohamed Omar Said Soba, a Malakote, also tried his luck and, again, several Pokomo contested for 
the seat as well.  This might have been a reason, why this position also went to the pastoralist  
community. However, in this case, the Lower and Upper Pokomo only had approximately 45%, the 
Malakote aspirant received 8.8% and the Orma together with the Wardei received 46.3% of the 
votes. Like for the Garsen MP post, a relatively unknown Wardei who had never contested before, 
was widely supported by the Orma community and appeared as the strongest candidate in Garsen 
constituency (with 43.7%) as well as county wide. The race for the Women Representative was won 
by Halima Ware Duri who received in Garsen 44.4% of the votes. Unlike for the other position, the 
Orma aspirants for the Women Representative received more than 50% of the votes due to the fact 
that in some of the Pokomo strong hold voting stations, especially in Garsen North, several dozen 
votes were given to either of the two Orma aspirants.
For  these  elections,  the  number 
of  divisions  in  Garsen 
constituency  was  reduced  from 
three60 to  two  (Garsen  and 
Kipini) and the number of wards 
from nine61 to six: Garsen North, 
Garsen  West,  Garsen  Central, 
Garsen  South,  Kipini  East,  and 
Kipini West (see Figure 9). It was 
striking that only one incumbent 
councillor  was  re-elected  as 
County Representative, the Orma 
60 Garsen, Tarasaa and Kipini.
61 Ndera, Salama-Mwina, Kipini West, Kipini Rast, Shirikisho, Garsen-South, Garsen-Central, Bilisa and Assa.
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Figure 9: Garsen Constituency: Wards
Mahmud Ahmed Gabo for Garsen West. 
This was probably partly a result of the 
change  of  boundaries,  due  to  the  fact 
that in some cases two incumbents had 
to contest against each other but others 
were probably rather lacking support of 
the  population,  because  their 
performance in the election was one of 
the weakest in their ward (see Table 14); 
Kawidsi Mwakatwa Peter, for example, 
only  received  18  votes  in  his  ward 
Garsen  North.  It  is  also  very  obvious 
that the Pokomo incumbents performed 
relatively  weak.  In  interviews  in  July 
and  August  2012  the  Pokomo 
councillors  stressed,  that  they  did  not 
only try to please their own community but initiated projects which benefited the Orma community. 
In case people voted along ethnic lines, this could partly explain their poor performance because 
even though Orma might have benefited, they did not vote for the incumbent and Pokomo voters 
might have been disappointed and were unsatisfied with the performance of the incumbent. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that only one of the elected local county representatives is a 
Pokomo  (Manase  Samuel  Guyo  (TNA)  in  Kipini  East  ward)  even  though  almost  half  of  the 
constituency population are from his Pokomo community. Garsen Central and Garsen West, which 
are located in  Orma areas,  were likely to be won by an Orma,  but  at  least  Garsen South was 
expected to see a Pokomo candidate winning, due to the fact that it combines several big Pokomo 
villages on the South-West side of the river. The other wards were believed to be hotly contested 
and were all taken by pastoralist aspirants (Salat Farah Dakan (URP) – Garsen North; Boru Dela 
Masha (WDM-K) – Garsen Central; Hussein Gobu Godana (URP) – Garsen South; Musa Wario 
Shora (WDM-K) – Kipini West). This could, like for the other positions, be a result of the high 
number of Pokomo aspirants and the fact that they did not concentrate their votes on one candidate.
The entire election might also have been influenced by pastoralists and especially Orma voting in 
Garsen constituency or other parts of the county even though they did not permanently live in the 
area. An Orma who lived in the Lamu West part of the delta mentioned, that most Orma from the 
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Name Party Former 
ward
New 
ward
Ethnicity %
Kawidsi 
Mwakatwa Peter WDM-K
Salama-
Mwina
Garsen 
North Pokomo 0.3
Ali Omar Buya URP Kipini-West
Kipini 
West Pokomo 1.7
Ben Maneno Dullu FPK Garsen-South
Garsen 
South Pokomo 1.9
Babuya Komora WDM-K Shirikis
ho
Garsen 
South Pokomo 13.8
Hijabu Mohamed 
Hiribae LPK Ndera
Garsen 
North Pokomo 14.7
Sharif Abdulikadir 
Abderhman WDM-K
Kipini-
East
Kipini 
East Orma 24.2
Bakar Dokota 
Shongolo SAFINA Assa
Garsen 
West Orma 27.9
Mahmud Ahmed 
Gabo URP Bilisa
Garsen 
West Orma 34.5
Salim Golo Ndogo URP Garsen-Central
Garsen 
Central Orma 39.7
Table 14: County Representative elections, incumbent councillors.
area of Dide Waride decided to register in Garsen to support their fellow Orma in Tana county.
Furthermore,  a general  remark should be made that  the voter turnout of the different positions 
varied between 24,338 for the presidential ballot and 25,098 for the MP, due to the fact that some 
people decided not to vote for a certain position or to only vote for another one. However, no major 
irregularities could be found by analysing the results, but it was reported by respondents that at  
some polling stations people were asked to sneak into the line after the official closing time and told 
to cast the ballot for a certain position and candidate to increase the chances of a victory. This might 
also have influenced the end results in the constituency.
By considering the ethnic group predominantly living near a polling station and comparing it with 
the voting patterns, it is evident that Pokomo villages overwhelmingly voted for Pokomo aspirants 
and Orma either for Orma or Wardei (especially in the case of the MP and the Senator). On the one 
hand, this could be interpreted as ethnic voting, but on the other hand it could also be related to the 
livelihood strategies and different interests in the usage of natural resources. Only in few cases 
votes were not cast along these lines. For example, in Handaraku, 75% of the Orma village voted 
for  Frankfaith  Daiddo,  a  Lower  Pokomo  MP aspirant,  but  votes  cast  in  the  village  for  other 
positions overwhelmingly went to Orma candidates.
In  the  rest  of  the  county the  voting  pattern  was  similar.  As a  result,  most  seats  were  won by 
members of the pastoralist communities and only few County Representative positions went to the 
Pokomo.  After  the  election  five  Pokomo  aspirants,  namely  Dhadho  Godhana,  Alfeit  Abiyo, 
Mahadhi Ali Loka, Khalif Bahola and Maimuna Mohamed vowed to challenge the results in court 
because they assumed there must have been major irregularities, if their community did not win any 
of the central positions. Other Pokomo, however, accepted the result and saw the fault in their own 
strategy and the lack of uniting for one candidate.
6.2.4.1 Different voting patterns
The  theoretical  framework  stressed  that  there  can  be 
several factors which lead to or influences voting decision 
making. Table  15 gives an overview of the relevance of 
different factors for how IDPs in the Tana delta cast their 
ballot.62
Results  shown  in  Table  15  make  us  conclude  that 
ethnicity,  competence of the aspirant,  personal relations, 
62 The possible answer categories were based on the theoretical background and results from interviews in the first  
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Percent Pearson 
Chi-Square
Political Party 8.7% 4.50
Ethnicity 52% 39.043
Competence 63.3% 49.562
Personal relations 38% 15.476
Previous 
performance 28.7% 11.339
Character of aspirant 42% 11.556
Table 15: What do you base your decision on?
the previous performance and the character of the candidate are all factors which were of significant 
relevance for the voting decision.63 However,  with an outcome of 4.5 points, the political  party 
cannot be regarded as a factor which is of significant importance for the population of Garsen 
constituency when making up their  minds whom to vote for.  By taking the highest scores into 
account,  we  see  that  the  competence  of  the  aspirant  is  most  important  for  two  out  of  three 
respondents, followed in importance by the candidates ethnicity, character, personal relations and 
finally the previous performance, if any. 
In qualitative interviews almost all respondents stressed politicians from their community should be 
voted in. The Orma explained, in case the government would be formed by Orma they expected the 
clashes would end, peace would return and the situation in the delta would improve. The Pokomo 
on contrast argued it was mainly important that one of their communities was elected because the 
Pokomo leaders were better educated, and they had the knowledge and skills to develop the area.  
According to them the ethnicity was not such an important factor but the qualifications were more 
crucial.  The fact that they did not regard the Orma leaders as qualified could, however, also be 
linked  to  the  different  interests  they  had  and  the  expectation  the  county  would  not  get  many 
additional  revenues  in  case  Orma  were  elected  because  the  latter  ones  opposed  large  scale 
agricultural projects. The strong focus of the Orma on the ethnic belonging of the politicians raises 
the question whether they were very neglected by the Pokomo government or they had a tribalistic 
attitude. According to the elaborations of Orma respondents, they felt quite neglected and made 
Mungatana's government responsible for the lack of progress, even in areas which were not part of 
his responsibility.64
research period. Possibly, religion and contents of the party manifesto or ideology could have been included as well,  
however, in the first research phase those aspects were dismissed as irrelevant factors and have therefore been left 
out in the questionnaire.
63 According to the Chi-Square table, the result of a test with two degrees of freedom and 95% Confidence Level is 
significant if the value is higher than 5.99.
64 But several aspects mentioned were either exaggerated or untrue. As an example for the negligence by Mungatana  
they mentioned he had not visited Orma villages  to show his condolence,  however,  several  newspaper articles 
reported the opposite and in some cases he was chased away (Oda) or told not to visit the village because the 
residents were to furious (Kipao). Furthermore, several Orma complained Mungatana had not built any secondary 
school in an Orma village. However, an informant who worked in an education project in the area explained the  
villages which were interested in the construction of a school first had to show interest, apply for CDF money and 
allocate land for the school as well as raise part of the money themselves. If this was not guaranteed before, the  
village would also not  receive money for  the school.  Also, some Orma claimed Mungatana's  family had been 
favoured when it came to the distribution of CDF money, and Orma would not receive retirement allowances or 
support for schooling. If one has a look at Mungatana's home village, one could indeed come to the conclusion that  
he privileged his own people, however, the Secondary School and the hospital, for example, were already build 
years before Mungatana got in power. Also, tabbed water and electricity were crucial in this village because the  
district hospital was there. Furthermore, other than the Orma claimed, even applicants from Mungatana's clan were 
denied financial support to pay school fees. 
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6.2.4.2 Consequences of the Conflict on the Elections
The  low  registration  number  of  voters  mentioned  above  was  surely  a  result  of  the  conflict. 
According to the survey data many people could not or refused to vote because they were scared,  
displaced or had lost their  ID cards (see Table  16). One of the reasons for the low registration 
number was probably the displacement of about 
34,000 people during the conflict, which is 15% 
of  the  county  and  more  than  a  third  of  the 
constituency  population.  Some  of  these  IDPs 
stayed  in  camps  or  with  friends  and  relatives 
within the constituency, where they at least had 
the  possibility  to  register  at  nearby  polling 
stations. But others who left the area struggled to 
register or to vote, especially if they did not have 
the financial  mean for the travel  to  their  home 
area. Still, many people, who left the area, returned to vote, partly with the support of others who 
gave them a lift to their home or even through assistance by politicians. While the Pokomo mainly 
organised private cars, the Orma were given the opportunity to travel to the Tana delta in lorries and 
buses which were said to have been organised by the Governor aspirant Hussein Dado. This might 
have helped the latter one to his success; organising lorries and buses might on the one hand have 
shown how serious and committed he was to win the position, and on the other hand it increased the 
number of Orma voters. Also, his support to carry people to the voting stations might not only have  
been regarded as a selfish action, but rather as a sacrifice for the Orma community because almost 
all Orma respondents expected peace to return only if an Orma was voted in. 
Furthermore, both communities accused aspirants from the other to have incited, organised and 
financed the clashes. While the Pokomo candidates were only accused by Orma and defended by 
their  own  community,  the  Orma  aspirants  were  accused  by  Pokomo,  but  some  few  Orma 
respondents also confirmed that their politicians had talked badly about the Pokomo ones. Hence, it  
might be possible that they tried to take an advantage of the conflict and to unite the votes of their 
ethnic group. Similarly the Pokomo aspirants could have used the conflict to unite their community 
as well. In previous elections the Pokomo were said of having been divided between Upper and 
Lower Pokomo but not in this one. However, it is questionable why the conflict should have been 
used to unite the group if not even the elders gave a recommendation until after the clashes in  
February 2013,  when they realised  they might  lose  all  positions  if  they did  not  focus  on  one 
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People cannot vote because they got displaced 
or lost their ID cards 79.7%
People fear to vote 58.1%
It brought up a stronger group coherence; as a 
result voters rather vote for aspirants of their 
community
88.5%
Now  it  is  more  important  to  vote  for  an 
aspirant of the own community 87.8%
Now it is more important to vote for a capable 
leader no matter from which community 6.1%
Table 16: Which consequences did the conflict have on  
the elections? (general)
candidate. However, the advice of the elders to vote for the Lower Pokomo Joel Ruhu from Hewani 
was  obviously not  binding  which  is  why other  competitors,  especially  Ruhu's  Lower  Pokomo 
fellow from Ngao, Wellington Godo, also received a substantial number of votes. In interviews with 
different  Pokomo  aspirants  and  voters  most  of  them  said,  the  best  candidate  with  the  most 
supporters should win, irrespectively of the ethnicity. Hence, the Pokomo consciously did not want 
to  focus  on one candidate,  which led to  the result  that  almost  all  seats  went to  the pastoralist  
community. Due to all these factors it is rather likely that the Pokomo did not intent to use the 
conflict for political purposes. 
Looking at the survey data, it is, however, striking that 88% irrespective the ethnic origin, were of 
the opinion the clashes brought up a stronger group coherence and as a result people would rather 
vote for an aspirant from their own community. Furthermore, almost the same number of people 
said it would in fact be more important to vote along ethnic lines, whereas only 6% were of the 
opinion, due to the conflict it would be more important to vote for a capable leader (see Table 16). 
Hence,  these  findings  confirm  the  thesis  that  ethnic  pre-election  violence  unites  the  warring 
communities for the election.
Similar observations can be made by looking at 
which  aspects  voters  perceived  as  important  if 
their decision on whom to vote for changed due 
to the clashes. More than half of the voters (57%) 
said they changed their decision after the clashes 
(see  Table  17).  About  88%  of  those  who 
reconsidered  it  said  ethnicity  was  one  of  the 
deciding factors for their choice, while only about 
a  quarter  of  the  other  respondents  regarded 
ethnicity as relevant. Also, the competence of the aspirants was an important factor for those who 
changed their choice (64.4%), however, it was even more important for those who remained with 
their initial candidate (87.3%). The importance of the character of the aspirant increased slightly 
with the conflict, but it was also a relevant factor for the other voters. The relevance of personal 
relations and the previous performance did not change with the conflict, which was to be expected. 
Most surprising is, however, that the relevance of the political party increased after the conflict, but 
like mentioned above, the Chi-square test already indicated that the factor was insignificant for the 
explanation of voting behaviour in Garsen constituency. 
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Did you consider different 
candidates before the clashes
What do you base your 
decision on?
No (43%) Yes (57%)
Political Party 2 3.6% 11 15%
Ethnicity 14 25.5% 64 87.7%
Competence 48 87.3% 47 64.4%
Personal relations 49 89.1% 8 11%
Previous performance 40 72,7% 3 4.1%
Character of the aspirant 24 43.6% 39 53.4%
Table 17: Consequences of conflict on voting patterns
The question whether or not the conflict helped to decide was followed by an open question in 
which  the  respondents  were  asked  to  explain  how.  Like  Table  17  already suggested,  the  most 
relevant aspect for the voting decision in case of a change of mind was the ethnicity of the aspirant.  
This was confirmed by the answer to the question how the conflict helped to decide because the 
answer  that  after  the  clashes  the  respondent  would  only  vote  for  somebody  from  the  own 
community dominated. Another factor which was important for several people was the perceived 
ability of a candidate to unify the groups living in the county and to bring peace. In this respect the 
fact that the person should not be a tribalist was emphasised. Others mentioned, after the clashes 
they would only vote for somebody who was able to bring development, who was a democratic, 
incorruptible, capable and faithful leader or somebody who had a good character.
The question  whether  or  not  the conflict  changed 
the respondent's  picture of certain politicians,  was 
answered positively by almost 50% (see Table  18). 
In  the  next  question  which  was  directed  toward 
defining their picture of which politicians changed 
and  why,  the  incumbents,  especially  the  Pokomo 
parliamentarians  Dhadho  Godhana  and  Danson 
Mungatana were identified as the biggest political losers of the conflict. A total of 31 respondents 
said their picture of the incumbents in Tana River County in general or those in parliament changed. 
They either made them responsible for the clashes as inciters and sponsors or said they were selfish 
and did not take action.  An additional number of 20 respondents remarked their  opinion about 
Mungatana changed and four pointed fingers on Godhana. This could be a result of the reported 
negative speeches Orma aspirants gave about Pokomo ones. In fact the Pokomo suspected that the 
Orma tried to destroy the reputation of the two politicians through the conflict. Even though already 
before the conflict Mungatana was critiqued in several ways, he was known as a leader who brought 
peace to the area. The clashes in his second legislature put him, however, in a different light. By 
looking  at  Godhana's  records,  one  has  to  acknowledge  that  the  CDF  funds  were  managed 
extraordinarily  well.  However,  due  to  the  clashes  and  the  heavy accusations  he  lost  his  good 
reputation and in the end he even filed a case against the government in which he made the latter 
one responsible for his loss and especially the fact that he was publicly accused, sacked as Assistant  
Livestock  Minister  and  arrested.  Another  Pokomo  aspirant  who  was  pointed  at  was  the  MP 
candidate Joel Ruhu. Furthermore, two Orma respondents reported in semi-structured interviews 
that a text message was circulating which was believed to having been sent by Ruhu, in which he 
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No 
%
Yes 
%
Maybe
%
Did you lose your ID in the 
clashes 62.4 37.6 N/A
Will you vote 16.4 76.0 7.5
Did  the  conflict  change  your 
picture of certain politicians? 50.7 49.3 N/A
Table 18: Which consequences did the conflict have on  
the elections? (individual)
informed the chief in Ngao on the day of the Kipao attack that the attackers would return to Ngao 
soon and he pledged the chief to help them escaping and hiding the firearms. However, it is more 
likely that this was a simple trick to weaken Ruhu's reputation. If Ruhu had indeed written such a  
text  message,  it  is  questionable  why  it  was  circulating  among  the  Orma  community  but  the 
incidence had not been brought to court. On the Orma side only Ali Wario Guyo was mentioned 
three  times,  Fahim Twaha  once  and all  Orma  politicians  once  with  the  explanation  they only 
supported Orma or only visited villages of their community. However, with regard to the qualitative 
interviews with Pokomo, Hussein Dado's reputation was in this community already bad before the 
clashes broke out.
Beside the unifying factor, Cederman et al (2013: 389f) stress pre-election violence can be used to 
reduce the number of supporters of the opponents through displacement or killing. Like mentioned 
above as a result of the conflict almost 15% of the county population or more than a third of the 
population of Garsen constituency, where most of the IDPs came from, were displaced, which can 
be  an  explanation  why the  voter  registration  was relatively low in Tana River  (see  Table  16). 
Besides challenges of displacement, several people lost their ID cards in the clashes, especially 
when their houses were burnt. While Orma argued the Pokomo benefited more from the conflict, 
because they lost more people, the Pokomo argued the same in return because several Pokomo 
villages were burnt down and as a result the residents were displaced or lost their IDs. In a group 
interview with Upper Pokomo elders from different villages, who were accompanied by about 60 
people, it was reported that most of their people had lost their ID cards when their villages were 
burnt down in August and September 2012. Even though the government asked them to return to 
their village to vote, they did not see a reason to go back at the time of the interview, due to the facts 
that they did not have any IDs to vote, they were not registered as voters and they expressed their  
fear  of  further  attacks  or  that  their  wells  had  been  poisoned.  This  group  of  IDPs  was  very 
discouraged that their situation could improve because they had the impression the government did 
not  support  them, but rather  engaged in fighting and displacing them. One elder  said it  was  a 
government of the rich, and poor people would always get intimidated. Therefore, they did not 
expect any change following the elections.
Even though many people had lost their IDs, it is likely that some managed to receive new ones. In 
Table 18 we see that more than a third (56) of the respondents lost their ID cards in the clashes, but  
only 16% (24) said they would not  vote.  Hence,  we can assume the other  at  least  32 people 65 
managed to get new IDs.
65 It is “at least“ because possibly some who did have an ID did not want to vote.
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Another  aspect  through  which  politicians  could  have 
benefited from the conflict  and how they could have put 
themselves in a positive light, is by engaging in the peace 
building process (see Figure  10). In the elections in 2002 
this was probably a factor which led to Mungatana's victory 
(see above). During and after the conflict in 2012/2013, the 
leaders indeed also visited the affected villages and engaged 
in the peace process by partly attending peace meetings or 
trying  to  spread  peace  and  to  reconcile  the  communities.  Especially  in  the  Orma  community 
politicians were identified as a group which can influence the peace process by either inciting or 
calming  the  situation  down.  Even  though  politicians  were  mainly  identified  as  a  group  which 
financed and fuelled the conflict (see Table 3) their efforts in the peace building process were also 
recognised.  Still,  respondents  on  both  sides  suspected  aspirants  of  the  other  group to  fuel  the 
situation and remarked politicians from the other community showed peace efforts in public, but 
when they were with members of their community only, they started to incite. Similarly, the press 
conference with Kenya Red Cross in January 2013 was regarded as an occasion where the political 
leaders pretended to be united and to engage in peace only for the sake of publicity, however, their 
peace efforts were not regarded as genuine. In the end, when the leaders were supposed to hold joint 
peace rallies, the Orma aspirants did indeed not show up.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter we have seen that the constituency boundaries in Tana River were changed several  
times and in both 1966 and 1997 a constituency was added. The MPs in the different constituencies 
mostly changed after one term, even if some politicians were re-elected once or twice. The change 
of the incumbents was often also connected with a change of ethnic representation in the National 
Assembly. Therefore, even if one of the two bigger ethnic groups from the area (Orma or Pokomo) 
did not have a representative during one term, they were mostly represented in the following term. 
In some legislatures there was no Pokomo representation, in others no Orma was elected and in 
some few ones (1966, 1997, 2002) both groups were represented. Especially in Garsen constituency 
the Pokomo dominated politically. Orma candidates were only elected in 1974, 1988 and 1997 and 
Sane was the first Wardei who won the elections in Garsen (in 2013). While the 1992 and 1997 
elections were entirely won by KANU aspirants, Mungatana was elected on a NARC ticket in 2002, 
possibly due to the fact that the population was unsatisfied with the way the KANU government had 
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Figure 10: Mungatana giving a speech on a 
peace meeting in Mikameni.
handled the clashes in 2000/2001. Another reason for his success could have been his offer of free 
legal services for the victims of the clashes. 
The emergence of violence preceding multiparty elections in Tana River County is remarkable. In 
the 1990s the hiring of  shifta bandits who stole and destroyed voter cards or IDs, was used as a 
method to minimise the supporters of political  competitors. Prior to the 2002 elections, clashes 
escalated  in  Garsen  constituency,  due  to  a  land adjudication  policy.  While  the  clashes  did  not 
directly erupt in connection to the elections, the violence most probably affected the voting patterns. 
Besides the different services candidates offered (to make themselves more attractive), the conflict 
most likely brought up stronger group coherence among the communities. However, by the end of 
the conflict the Orma and Wardei were politically divided and the different interests of the groups 
regarding land were carved out even more. Despite the almost nation wide violence after the famous 
2007 election, Garsen constituency was relatively peaceful. Even if irregularities were noted and a 
protest ended in the burning of ballot papers, the situation calmed down quickly. However, in Bura 
and Galole clashes between Orma and Wardei erupted, which were said to have been initiated by 
politicians. 
Finally, only few months before the 4th March elections another conflict escalated which was said to 
have been fuelled and partly organised by politicians as well. Even if the conflict was not triggered 
by the elections, it is likely that the prospects for the new power distribution, especially in relation 
to the devolved government, increased tension. While the Pokomo argue the Orma wanted to use 
the conflict to create a common enemy to unite the pastoralists, the Orma assumed the Pokomo 
were  afraid  to  be  left  with  no  position  in  the  devolved  government  and  wanted  to  split  the 
pastoralists because there was a possibility the Orma and Wardei would win all seats in case they 
united. It is, however, questionable, if the Pokomo would have tried to divide the pastoralists with 
help of a conflict, if they did not even put effort in uniting their own group and focusing on one 
candidate. The lack of focus was probably, on the one hand, related to the attitude the best candidate 
should win, but on the other hand also a result of the fact that the opinion of Pokomo elders is not as 
important in nominating and deciding for a candidate as in the Orma community. Furthermore, in 
relation to the different accusations, the key politicians lost popularity among the opposing groups. 
The biggest political losers in the clashes were the two Pokomo politicians namely, Mungatana and 
Godhana. Additionally, more than 50% of the respondents reconsidered their voting decision after 
the clashes.  Almost 90% of those who changed their  decision said the ethnic belonging of the 
candidate was a crucial factor for their voting, while only 25% of those who stuck to their decision 
regarded ethnicity as important. Due to the clashes several dozen people were displaced or lost their 
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voter cards, which affected the elections and explains the relatively low voter registration. Still, the 
voter turnout was high. Several hundred people who had left the area returned to vote, either with 
private cars, or, in case of the Orma, buses and lorries were organised. A reason why these elections 
were perceived as very important, was surely the implementation of the devolved system and the 
new  responsibilities  local  politicians  were  given,  especially  regarding  the  control  of  (natural) 
resources. 
A major difference in interest between the Orma and the Pokomo groups was the usage of land.  
While  the  Pokomo still  desired  title  deeds  and  large  scale  agricultural  projects  in  the  delta  to 
improve  the  employment  situation  and  increase  the  revenues,  the  Orma  objected  these  plans, 
because they feared to loose their crucial grazing areas. Instead they promoted the idea to use the 
area for eco-tourism, however, only under the condition that they could still use the delta as grazing 
ground. Other topics which were raised during the campaign period were mainly related to the 
underdevelopment of the area. The residents saw the need for the improvement of the road network, 
health facilities and education, the communication network, security as well as the reduction of 
corruption. Most of the topics were already raised in other elections, however, the marginalised area 
had either not received sufficient funds or due to poor governance and bad leadership was still 
lacking development.
The election day of the 4th March elections was held peacefully and the results were accepted by the 
population,  even  though,  the  Pokomo,  who distributed  their  votes  on  several  candidates,  were 
indeed only left with few County Representative seats.
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Chapter 7    Discussion
After having had a closer look at both the clashes and the election we will now link them to the 
literature discussed in the theoretical framework and see how this  study fits in it  and what the 
research findings can add to the existing theory.
The conflict in the Tana delta suits Allen's (1999: 36ff) characterisation of 'New Wars' in several 
respects. According to Allen, the so called 'New Wars' are more intense than conflicts before the 
1980s, they claim a high number of victims, including civilian and vulnerable groups. The clashes 
did not only claim the lives of almost 200 people but most of the victims were indeed civilians,  
especially women and children mostly trying to run away from the violence. For example, people 
were massacred while they were hiding in a mosque or schools (Kilelengwani), elderly were pushed 
into their burning houses (in Kau) or in the case of Kibusu, a school child was shot while collecting  
wood in a tree and others were shot on their way to school. These were not fights between two 
armed militias but the militias attacked helpless civilians. The fact that the attacks were directed 
towards civilians whereby it looked like the attackers wanted to eliminate whole villages rather 
reminds of genocides than traditional warfare, even if the word genocide is too big for the clashes in 
the Tana delta. Also, in several attacks the raiders were identified as neighbours and sometimes even 
as friends, which can be classified as interpersonal violence. Another 'New Wars' characteristic the 
clashes in the Tana delta seem to meet is the intensification of the conflict by firearms, which are 
according to Allen especially used in pastoralist  areas.  Even if  the biggest attacks were mainly 
carried out with crude weapons, both groups argued they did not feel secure and were in some cases 
not willing to engage in peace talks, unless the other group surrendered their firearms. Furthermore, 
not only human beings were attacked, but other resources, especially livestock and farms as well as 
houses were destroyed as well.  This economic warfare is  another feature of 'New Wars'.  Allen 
additionally remarks 'New Wars' were sometimes even connected to state collapse. Even if this did 
not happen, the institutional failure and absence of the state in the Tana delta was a relevant factor 
for the escalation of the conflict. The institutions and the police were overwhelmed and not able to 
control the situation. Besides that, the national government took a whole month to take action and 
the GSU troops which were sent, finally also engaged in violence like in the case of Ozi village.  
The involvement of state officials or even the government is another characteristic of these 'New 
Wars'.
Furthermore, Allen classifies the literature on post-Cold War conflicts on the African continent in 
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five categories (see section 2.1.3). The third type he describes is rooted in the nature of African 
political systems and the competition for resources. According to the perception of IDPs from the 
Tana delta, these were central reasons for the clashes in the area. The hybrid political order and 
legal pluralism complicate the land rights in the Tana delta, which is one reason why the conflicts 
over natural resources arise frequently. Both groups see themselves as the rightful inhabitants of the 
area. Especially the areas at the river banks in “Orma locations” (like for example Kipao or Galili) 
are  contested  due to  the fact  that  the Pokomo argue  they had been farming in these  areas  for 
centuries, while the Orma claim the land as well because it is part of administrative units which 
were given names of Orma villages. 
Furthermore, the hybrid political order does not only leave people with unclear land rights, but also 
the responsibilities of leaders are not as distinct. Traditionally mainly elders were responsible for 
inter-community peace negotiations, and especially in the Orma culture, those are until today the 
only leaders who have the authority to negotiate peace agreements. However, the administrative 
peace committees consist of a mixed group of residents who (at least partly) do not have the support 
and respects of their communities. On the basis of Boege et al. (2008: 2ff), who identify hybrid 
political orders and legal pluralism as a source of conflicts and even see it as a possible root cause, I 
argue that the main problem in the Tana delta which underlies this conflict is the unclear legal 
situation  due  to  the  lack  of  title  deeds  and  different  legal  systems,  and as  a  consequence  the 
uncertainty the residents have to live with. Due to these overlapping land rights, not only the local 
communities claim the land, but according to statutory law the biggest part of the delta is Public 
Land, which means de jure, the land which was over centuries inhabited by these communities can 
be leased to investors. This further increases tensions over land in the area and could be a reason 
why the Community Land which is located along the river banks is so contested. Only the court 
ruling from February 2013 gives the residents a say in what will happen with the land they are 
living on. In connection to the different perceptions of ownership and land tenure systems, the two 
communities also lack respect for each other's property. This was argued on several peace meetings, 
due to the fact that pastoralists sometimes fail to control their animals and farmers occasionally kill 
or hurt cattle if the animals stray into the farms and destroy the crops. I argue that the disrespect is 
rooted in the different tenure systems as well. While the pastoralists do not recognise individual 
land ownership and regard the delta, and especially the areas in “Orma locations” as pasture area or 
their land, the Pokomo still claim the river banks and feel violated when animals destroy the crops 
they had grown in their ancestral farms.
Another aspect often mentioned in connection with the nature of African political systems and the 
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political culture are clientage relations, which Clapham (1982: 6) describes as dyadic systems in 
which every actor relies on those above and below him. Due the fact that politicians often try to 
mobilise  people  from their  own ethnic  group  via  moral  ethnicity  (Lonsdale  1993:  131),  these 
clientage structures eventually involve ethnic relations. Therefore, according to the neo-patrimonial 
theory (see Erdman & Engel 2007), politicians often channel resources mainly to their own ethnic 
groups. In the data presented above, the fear of being left out in case a member of the other ethnic 
groups is elected, was very strong and led to the high ethnically polarised competition in these 
elections, especially for county positions. The fear of not benefiting from the government in case 
the other group won central positions was connected to general development and financial county 
resources but also natural resources and especially land policies in the county. Due to the different 
interests of the communities, the question who would end up in the government mattered. Many 
people thought that Pokomo politicians would especially promote agricultural projects in the delta 
to increase employment opportunities and county revenues, while the pastoralists rather wanted to 
promote cattle herding and to a lesser extent eco-tourism as a revenue generating activity. Besides 
the fear of being disadvantaged regarding the livelihood strategy, the pastoralists also feared to get 
displaced and to loose their fertile grazing areas in case large scale projects were implemented in 
the actual delta.66 Even if the different political interests and election politics did not trigger the 
conflict  and might as well  not have been the root cause, it  still  contributed to the tensions and 
probably to the extent of the clashes. Due to the new (partly believed) responsibilities the county 
government was given, these elections were regarded as being even more crucial than the past ones, 
because of the fear the increased resources would only be distributed among one community. On the 
Pokomo side this fear was fuelled by the plans of the Orma community to enter a pre-election 
coalition with the Wardei in order to leave no seats to Pokomo politicians, while the Orma had 
already missed out on the previous elections in which they did not get any parliamentary seat. The 
intention of electing politicians from the own community with the aim to benefit from the resources 
is according to Lonsdale (1993: 131) called “political tribalism”. 
One reason why this conflict, which was triggered by farmer/herder disputes, escalated in August 
2012,  was that  the  administration  did not  react  appropriately to  the  tensions  which  arose  over 
several months. If perpetrators were arrested, they were mostly released the same day or after one 
night. Also, both groups accused the administration of having been corruptible. Hence, people lost 
more and more political trust and as a result the conflict escalated (cf. Hutchinson & Johnson 2011: 
738).  Due  to  this  institutional  failure  and  the  almost  anarchic  situation,  the  resident  found 
66 As well, a nature conservation area, which alienates grazing areas could affect the pastoralists negatively.
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themselves in a position in which they felt like they had to defend themselves and to take the right  
in their own hands; or with the words of Hobbes (1651: Chapter XIII), they were set back into the  
natural condition which is dominated by war. In fact, the description of war Hobbs gave in the year 
1651 characterises the situation in the Tana delta conflict quite well. According to Hobbes people 
needed  regulations  of  the  “Leviathan”  because  otherwise  they  had  to  live  in  a  condition  of 
economic stagnation and fear. Even agricultural production was impossible and social growth was 
hindered because people had to live in “continual fear and danger of violent death” and were busy 
to defend themselves (1651: Chapter XIII). According to Hutchinson and Johnson (2011) political 
trust does not only decrease if the government fails to provide security, but the trust in political 
institutions is often weakened by the failure to provide other services. The population in the Tana 
Delta District had gotten the impression of not only being neglected by the local administration, but 
also by the national government. This feeling of marginalisation was mainly based on the lack of 
development in the area, including the lack of health facilities, schools, roads and economic growth. 
Therefore, the political trust of the residents in the Tana delta was probably already weakened due 
to their marginalisation by the state for several decades. According to Herbst (1990) areas where the 
state failed to provide these services were more prone to conflicts.
Both  conflicting  parties  were  afraid  of  being  displaced  or  killed  due  to  the  elections,  which 
Cederman (2013: 389f) describes as making the demos coincide with the ethnos. While the Orma 
were on the one hand afraid to get displaced in case large scale projects would be implemented in 
the delta, they also feared the Pokomo wanted to reduce their present and future (voting) population 
because they feared the Orma competition. The Pokomo, by contrast, were afraid the Orma wanted 
to displace them to win the elections. Once in power, the pastoralists would be in the position to 
decide over the land use and ownership in the delta. The Pokomo, moreover, felt that the conflict 
arose due to political interests of the Orma as the latter tried to unite the pastoralists and announced 
they wanted to win as many seats in the elections as possible to govern the county. Hence, the 
Pokomo got the impression, the Orma, whom they still perceived as visitors in the area, wanted to 
take over their ancestral lands and govern it according to their own values and interests. The Orma, 
however, interpreted the conflict as a method to bring mistrust among the pastoralist groups. As 
both groups feared the other aimed to bar their opponent from being in power, the perception that it 
was important to vote in one’s ‘own’ people gained strength.
Whether  or  not  politicians  actually tried to  take an advantage of the conflict  by fuelling it,  is, 
however, not clear and hard to proof, even though both communities accused aspirants of the other 
group to have incited or financed the conflict. Hence, both groups sensed the others wanted to take 
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a political advantage and the we-versus-them feeling even intensified the ethnic boundaries and the 
idea of ethnic belonging. Barth stated in his book “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries” (1969) ethnic 
communities are defined by boundaries to other groups and have both an intrinsic and extrinsic 
group identity. In case of an ethnic conflict the differences between groups are perceived to be 
stronger and therefore the boundaries as well. Simmel (1964) mentioned that conflicts lead to a 
stronger group coherence. Therefore the ethnic identities were strengthened and a voting on ethnic 
lines was perceived to be more important as shown in Table 17. 
Luhmann and Machiavelli both pointed out that the ultimate aim of politicians is to get or stay in 
power. According to Luhmann's theory everything politicians do is directed towards maximising 
power (Kieserling 2002),  Machiavelli  goes a  step further  by claiming politicians would use all 
means to get into power. These claims as well as Cederman et al.'s thesis that pre-election violence 
could be used to unite an ethnic group (2013: 389f), one could propose the hypothesis the Tana 
delta clashes were politically instigated, however, evidence to proof this is missing. Still, no matter 
whether or not the violence was fuelled by politicians, the conflict had direct effects on the elections 
due to the fact that voters were displaced or killed and the perceived relevance of voting along 
ethnic  lines  was  intensified.  Interestingly  voters  who  did  not  change  their  decision  regarded 
personal relations, the aspirant's competence and previous performance as the three most relevant 
aspects  for  their  voting  decision,  while  those who changed their  mind rather  gave attention  to 
ethnicity, also the competence and the character of the aspirant.
The results  on different  factors  that influenced voting behaviour does neither  fully confirm the 
neopatrimonial theory nor the rational voter theory. Downs (1957) suggested in his rational voter 
theory the voter based his decision on policies and the previous performance as well as possibly the 
ideology of a political party. However, neither the political party is very relevant for voters in the 
Tana delta, nor do they solely base their decisions on other factors suggested by Downs. In fact, the 
significance of the political party for the voting decision was insignificant. Instead, the competence, 
character, ethnic group and personal relations of the aspirant were regarded as crucial factors. Even 
though, ethnicity only became a decisive factor after the clashes. 
Also, the outcome of the research does not fully support the neo-patrimonial theory, which sees 
ethnicity and personal relations as the main factors for the voting decision. Before the conflict only 
a quarter of the respondents regarded ethnicity as a central factor while in the overall results 38% 
took personal relations into account. Furthermore, 27% of the respondents regarded the previous 
performance of the aspirant as a very relevant factor. Hence, the voting behaviour rather seems to be 
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a mix of factors and it has to be acknowledged that the voting decision of voters in the Tana delta 
seems to be based on a broad spectrum of different factors, including competence and character of 
the candidate as well. This rather confirms the hypothesis given by Grignon et al (2001: 10) that 
voting  decisions  are  usually  a  conjunction  of  three  different  factors,  identities,  ideologies  and 
interests.
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Chapter 8    Conclusion
This conclusion contains a summary, policy recommendations and further research perspectives.
8.1 Summary
Multiparty elections in Kenya in general and in Tana River specifically have often seen violent 
clashes in a number of selected hotspots. When violence erupted in Tana River it did so foremost 
preceding elections (in contrast to post-election violence). Even if the respective elections were not 
always the root cause and trigger of this violence it still affected the voting, either because voters 
were hindered to vote due to the fact that they got displaced or lost their IDs or voter cards, or 
because the conflict made people reconsider their choice, a stronger group coherence arose and 
group boundaries were strengthened through the conflicts. This was also the case with the clashes 
and elections which were subject to this research.
The clashes in the Tana delta which started in August 2012 claimed almost 200 lives and about 
34,000 people were displaced. Due to the fact that mainly two ethnic groups fought each other, the 
clashes can be classified as ethnic violence, however, the trigger was conflicts over land and access 
to water. One of the central problems underlying these clashes is the fact that both groups claim 
access to an ever shrinking landbase, whereby ownership and user rights overlap. This is to some 
extent  a  result  of  one  group,  pastoralists  mainly,  favouring  traditional  customary  land  tenure 
systems  that  allow for  the  communal  use  of  an  area,  whereas  the  farming  community  would 
welcome more fixed statutory and individual property rights so as to be able to exclusively use land 
for  farming.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  by  government  ownership  of  land  and  the 
(potential)  leasing of land by the government,  as well  as company and co-operative ranches to 
outsiders either for nature conservation of for large scale farming as lays down in Vision 2030. The 
Kenyan  government  planned  in  this  development  plan  to  use  the  area  to  boost  the  country's 
economy.
Besides this natural resource perspective on the clashes, another central factor which contributed to 
the conflict was the weak institutions. On the one hand, the local government did not interfere when 
the  conflict  was  still  in  its  initial  stage,  on  the  other  hand,  neither  the  local,  nor  the  national 
government reacted appropriately when the clashes started and the first villages were attacked. Only 
after attacks and counter attacks were carried out for a month measures were taken and paramilitary 
units were sent to the area which, however, used rough methods in line with 'the end justifies the 
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means'. Instead of reacting immediately the government first relied on the local peace committees 
which tried to calm the situation down by organising peace meetings and peace talks. However, due 
to the fact that the peace meetings were not fully supported by the residents, the effects, especially 
when the situation had already escalated were limited. This can, at least partly, be blamed on the 
hybrid political order. The peace committees and peace meetings are missing support because the 
committee members, who are posed under the district administration, often lack the authority to 
engage in peace negotiations because these leaders are not concordant with the customary ones. The 
meetings were much more effective if the peace committees were comprising traditional and more 
respected community leaders. Another major problem is that the social structures of the two warring 
groups  are  different.  In  the  Orma  culture  the  authority  of  the  elders  is  very  strong  and  their 
decisions are more or less binding to the community. The Pokomo by contrast do not have such a 
hierarchical structure but the role of women and youth leaders are not to neglect (this also applies to 
the  nomination  of  politicians).  Therefore,  the Pokomo see  the  need of  stronger  engagement  of 
women and youth in peace meetings, while the Orma suggested peace committees can only be 
effective if they only consist of elders.
A third component which likely contributed to the clashes, and maybe even triggered the escalation, 
were the upcoming elections. Several politicians were accused of having been involved, however, 
so far there is not enough evidence to claim that the clashes were politically instigated or fuelled, 
although several  political  leaders  were  at  least  lured  into  the  conflict  once  it  evolved and the 
elections  certainly contributed  to  the  tensions  in  the  area.  Especially  so  because  following the 
introduction of the new constitution in 2010 a new political  system centred around a devolved 
government  brought  responsibilities  to  the  new  county  government.  For  that  reason  the  2013 
elective positions were highly contested. Among the new responsibilities of the county government 
is the control of (natural) resources, and also other decision making processes like establishing a 
county law. 
As a result of political tribalism and conflicting interests, the competition in the elections mainly 
centred around the division of farmers and pastoralist communities. Due to the fact that the groups 
differ  culturally,  economically  and  partly  religiously,  they  have  different  interests  in  several 
respects, yet especially with respect to the control of natural resources such as land and water.. 
While it is unclear how exactly the elections contributed to the conflict, the consequences of the 
conflict  on  the  elections  are  rather  clear.  Due  to  the  displacement  of  about  one  third  of  the  
constituency population,  the voter registration in Garsen constituency was lower than expected. 
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Those who stayed within the constituency had at least the possibility to register at the place they 
stayed at, however, those who left the area were only able to vote if they could afford travelling 
back home for the elections (and in case they fled from the Tana delta before voter registration 
started, they even had to travel twice). Furthermore, the conflict brought up a stronger ethnic group 
coherence and therefore the relevance of ethnicity as a factor for the voting decision increased. 
However, voting decisions are usually more complex and also in the case of the Tana delta, even 
after the clashes, the voting decision cannot only be reduced to ethnicity. Instead, voters base their 
decisions  on  several  aspects  and  all  three  factors,  interests,  identities  and  ideology  were  of 
relevance. While the effects of violence before the elections are usually discussed in theories on 
election violence, this study showed that conflicts close to elections can have the same effects like 
election violence, even if the conflict was caused by other factors.
8.2 Policy Recommendations
The land rights in the Tana delta are so far relatively unclear. The two groups claim the same land 
and only few people have received title deeds. Due to the different land tenure systems and multiple 
ownership claims land adjudication is, however, difficult and a sensitive topic which bears the risk 
to trigger another series of violence, like in 2001/2002.  Also, it is important to notice that only a 
small part of the area is communal land which can be adjudicated, while about 70% of the district  
have the status of Public Land. According to the District Land Officer the communal land (about 
20% of the district) is located along the river banks, which is the area the Pokomo claim as their 
ancestral farms. This means, in case the Pokomo received title deeds for their farms, the Orma 
community  would  be  left  with  Public  Land  only,  which  could  as  well  be  leased  to  (foreign) 
investors. However, expropriating the grounds generations of Pokomo families have been farming 
on cannot be a solution either and bears the danger of clashes as well. Still, both groups suggested 
one of the most important measures to prevent further conflicts was to clarify the land rights in the 
area. Hence, I suggest, it has to be reconsidered if the status of at least some parts of the delta area 
could be changed from Public to Community Land, to ensure, people will not be left without any 
land. One option could be to create sufficient water points in the hinterland, so livestock could stay 
(most of the time) outside of the delta and the pastoralists  received some land in the delta for 
farming.  At  the  same  time,  the  land  along  the  current  river  banks  could  be  allocated  to  the 
traditional  owners,  however,  it  should  also  be  ensured  that  water  corridors  would  be  kept  for 
emergencies. Even though the river course might shift due to the flexibility of the river, people 
would at  least  own some land and the legal  rights  would  be clearer.  Such a  land adjudication 
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process can, however, only be started if the groups are well informed and educated on the topic. It 
would be important that both groups see the benefits of it and both groups have the impression their 
interests were respected. The rest of the delta could either become a conservation area to attract 
tourists, and function as a fall back area for pastoralists in case of severe droughts; or the area could 
be used for large scale agricultural production, possibly with an outgrower area. Additionally, the 
influx of foreign pastoralists has to be controlled. It has to be assessed how many animals the area 
could feed during dry seasons and clarified to which areas foreign pastoralists would get access. 
Additionally or alternatively the agricultural plots could be safeguarded to reduce the likelihood of 
farmer/herder conflicts. Even if the delta used to be a dry season grazing area for pastoralists from 
far away, there have to be regulations and restrictions in order to stabilise the situation and to ensure 
the well being of the local residents is not endangered.
Furthermore, conflicts could be prevented by developing the area and giving people a perspective. 
By  providing  government  services  like  education  and  health  facilities  but  also  improving  the 
infrastructure,  political trust could be restored and people would have more to loose in case of 
clashes. Furthermore, it is crucial that food security as well as employment opportunities will be 
increased. Also, awareness of the importance of education has to be lifted and education standards 
should be raised.
Additionally, police should be better equipped and more police posts have to be installed in the area, 
especially in Orma villages. This was requested by both groups, because the Orma do not feel well 
protected and the Pokomo fear the Orma can plan attacks without anybody knowing. To increase 
security it would also be beneficial to continue disarming the population. However, as long as the 
residents feel insecure, it is not likely that they will be willing to surrender their weapons. Also, in 
case of a renewed outbreak of violence, the government has to react faster.
Another aspect which is crucial to stabilise the situation in the Tana delta, and to boost development 
is  to  invest  more  in  good  governance  and  to  improve  the  reliability  and  impartiality  of  the 
administration and judiciary.  Hence,  for  example  corruption has  to  be fought  and transparency 
should be increased.
Regarding the peace committees I suggest different groups should be involved in the reconciliation 
and negotiation process to make sure the peace messages reach all groups and the negotiations are 
taken  serious.  I  would  suggest  three  groups,  youth,  women  and  elders,  should  first  negotiate 
separately, and later have joint meetings in which solutions can be found which are backed by all  
three groups from both communities.
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Furthermore, the election system of the Governor should be reconsidered. The Governor post is an 
executive position with crucial responsibilities on county level, but unlike the President, an absolute 
majority for his election was not foreseen. The winner-takes-all atmosphere seems to be strongest 
for  this  post.  I  suggest,  the  two strongest  candidates  should  be confronted  in  a  run-off  ballot,  
otherwise, the Governor might not be backed by the majority of the residents. As it is now the 
system leaves room for candidates to hire others in order to split the vote and appear the winner 
with less than 50% of the votes cast.
8.3 Research Perspectives
After  having conducted this  research some knowledge gaps were still  left.  To complement  this 
study,  research  could  be  conducted  on  the  perspective  of  other  groups  who  were  not  directly 
involved in the clashes. Such an outside perspective could shed more light on the actual happenings. 
Especially the perspective of Wardei seems to be important. It would be good to gain knowledge on 
their  political  interests  and their  position  towards  the  two groups  before  and after  the  clashes. 
Furthermore,  it  is  still  unclear  why many Orma voters  cast  their  ballot  for  Wardei  candidates, 
especially the Senator and Garsen MP position. Also, it would be interesting to compare the election 
results from Garsen with Galole and Bura constituencies and to gather more information on voting 
behaviour in those two areas. Another aspect which is still fairly unclear is the involvement of hired 
militias and the MRC in the clashes. Last but not least, a further evaluation of the peace measures 
and why the attacks ended would be an interesting field of study.
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Appendix: Questionnaire for Survey with IDPs
Interviewer_________________________ Interview Location__________________Interview No.:______Date:_______________ Starting Time:_____________ Ending Time:_____________
Introduction:Introduce yourself; doing research for a project, aim is to give recommendations on lasting peace solutions and possibly do peace activities, therefore data/information is needed; also the study will be published in a Master thesis, however information will strictly be treated confidential, The survey is on the most recent conflict with different subtopics, in any question multiple answers are possible (except if it is a yes/no question).
1. Respondent1.1. Ethnic group:_____________________________1.2. Sex:  male□ female□1.3. Occupation_______________________________________1.4. Education: _________________1.5. Age:________________1.6. Marital status:  single□  engaged□  married□  divorced□  widowed□1.7. Place of residence:___________________________
2. Household characteristics2.1. Number of members:____________2.2. Number of grown-ups:_______________2.3. Number of children:_________________2.4. What is/was your main source of income (before the clashes)?  animal□  keeping □ farming □ business □ others specify: ________________________________________2.4.1. Are you  □ employed or  □ self-employed?2.4.2 On how many acres do/did you farm (before the clashes)?
I
 If employed, please continue   with 2.4.4.
for subsistence______________________________cash crops_______________________other crops for business_______________________2.4.3. How many animals do/did you keep (before the clashes)?chicken_______________donkeys_________________goats_____________sheep_____________milk cows______________cattle for business______________other cattle_______________others specify:____________________________2.4.4. How much cash income do/did you earn per month (before the clashes)? □ 0-10,000 □ 10,000 – 20, 000 □ 20,000 – 50,000 □ 50,000 – 100,000 □ over 100,000
3. Respondents experience3.1. What is your home area?______________________________________ 3.2. What is your home village?______________________________________3.3. Were you affected by the recent attacks in the Tana region?  □  yes  n□ o
3.3.1. When did you leave your home?_________________________________3.3.2. Why did you leave your home? _____________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________3.4. Which one(s)?_______________________________________________________________________3.5. Where were you living at the time of the attack?  i□ n the village  □ somewhere else3.6. If you were in the village, where were you when the attack happened? in bed□ in front of the house□ in a farm□
II
 If “no”, continue with question No. 3.3.1., 3.3.2. and then part 4.; if “yes”, continue with question no. 3.4.
 with the cattle□ on the way out of the village□ others□ specify ____________________________________________3.7. Please describe how the attack happened________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3.8. Do you have an idea why they targeted your village?  □ yes  □ no3.8.1.  why?_______________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3.9. What would you say were the causes and reasons for this specific attack? Please rank the answers (from ++ very important to - -  not important at all).natural resources □++ □+ □± □- □--revenge □++ □+ □± □- □--intimidation □++ □+ □± □- □--displacement □++ □+ □± □- □--hatred ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□pure violation □++ □+ □± □- □--creating an enemy □++ □+ □± □- □--provocation □++ □+ □± □- □--no idea □++ □+ □± □- □--others □++ □+ □± □- □-- specify___________________________
3.10. Were you surprised about/by the attack?  y□ es  □ no3.10.1. Why?_________________________________________________________________________3.11. Have you been warned?  y□ es  □ no3.11.1By whom?________________________________________________________
III
3.12. Did you organise a defence or warning system?  y□ es  □ no3.12.1. How did it work?________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________3.13. Did you recognise the attackers?  y□ es  □ no3.13.1. Who attacked your village?__________________________________________________________________
4. Rationales, motives and aimsThese are not the first clashes in the Tana Delta and not the first ones between these two  communities. I have heard that there are rationales behind these most recent clashes.4.1. What is the rationale for “your community” behind the fightings? ____________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________4.2. What are the motives/reasons of  “your community” for these fightings? Please rank the answers (from ++ very important to - -  not important at all).natural resources □++ □+ □± □- □--revenge □++ □+ □± □- □--intimidation □++ □+ □± □- □--displacement □++ □+ □± □- □--hatred □++ □+ □± □- □--pure violence □++ □+ □± □- □--creation of an enemy □++ □+ □± □- □--provocation □++ □+ □± □- □--defence ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□large scale projects ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□others □++ □+ □± □- □-- specify____________________ no idea□
4.3. What are the aims of “your community” for the clashes? Please rank the answers (from ++ very important to - -  not important at all).unification of the own group □++ □+ □± □- □--intimidation of the other group □++ □+ □± □- □--
IV
gain of political power □++ □+ □± □- □--to show strength □++ □+ □± □- □--stop the others of destroying livelihoods □++ □+ □± □- □--displacing the others from the Tana Delta □++ □+ □± □- □--burning of Ids of voter cards ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□others specify____________________________________ ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□ no idea□
4.4. What do you think is the rationale for the other group? ________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
4.5. What do you think are the motives/reasons of the other group? Please rank the answers (from ++ very important to - -  not important at all).unification of the own group □++ □+ □± □- □--intimidation of the other group □++ □+ □± □- □--gain of political power □++ □+ □± □- □--to show strength □++ □+ □± □- □--stop the others of destroying livelihoods □++ □+ □± □- □--displacing the others from the Tana Delta □++ □+ □± □- □--burning of Ids of voter cards ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□others specify____________________________________ ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□ no idea□
4.7. What was the trigger for the conflict (please include the reason and the location)?__________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________4.7.1. Which community started the clashes?  Pokomo□ Orma□ no idea□
V
 others□ specify___________________________________________
4.8. Who of the following groups was involved in the clashes and in which way? Some people are part  of  several  groups.  Please only tick the ones which you think are relevant for the  current clashes. 1) organising/planning; 2) inciting; 3) financing;4) physical fighting; 5) use of firearms;  6)  use  of  crude weapons;  7)  defence only;  8)  cattle  raiding  9)  cattle  killing 10) destroying farms 11) burning houses 12) abusing people 13) kidnapping people 14) arming 15) others (specify). Please also indicate if you know it from eye witness (W) or hearsay (H).Group 4.8.1. Type of involvement p□ oliticians ____________________________________ □ elders ____________________________________ □ chiefs ____________________________________ other government officials□ ____________________________________ police□ ____________________________________ GSU□ ____________________________________ □ businessmen ____________________________________ □ investors ____________________________________ conservationists□ ____________________________________ NGOs□ specify________________________________ ____________________________________ youth□ ____________________________________ well educated people□ ____________________________________ less educated people□ ____________________________________ poor people□ ____________________________________ wealthy people□ ____________________________________ □ people from the area ____________________________________ □ people from outside ____________________________________ □ people who have been affected by violations ____________________________________ □ relatives of victims ____________________________________ Lower Pokomo□ ____________________________________ Upper Pokomo□ ____________________________________ Orma□ ____________________________________ people of other ethnic groups□ specify____________ ____________________________________ militias□ ____________________________________
VI
 Christians□ ____________________________________ Muslims□ ____________________________________ farmers□ ____________________________________ local pastoralists□ ____________________________________ foreign pastoralists□ ____________________________________ people with mixed livelihoods□ ____________________________________ no idea□ ____________________________________ □ others specify________________________________ ____________________________________
4.9. Please indicate in how far you agree with the following statements.
4.9.1. These conflicts were politically instigated from the beginning.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.2.  These  clashes  were  not  planned  but  started  because  of  normal  resource  conflicts between farmers and pastoralists.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.3. The clashes were not triggered by natural resources but by anger and hatred.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.4. The conflict was later used for political purposes.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.5. The conflict was connected to large scale projects in the area.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.6. The conflict was connected to a land survey.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.7. Leaders fuelled the conflict.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.8. Leaders supported and protected their communities.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.9. My community attacked the other group to stop their frequent violations.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.10. Control of natural resources is a crucial factor for the conflict.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.11. The conflict is/was not about natural resources but the initiators wanted to make it look like.
VII
Possibly note corrections
 From strongly agree (++) to strongly disagree(--)
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.11.1. if you agree, why?_____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________4.9.12. Businessmen were hoping to benefit from the clashes.
□++ □+ □± □- □--4.9.12.1. if you agree, how?__________________________________________________________________________
5. Politics and the conflict5.1. Which political effects did the conflict have? p□ eople cannot vote because they got displaced or lost their ID cards □ it brought up a stronger group coherence; as a result voters rather vote for aspirants of their community □ people fear to vote now □ it is more important to vote for an aspirant of the own community now  □ it  is  more  important  to  vote  for  a  capable  leader  no  matter  from  which  community no idea□ others□ specify______________________________________________________________
5.2. How did the government try to mediate in the conflict and solve issues? Please indicate how effective the measures were? effectiveness held peace meetings□ ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□ □ high officials were present □++ □+ □± □- □-- sent □ GSU □++ □+ □± □- □-- □ curfew □++ □+ □± □- □-- disarmament□ □++ □+ □± □- □-- □ establishment of new police posts □++ □+ □± □- □-- □ arresting people □++ □+ □± □- □-- Tana Investigation Commission□ ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□ □ aid □++ □+ □± □- □-- no idea□ □ others specify____________________________________ □++ □+ □± □- □--
VIII
5.3. What would you have liked to see from the government and politicians (additionally or instead)?_________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5.4.  Which  politicians  were  present  and  engaged  in  the  reconciliation  or  peace  building process?  _________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5.5. How would you describe the (re-)action of politicians on/after the clashes? They5.5.1. spread peace ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.2. were present in the area without any impact ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.3. organised aid ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.4. insisted in/organised help from the state/government ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.5. campaign on peace meetings ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.6. incited/fuelled the conflict ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.7. talked only ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□5.5.8. were impartial ++□ +□ ±□ -□ --□
5.6. Did you hold/attend peace meetings?  y□ es  □ no5.6.1. What was done on those peace meetings? _____________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________5.6.2. Were politicians present?  y□ es  □ no  I don't know□5.6.3. What was their position?  organised it□  were invited□5.6.4. What did they do? o□ nly gave a speech □ campaigned □ came up with ideas how to solve problems □mediated between the groups nothing□
IX
If “no”, continue with question 5.7.
If “no” or “I don't know”, continue  with  question 5.7.
 □ others specify_______________________________________________________________5.7. Do you think the conflict would have happened in the same way if the elections were not around the corner?  y□ es  □ no  I don't know□5.7.1. Why?_______________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5.8. Did the conflict change your picture of certain politicians?  y□ es  □ no5.8.1. How, of which politician and why?______________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________5.9. Did you lose your ID in the clashes?  y□ es  □ no5.9.1. Did you lose your voter card in the clashes?  y□ es  □ no5.10. Will you vote?  y□ es  □ no  I don't know yet□5.10.1. Do you already know for whom you want to vote?  y□ es  □ no5.10.2. What do you base your decision on? political party□ ethnicity□ competence□ personal relations□ previous performance□ character of the aspirant□ others□ specify______________________________________________________________________5.10.3. Did you consider a different candidate before the clashes?  y□ es  □ no5.10.4. Did the clashes “help” you to decide for somebody?  y□ es  □ no5.10.4.1. How/why?_____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________5.11. Which changes do you mainly hope for (after the elections)?_________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________5.12. According to your opinion what would have to be done to solve the problems in the Tana Delta sustainably and to enhance peace? land allocation; if yes, for whom?_______________________________________□ inter-community activities i.e. sport activities□
X
 If “no”, continue with question 5.11.
 hold more or regular peace meetings□ increase inter-ethnic schooling□ create more water points□ create more grazing corridors□ create more by-laws□ reduce corruption□ come up with alternative livelihood strategies□ reduce large scale projects□increase large scale projects to create jobs□ more inter-marriage□ no idea□ others□ specify____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________5.13. Would you say the conflict is/was political?  y□ es  □ no  I don't know□5.13.1. Why? _____________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________5.13.2. What are characteristics of a political conflict?_______________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5.14. Are you affiliated to a political party or a politician?  y□ es  □ no5.14.1. Which?___________________________________________________________________________________________
5.15. Other comments______________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________
XI
6. Post-interview noteslocation of the interview________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
interruptions  y□ es  □ noBy whom?________________________________________________________________________________________________
Attendees: _______________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Behaviour of respondent (willing to give answers, interested in research etc.)____________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Other  comments_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
XII
